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Abstract
Matching high ambitions with scarce resources is one of the primary challenges of the aerospace industry,
on par with the technical challenges of developing new technology. The challenge is further complicated
in space exploration, by its own nature aimed at exploring the unknown. Stakeholder objectives are often
unclear due to business cases highly exploratory in nature. Further ambiguity emerges from disagreement
between stakeholders and decision-makers called to formulate scientific, technological and policy
requirements for new systems.
This thesis develops a structured approach to develop recommendations to system architects concerned
with the design of unprecedented large aerospace infrastructures for which objectives are ambiguous or
unclear. The approach is composed of three parts.
The first part consists in a novel taxonomy of ambiguity in systems design that classifies ambiguities in
reducible and irreducible components. Building on this taxonomy, the second part of this thesis develops
a Descriptive Systems Architecting Management Framework (SA-MF) to distill canonical forms of
ambiguity management from the literature in political science, finance and economics, management, and
engineering design. The third part of the dissertation presents a Delphi-Based Systems Architecting
Framework (DB-SAF). DB-SAF objectives are to identify sources of ambiguity in the value delivery and
tradespace exploration processes, characterize and model sources of ambiguity, mitigate ambiguities
through effective systems architecting strategies, integrate the analysis of upstream and downstream
architecting processes, and to assess the impact of requirement ambiguities on the architectural
tradespace.
The proposed systems architecting approach has been applied to three case studies: the assessment of a
robotic Mars Sample Return Campaign, the study of in-space transportation infrastructure for future
human space exploration beyond Low Earth Orbit, and the retrospective analysis of satellite constellations
for commercial applications. The application of the proposed approach to three different disciplinary
fields demonstrates its broad applicability for architecting complex aerospace systems.
This dissertation integrates methods from systems engineering, systems architecting, multivariate
statistical analysis, uncertainty modeling, economics, management science and social science research. It
allows decision-makers to visualize an architectural synthesis of aerospace systems, understanding
adverse impacts of ambiguity, and supporting negotiations among stakeholders for efficient compromise
in systems architecting.
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Chapter I : Introduction
Fac ergo, mi Lucili, quod facere te scribis,
omnes horas complectere;
sic fiet ut minus ex crastino pendeas,




Matching high ambitions with scarce resources is one of the primary challenges of the aerospace industry
in the XXI century, on par with the technical challenges of developing new technology. The challenge is
additionally complicated in space exploration, which by its own nature is aimed at exploring the
unknown. While it is often the case that space missions require large capital expenditures, setting
objectives for space exploration is not trivial. Objectives are often unclear due to the ambiguity
surrounding the subject of the investigation, which is highly exploratory in its own nature. Ambiguity
further arises from disagreement that is often found between experts called to specify science and
engineering requirements for missions. Exploration requires large capital expenditures, and therefore
becomes problematic in times of tight budget and in presence of several entities seeking to compete for
scarce resources to fund their missions.
The history of Human Spaceflight and Planetary Science provide several examples of missions that were
cancelled due to budget constraints or disagreement among stakeholders. The outlook for new mission
proposals leaves no room for missions not keeping cost in high consideration, while ensuring that
objectives are carefully selected and properly reflected into system requirements. Oversights in over-
designing requirements, such as setting an excessive mass amount of samples to be returned to Earth, can
be fatal to mission success. Over-design increases the overall dry mass of a mission and the number of
required development projects. This potentially leads to failure in meeting cost caps. On the contrary,
under-designed requirements preclude scientific discoveries and overall value delivery of the mission to
stakeholders. In the worst case, poorly specified requirements can lead to not answering any scientific
question at all. It is therefore crucial to find the "right answer" (or better, the set of efficient "right
answers"), and identify architectures with the highest likelihood of satisfying goals, finding consensus
among stakeholders, while meeting engineering and programmatic constraints.
This thesis presents a systems architecting framework aimed to define, identify, characterize, mitigate and
analyze ambiguity in the systems architecting process. The framework identifies areas of opportunity of
ambiguity mitigation, and develops information of interest to develop recommendations in support of
system architects and involved decision-makers. The goal of this work is to support Decision Makers,
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Program Managers and Principal Investigators in reducing ambiguity in their objectives, identifying
architectures with effective and robust programmatic trade-offs, engineering performance, and meet
desired science and policy objectives.
This thesis integrates methods from systems engineering, computational systems architecting,
multidisciplinary system design and optimization, uncertainty modeling, utility theory and social science
research. It allows decision-makers to visualize an architectural synthesis of their engineering systems,
understand the impact of ambiguity in the definition of requirements, and consequently support
negotiations in reaching consensus towards "globally best" system requirements and associated Pareto-
efficient system architectures.
1.2. Stakeholder Arnbiguity in Systems Architecting
As large complex engineering projects involve significant expenditures and span several decades,
effective systems architecting is a critical element of the lifecycle process. Systems architecting is the
process of transforming a set of needs and goals into an architecture for a system (Simmons 2008). An
architecture is the underlying structure and set of relationships of the elements of a system, that forms the
basis for engineering design (NASA 2007).
The first threat to successful architecting is posed by unidentified and unmitigated ambiguities in defining
what is value and how to maximize value delivered to stakeholders by conceiving, designing and
operating complex systems. This section describes the problem of system architecting under ambiguous
stakeholder objectives and outlines the goals pursued by the thesis.
Systems are developed to deliver value and satisfy the needs of supporting stakeholders, following a
value delivery process (Crawley 2008). The OPM diagram (Dori and Crawley 2002) shown in Figure 1
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Systems are developed to satisfy a set of needs, elicited by some beneficiaries (or stakeholders). For
instance, consider the example of the future US launch infrastructure for human space exploration. In this
case, Congress and the aerospace industry are among main stakeholder groups.
System architects interpret and incorporate stakeholder needs into a set of functional requirements. For
launch infrastructure, instances of functional requirements are:
The US launch infrastructure shall be able to:
1) Deliver 25mt payloads to a 200 km Low Earth Orbit;
2) Deliver 30mt payloads to Escape Orbit;
3) Deliver 30mt payloads to a Near Earth Asteroid (4 km/s beyond Escape).
Once functional requirements are elicited, system architects explore the tradespace of feasible
architectures, considering architectural alternatives to identify promising concepts for further study (Ross
and Hastings 2005; NASA 2007).
Functions correspond to a set of physicalforms (in Figure 1, System A, B and C). The architecture in its
functional form includes interfaces with intended operators and supporting systems. Forms deliver value
by performing intended functions therefore satisfying stakeholders' needs. In the launch infrastructure
example, the primary function of the architecture is "delivering payloads to orbits specified by the
customer's desired orbital parameters". For given functional requirements, the associated set of forms in
this example is the family of launch vehicles designed for intended payloads and target orbits. Figure 2
shows a notional family of launch infrastructure, composed of three vehicles. Vehicle 1 is a vehicle for
small payloads to LEO, designed to meet functional requirement 1 in the example above. Vehicle 2 is a
heavy lift vehicle designed to meet functional requirement 2, and Vehicle 3 is a super heavy lift vehicle
designed to meet functional requirement 3.
Vehicle #1 Vehicle #2 Vehicle #3
LEO Heavy Super
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Value delivery of architectures to the stakeholders is affected by uncertainty (de Neufville 2003;
Hastings, Weigel et al. 2003; Hastings and McManus 2004; Smaling, de Weck et al. 2004). As Figure 3
shows, there are two segments of the value delivery process where uncertainty occurs, i.e. on the family
of systems being designed (uncertainty "in" the problem), and on the stakeholder needs (uncertainty "on"
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Family of systems
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(Uncertainty IN the problem)
Figure 3 Distinction between processes subject to ambiguity (uncertainty O.N the problem)
and processes subject to cost / risk / schedule / performance uncertainty (uncertainty IN the problem)
Examples of uncertainty "in" the problem in the launch infrastructure are:
- Uncertainty in technical performance: on the stage inert mass fractions, on payload capability
for a given target orbit, on the specific impulse delivered by engines, etc.
e Uncertainty in market demand: on the number of launches per year per launch vehicle, on the
cost to the customer per kg of payload delivered.
The analysis of uncertainty in system design (meant as uncertainty "in" the problem) has been thoroughly
explored in the literature, as discussed in the literature review in Chapter 2. The analysis of uncertainty
"on" the problem, which is on the ambiguity in stakeholder needs, is a research opportunity that has not
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yet been explored quantitatively in systems architecting and engineering design. This thesis addresses this
gap. Specific research gaps that have been identified are discussed in detail in Section 2.4 following the
literature review.
With ambiguity in mind, consider the functional requirements in the launch infrastructure example:
The US launch infrastructure shall be able to:
1) Deliver 25mt payloads to a 200 km Low Earth Orbit;
2) Deliver 30mt payloads to Escape Orbit;
3) Deliver 30mt payloads to a Near Earth Asteroid (4 km/s beyond Escape).
Two fundamental assumptions lie behind those requirements, namely on desired payload capabilities and
on target destinations. Furthermore, while Low Earth Orbit and Escape Orbit are well defined and
bounded in terms of required delta V, Near Earth Asteroids (NEA) are obviously not. Hence, this example
shows two categories of uncertainties "on" the architecting problem. From now on, we will always refer
to those as "ambiguities" to make a clear distinction from traditional uncertainties "in" the problem
described previously. The launch infrastructure example shows instances of different classes of
ambiguity:
* Ambiguity in stakeholder needs:
o Ambiguity on launch infrastructure needs: Are stakeholders going to support the
development of three different launch vehicles in a long term development scenario?
o Ambiguity on desired payload capability: Are stakeholders likely to perceive the need of
achieving payload capabilities of 25mt to LEO / 30mt to Escape / 30mt to NEA in the long
term, or are such capability perceptions subject to change over time? For instance, at the time
of writing this thesis the US human spaceflight enterprise is undergoing a time of change in
perceived needs. While the previous Constellation program focused on a transportation
infrastructure designed to return astronauts on the Moon, the new program under the Obama
Administration shifted NASA towards the development of technologies for a mission to a
Near Earth Asteroid (Nasa 2010).
o Ambiguity on desired destinations: Are NEAs still going to be the desired first destination
for human space exploration of the next three decades? How is the exploration architecture
affected by evolving destination requirements and associated change in required
transportation capabilities? Is the architecture designed as robust to time evolving stakeholder
objectives?
e Ambiguity in interpreting and incorporating stakeholder needs: How is the NEA destination for
human space exploration going to be selected? Figure 4 shows a cumulative distribution plot of all
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known NEAs from a database maintained by NASA JPL (Benner 2011), showing that the 50%
percentile of NEAs is at reach within 4km/s beyond Escape orbit with a 30mt payload. The functional
requirement for the launch vehicle system in the example above has been stated using these reference
numbers for required destination delta V and payload capability. However, the upward tail of the
NEA distribution suggests that 50% of possible NEA destinations are not at reach of such launch
infrastructure with the same desired payload capability. To date, there are 7,759 possible NEA
destinations and required delta V is not the only value-related metric of interest to stakeholders. Other
metrics of interest are likely to be considered by a subset of stakeholders, such as NEA composition,
available resources on the surface and other physical properties of NEA surfaces of interest to the
scientific community (Nolan 2010).
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Uncertainties "on" the problem are equally relevant as uncertainties "in" the problem traditionally
considered by engineers in the system architecting process. In the launch infrastructure example, consider
the case shown in Figure 5 where a 4 stage, serial bum launch vehicle is designed to deliver 30mt to a
NEA at 4 km/s beyond Escape Orbit (to satisfy functional requirement 3 of our example - from now on
referred to as the "Baseline NEA" case). For sake of simplicity, the underlying concept of operations is a
direct delivery of the payload to the NEA, without any use of on-orbit refueling or convoluted assembly
operations. If the launch vehicle is operated at an off-nominal destination delta V - for example because
the interest of stakeholders switches to a NEA at 6 km/s beyond Earth Escape orbit instead of the original
4 km/s - then the allowable payload capability decreases drastically. As Figure 7 shows, the selected
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launch vehicle architecture is unable to deliver any payload to a destination farther than 10 km/s beyond
Escape, corresponding to approximately the 92% percentile of the entire NEA population known today
(Figure 8). A decreased payload capability corresponds to a degradation of mission objectives, as less
equipment can be brought for exploration, and in some cases it corresponds to a total failure of the
architecture of accomplishing any goal, when the launch vehicle is unable to deliver critical elements of
the in-space transportation architecture such as a manned capsule or a habitat.
This example shows that consideration of ambiguity in stakeholder needs is therefore critical to ensure
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Ambiguity in stakeholder objectives deserves careful consideration when the following conditions are
met:
- High degree of innovation in system objectives and stakeholder needs: the systems being
designed are intended to fulfill stakeholder needs with a high degree of innovation, which is the
case of early Research & Development ventures, human space exploration, robotic exploration of
the Solar System and so forth. The goals of highly innovative research projects are prone to
abrupt changes, according to progress made, as soon as new discoveries are made. Breakthrough
discoveries could drastically change the focus of the enterprise;
- Large scale systems translate into large scale failures in worst case scenarios: the potential
impact of ambiguity is greater where systems being architected are large-scale, as they involve
the investment of significant resources. This is often the case in the aerospace industry where
projects typically range hundreds to billions of dollars.
- Higher leverage on final outcomes during the early phases of the design process: system
architects have the greatest leverage in the outcome of the project, as they operate in the early
phases of the design stage (conceptual design). This is particularly important for architectures
which systems are all yet to be developed, such as the architecture of the future human space
exploration infrastructure. Figure 9 shows that roughly 70% percent of the total lifecycle cost is
typically committed in early architecting stages, and that modification costs increase significantly
as the project moves through the lifecycle (INCOSE 2010). Therefore, if critical decisions are
made around ambiguous objectives, and ambiguity is not considered as part of the tradespace, the
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- Large-scale systems have lifecycles spanning several decades, leaving large windows of
opportunity for stakeholder objectives to change over time: while the lifecycle of a large-
scale engineering project could several decades, the timescale of policy lies in shorter time spans.
An example from the aerospace domain is the Space Shuttle, decommissioned in 2011, which
development started in the early 1970s (Jenkins 2001). This is also found to be true in other
engineering domains (Miller and Lessard 2000). For instance, in petroleum engineering a typical
offshore oil platform design lifecycle is in the order of 30 years (Lin 2008). On the other hand,
policy changes happen in shorter arcs of time: a presidential mandate in the United States is of 4
years; therefore a project lasting 30 years will see in the worst case up to 8 potential opportunities
of drastic policy changes.
Traditionally, uncertainty in engineering systems is associated with the idea of a threat to the success of a
system development (Sage 1995; Kumamoto and Henley 2000; Garber and Pate-Cornell 2004; Weigel
and Hastings 2004); however, this view does not account for the upsides opportunities offered by
uncertainty. Research in real option analysis and engineering systems design has shown that traditional
uncertainty "in" the problem can represent an opportunity for improved system outcomes (de Neufville
2003; McManus and Hastings 2006). This thesis aims at extending this idea to the management of
ambiguities in stakeholder objectives, i.e. uncertainties "on" the problem of interest.
1.3. Thesis Objectives
This thesis develops a comprehensive quantitative framework aimed at satisfying the following thesis
objectives:
1) Identify sources of ambiguity in the value delivery and tradespace exploration processes;
2) Characterize and model sources of ambiguity on the beneficial attributes that contribute to value
as delivered to stakeholders, while satisfying stakeholder needs;
3) Mitigate ambiguities by developing system development strategies to cut the downside effects of
ambiguity while exploiting its potential upside opportunities;
4) Integrate the analysis of the value delivery process and functional intent definition (upstream
architecting processes) with conventional tradespace exploration (downstream architecting
processes).
5) Assess the impact of requirement ambiguities on the architectural tradespace, and to
improve the achievement of global optimaliity in the down-selection of preferred system
architectures;
6) Develop recommendations to decision-makers to support decisions on the selection of a system
architecture for the enterprise of interest.
26
1.4. Summary and Thesis Outline
The goal of this thesis is to define, identify, characterize, mitigate and analyze the problem of systems
architecting under stakeholders ambiguity. The thesis develops a theoretical background and a
multidisciplinary framework to explicitly include ambiguity in the definition of the functional intent of a
system, and integrate requirements definition of the broader systems architecting. This work aims to
support Decision Makers, Program Managers and Principal Investigators in reducing ambiguity in their
objectives, identifying architectures with effective and robust programmatic trade-offs, engineering
performance, and meet desired science and policy objectives.
The remainder of the thesis is structured as follows. Chapter 2 presents a literature review, to provide
intellectual background to the thesis and to support the identification of research gaps being pursued.
Based on these premises, Chapter 3 develops an analytic framework to define ambiguity in upstream
systems architecting processes, and describes the Comprehensive Approach for Systems Architecting
under Ambiguous Stakeholder Objectives. The approach is composed of two parts: a Descriptive Systems
Architecting Management Approach, and a Delphi-Based Systems Architecting Framework. Chapter 4
and Chapter 5 present two case studies that have been developed to demonstrate the approach in two
applications from the domains of robotic exploration of the Solar System and Human Spaceflight.
Namely Chapter 4 presents the architecting case of the Mars Sample Return Campaign, and Chapter 5
presents the architecting case of the in-space transportation infrastructure for future human space
exploration beyond Low Earth Orbit. Chapter 6 presents a retrospective case study of the approach,
consisting in a pilot study to validate the proposed approach by means of statistical analysis on a systems
architecting role play that has been conducted with graduate students from MIT. The thesis closes with
Chapter 7, presenting a cross-case analysis that synthesizes the major findings of this thesis and lessons
learnt. Research contributions developed in the thesis are discussed in this chapter along with conclusions
and the identification of avenues for future research. Chapter 8 lists bibliographical references used in the
thesis; Chapter 9 provides appendix material as further documentation of the case studies.
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Chapter 2 : Literature Review and Identification of Research Gaps
Systems architecture and stakeholder ambiguity are highly multidisciplinary topics. A broad literature
review is required to gain an understanding of the state of the art in this emerging field and to identify
areas of research opportunity. This section presents a review of literature of interest to the problem of
architecting systems under ambiguity in stakeholder objectives. The literature review is structured in three
parts, leading to the identification of research gaps in Section 2.4.
The first part overviews definitions of uncertainty and ambiguity as discussed in existing taxonomies in
the literature. This semantic review is not exhaustive, as uncertainty and ambiguity cover a variety of
other fields such as the physical sciences, psychology and other social science research in general.
Nevertheless, it provides a comprehensive overview of the themes of interest to this thesis.
The second part is a multidisciplinary survey on tools and methods being employed in science and
engineering to cope with uncertainty and ambiguity. The topic is analyzed in a cross-disciplinary fashion,
spanning political science, finance, economics, management and engineering. This part of the review
analyzes the theme of ambiguity and uncertainty within and beyond engineering systems, identifying
intellectual connections of interest.
The third part of the review expands in detail on multidisciplinary themes with direct relevance to the
research objectives of this thesis. Table 1 shows the mapping between reviewed themes and thesis
objectives. Key literature in the following fields is overviewed:
* Systems Architecting (Section 2.3.1) and formal architecting methods for systems
decomposition and holistic analysis, with focus on their application to the identification of
sources of uncertainty and ambiguity in the lifecycle of a system (supporting thesis objective n. 1);
* Multidisciplinary Design Optimization (Section 2.3.2) as a framework for the exploration and
evaluation of system architectures, with particular emphasis on optimization techniques under
uncertainty (Section 2.3.3). Pareto and Fuzzy Pareto and Monte Carlo Analysis are discussed as
tools for the exploration of design spaces under stakeholder ambiguity (supporting thesis
objectives nn. 2-4);
- Expert Elicitation (Section 2.3.5) as a set of tools for qualitative and semi-quantitative encoding
of expert judgments in the assessment of value of system architectures under stakeholder
ambiguity (supporting thesis objective n.2);
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e Uncertainty Management Strategies in engineering systems, and Decision-Making Theory for
the analysis of complex dicisions and development of recommendations to decision-makers
(supporting thesis objective n.5).
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2.1. Definitions of Lncertainty and Aiiibiguity
The term uncertainty can be defined as "liability to chance or accident", "doubtfulness or vagueness",
"want of assurance or confidence; hesitation, irresolution", and "something not definitely known or
knowable" (Murray 1961); uncertainty "applies to predictions offuture events, to physical measurements
already made, or to the unknown." (Wikipedia 2011). Ambiguity is a particular instance of uncertainty,
and is defined as "uncertainty about probability, created by missing information that is relevant and
could be known." (Camerer and Weber 1992). Klir and Folger further classify ambiguity into
nonspecificity of evidence, dissonance in evidence, and confusion in evidence (Klir and Folger 1988).
An exhaustive classification of uncertainty in economics, decision making, management, system analysis,
policy, risk analysis, physical science and engineering is provided by Thunnisen (Thunnisen 2003).
Several taxonomies of uncertainty have been proposed in the literature (Hastings and McManus 2004;
Earl C and Eckert 2005; de Weck, Eckert et al. 2007). Earl distinguishes between known uncertainties,




2005, 174). Hastings classifies different sources of uncertainty: lack of knowledge and lack of definition,
and distinguishes between known unknowns and unknown unknowns (Hastings and McManus 2004).
In this thesis, ambiguity in stakeholder objectives according to those taxonomies can be classified in
uncertainties in the description, due to both known and unknown unknowns. An example of known
unknown is budget uncertainty (as it is impossible to know with certainty how budget allocations vary in
future times), and an example of an unknown unknown is an abrupt policy change due to changed
political conditions (for instance the occurrence of a war), or a breakthrough scientific discovery that
changes the priority of scientific objectives in a space mission (for instance, the discovery of forms of life
on a planetary surface). De Weck distinguishes between endogenous and exogenous uncertainties (de
Weck, Eckert et al. 2007), depending whether their source lies within or outside of the boundary of the
system of interest (Figure 10); ambiguities in stakeholder objectives can be either endogenous or
exogenous. An example of endogenous ambiguity is in the use context, that is the functional intent of the
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2.2. Aimbiguity and Uncertainty beyond Engineering Systems
Ambiguity and uncertainty are themes that have been characterized initially in other disciplines than
systems engineering and engineering design. In this section we provide an overview of the main themes
in the literature, focusing the attention on concepts relevant to the assessment and mitigation of
ambiguities in stakeholder objectives. For each disciplinary field we report they key references that are
relevant to the topic under investigation.
2.2.1. P litical Science
Academic research in political science and problems encountered in policymaking are often faced with
the question of management of risk and uncertainties. In the policy domain, uncertainties are discussed in
the field of risk shielding (Oye 2010). In particular, the debate over risk shielding hinges on the extent to
which government and policymakers should shield against hazardous risks to the population. The fight in
political science on risk management in policymaking centers around two different approaches: a
libertarian (or laissez-faire) approach, as advocated by (Sapolsky 1990) and (Viscusi 2005), and a
regulatory approach, based on the use of the precautionary principle (Harremoes 2001). (Morgan 1993)
provides an intermediate approach to risk management in policymaking, advocating different approaches
to policymaking based on the nature of the risk being considered - making a distinction between known
and unknown risks - and based on whether the exposure to risk is on a voluntary or involuntary basis. The
literature in this field provides a set of qualitative tools and guidelines for policymaking under
uncertainty; quantitative tools used in policymaking are described in the decision-making theory
literature, which is surveyed in successive sections of this chapter.
2.2.2. Finance and Economics
The analysis of uncertainty in finance and economics research traces its root in the seminal works of Von
Neumann in game theory (Von Neumann and Morgenstern 1944) and Knight in uncertainty and risk
(Knight 1965). It must be noted that Knight was the first to distinguish between risks, i.e. uncertainties
with known probabilities of occurrence, and uncertainties (Knightian uncertainties), i.e. uncertainties
with unknown probabilities of occurrence. Uncertainty research in economics and finance provides
qualitative and semi-quantitative tools for the analysis of markets, improving the way in which
investments are made, using modern portfolio theory (Markowitz 1999) and associated tools such as the
Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) (Sharpe 1964; Lintner 1965; Mossin 1966) and financial options
(Black and Scholes 1973).
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2.2.3. Management
Literature in management science has explored extensively in a qualitative way both themes of
uncertainty and ambiguity. The focus of this literature is in the development of business strategies under
uncertainty. Courtney et al. classify uncertainty in strategy planning in four levels, according to the degree
of uncertainty to be faced (Courtney, Kirkland et al. 1997). From the lowest (level 1) to the highest (level
4) degree of uncertainty, they distinguish between clear-enough futures, alternate futures, a range of
futures and true ambiguity. They note that level 4 uncertainties (true ambiguity) is often encountered in
early stages of strategy planning, and it is often reduced to lower levels of uncertainty. They identify three
strategic postures in management under uncertainty: shape the future, adapt to the future and reserve the
right to play, implemented using three different types of management actions (no-regret moves, options
and big bets) and provide guidelines on their use according to the level of uncertainty being faced
(Courtney, Kirkland et al. 1997). Brandenburger and Nalebuff apply game theory to strategy planning
under uncertainty, discussing the options available to managers to shape strategies by "changing the
game", identifying lose-lose situations and transforming them into win-win strategies (Nash 1950), based
on a value-net framework (Brandenburger and Nalebuff 1995). McGrath and MacMillan propose the idea
of discovery-driven planning, where strategies are phased over time to allow uncertainty to unfold and
adapt decisions accordingly (McGrath and MacMillan 1995) - analogously of what is discussed in the
engineering section of this literature review in real option analysis and phased development strategies (de
Neufville, de Weck et al. 2004; De Weck, De Neufville et al. 2004).
2.2.4. Engineering Design
Uncertainty in engineering has been initially treated in the discipline of risk management (Kumamoto and
Henley 2000). The traditional focus of uncertainty in engineering are the uncertainties "in" the problem,
looking only at the downside risk effects of such uncertainties - in performance, cost and schedule - and
characterizing their likelihood of occurrence and impact. A semi-quantitative tool used in this context is
the risk matrix (Morgan 1993), such as the one shown in Figure 11; the horizontal axis of the matrix
measures the impact of the risk being assessed, and the vertical axis its likelihood of occurrence. The use
of risk matrices in risk management has been criticized (Cox 2008): since they are based on qualitative
assessments, they cannot provide an objective judgment of risk threats, and for the same reason they offer








Figuire II FExample of risk matrix
Another traditional application of uncertainty analysis in engineering is reliability analysis aimed at the
estimation of margins of safety (Ditlevsen 1982). Margins are used on uncertain variables of interest; an
example in structural engineering is the sizing of a beam under uncertain loads or uncertain structural
properties (Ganzerli and Pantelides 1999), or the design of buildings under seismic uncertainty
(Veneziano, Agarwal et al. 2009). Taking margins is the traditional engineering approach to hedge
uncertainty; however, it implies an overhead which has impacts on cost and performance: consider for
example the overhead on gross liftoff mass of a launch vehicle given by the margins of safety on its
structures.
Uncertainty analysis has found an ample breadth of applications in controls engineering. As reference
examples, here we mention the control of dynamical systems under environmental uncertainty (Yang,
Minai et al. 2004) and the disciplinary field of adaptive controls (Corless, Leitmann et al. 1987). In
particular, a mathematical model that has found several applications in modeling uncertainty in this
domain is that of Markov Decision Processes (Puterman 1994) (MDP). An MDP is a discrete time
stochastic control process. Systems are modeled as a set of possible states, within which there are state
transitions and associated transition costs (Figure 12 provides an example of a two-state MDP). MDPs
can be used to model systems which behavior is partly random and partly controlled by an agent. MDPs
are usually solved by means of dynamic programming (Bellman 1957), therefore implying that system
states are path independent (i.e. the outcome at every state does not depend from the path taken to reach
that state). A category of interest of MDPs is that of Partially Observable Markov Decision Processes
(POMDP) (Monahan 1982), where the knowledge of possible states and/or transitions is also subject to
uncertainty.
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Figure 12 Eaimple of two-state M DP (image source: Wikipedia)
Operations Research (OR) is another field of interest where uncertainty analysis has been applied
extensively; problem examples in this domain are in logistics and supply chain management under
demand uncertainty (Petrovica, Royb et al. 1998), and formulations of the classical OR problems under
uncertain demands such as the Traveling Salesman Problem (Flood 1955), the Warehouse Location
Problem (Baumol and Wolfe 1957) and the Knapsack Problem (Sinha and Zoltners 1977). Heyman
provides an ample overview of stochastic models developed for OR problems (Heyman and Sobel 2004).
2.3. Ambiguity and Uncertainty in Engineering Systems
This section reviews the relevant literature concerning the study of ambiguity and uncertainty in
engineering systems. As mentioned previously in this document, while uncertainties "in" the problem
have been studied comprehensively in engineering systems, this is not the case of ambiguity
(uncertainties "on" the problem), where this topic has been considered thoroughly or considered only
using qualitative approaches.
2.3.1. Systems Architecting
The context in which this thesis operates is within the emerging body of literature in systems architecture,
which is the discipline that provides "an abstract description of the entities of a system and the
relationships between those entities" (Crawley 2008). The literature in systems architecture includes
formal languages for system decomposition, such as Unified Modeling Language (UML) (Booch,
Rumbaugh et al. 1996) and Object Process Modeling (OPM) (Dori and Crawley 2002), and quantitative
methods for tradespace exploration (Ross and Hastings 2005). Koo developed a meta-language for
systems architecting based on OPM, called Object Process Networks (OPN) (Koo 2005) (Figure 13);
building on his work, Simmons developed a framework for quantitative, decision-based systems
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Figure 13 OPN E xample (image soti rece: (Simmons 2008))
Figure 14 Apollo ADG Example (image source: (Simmons 2008))
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Both OPN and ADG are used to perform tradespace exploration, based on a three step approach: 1)
generation of architectures using a full enumeration approach, 2) evaluation of architectures and 3)
identification of Pareto-efficient architectures (de Weck 2009). (Hastings, Weigel et al. 2003) proposed a
systems architecting methodology accounting for uncertainty using portfolio theory, looking at the impact
of traditional uncertainties "in" the problem on systems architecting, with an application to space systems
developed for commercial purposes (a satellite constellation for telecommunications). This method can be
used to determine portfolios of systems robust to uncertainty, but does not include an assessment of the
impact of ambiguity in stakeholder objectives, and does not consider the value of flexibility in
engineering systems (as discussed later in this chapter), and it is only applied to architectures represented
by purely discrete design vectors, being formulated as a portfolio optimization.
2.3.2. Multidisciplinary Systems Design Optimization
The architecting methods described above rely on full enumeration of architectures; however, those
methods fail when the size of the feasible design space is large enough so that computational times would
be prohibitive for full enumeration. A solution to this problem comes from the literature in
Multidisciplinary Design Optimization (MDO) (Agte, de Weck et al. 2010), that provides optimization-
based methods for exploration of large design spaces. MDO is a discipline that has been traditionally
introduced for detailed system design, and its approaches are recently being implemented in large-scale
systems architecting problems; the author of this thesis developed a MDO framework for systems
architecting of launch vehicle families based on a hybrid optimization framework (Aliakbargolkar and
Crawley 2010). Several MDO approaches have been developed over the years, such as Braun's
Collaborative Optimization (Braun and Moore 1999) and others: Tedford provides an overview and a
benchmark of multiple MDO algorithms, making use of different strategies for problem decomposition
and optimization approaches (Tedford and Joaquim 2007).
2.3.3. Optimization under Uncertainty
The OPN and ADG architecting methods assume deterministic models for architectural evaluation, and
do not account for uncertain environments; on the other hand, the MDO community developed several
approaches to account for uncertainty and ambiguity. This literature falls into the sub-field of
Optimization under Uncertainty. Optimization routines can be embedded into an MDO framework,
therefore allowing uncertainty assessments in the overall architecting process. The seminal work in
optimization under uncertainty was conducted by Dantzig in his Linear Programming (LP) formulation
under uncertainty (Dantzig 1955), based on a stochastic programming with recourse approach (Kall and
Wallace 1994; Birge and Louveaux 1997). Sahinidis provides a comprehensive overview of optimization
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methods under uncertainty (Sahinidis 2004), including stochastic integer programming (Dempster, Fisher
et al. 1981; Spaccamela, Rinnooy Kan et al. 1984), stochastic nonlinear programming (Bastin 2001),
robust stochastic programming (Mulvey, Vanderbei et al. 1995) and fuzzy programming (Bellman and
Zadeh 1970, 141), (Tanaka and Asai 1984).
2.3.4. 1 ncertain ty Miaiagement and )ecision-Making Theory
Management of uncertainties in engineering systems is an emergent body of literature, dealing with
approaches to cope with uncertainty in engineering systems. Two main approaches have been proposed:
the implementation of robustness (Phadke 1995), (Taguchi 1986) and the implementation offlexibility
options in the system of interest (de Neufville, de Weck et al. 2004). Among its objectives, the research
proposed for this doctoral thesis intends to implement both approaches as management strategies for
ambiguity in stakeholder objectives, in order to verify their effectiveness in this context. De Weck
demonstrated the value of implementing flexibility options in a satellite constellation architecture (De
Weck, De Neufville et al. 2004), using lattice analysis to describe propagation of uncertainty over the
lifecycle of the architecture and advocating for a phased development approach for large-scale systems to
hedge endogenous and exogenous uncertainties and capture upside opportunities due to uncertainty.
Furthermore, Silver and de Weck proposed a network-based approach to analyze flexibility for complex
evolutionary large-scale systems, the Time-Expanded Decision Networks (Silver and de Weck 2007).
More recently, screening models based on a Monte Carlo simulation framework have been proposed for
the evaluation of flexibility options in engineering systems (Lin 2008). Screening models have the
advantage of having less constraints on the formulation of the problem than other methods (for example,
they do not require the system representation to be path independent), assuming the problem is formulated
and decomposed properly to be resolved in reasonable computational times, but they do not include an
assessment of the impact of ambiguity of stakeholder objectives in the evaluation of system architectures.
2.3.5. Expert Elicitatioi aid Decision-nmaking Theory
Architecting methods allow the identification of Pareto-efficient architectures, as described previously;
they can be complemented with quantitative tools from decision-making theory (Edwards 1954; Bellman
and Zadeh 1970; Keeney and Raiffa 1976; Kahneman and Tversky 1979; Zeleny 1982; Howard 1988;
Dyer, Fishburn et al. 1992; Roy and McCord 1996). A tool of practical use in this context is the
development of decision trees (Howard 1988) (Figure 15), which require a formal choice-decision to
enumerate possible scenarios, associated expected outcomes and subjective probabilities of occurrence.
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Figure 15 Example of decision tree analysis (image source: Wikipedia)
Recommendations based on decision-tree analysis are based on the maximization of expected value
criteria (Meyer 1987). Decision tree analysis, however, has several limitations. In fact, it requires a
"discretization" of the range of possible outcomes in a set of discrete occurrences. Furthermore, full
enumeration of full scenarios is prohibited if the number of possible scenarios is too large; this issue is
often overcome with dynamic programming approaches (Bellman 1957), which however require the
decision-tree representation to have specified characteristics such as path independence. Most
importantly, for the purposes of modeling ambiguity in this thesis, the main limitation of traditional
decision trees is that they require a deterministic knowledge of subjective probabilities of occurrence for
each scenario.
Decision-making support often requires the synthesis of subjective opinions, for instance, in the definition
of value metrics in systems architecting. Multi Attribute Utility Analysis (MAUA) (Keeney and Raiffa
1976) and the Analytical Hierarchy Process (AHP) (Forman and Gass 2001) (Figure 16) are tools that
have been applied for decision-making purposes in several disciplinary fields.
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While MAUA has been applied to systems architecting previously (Ross and Hastings 2005), little
research has been done on how to define utility under ambiguous stakeholder objectives - where the
definition of value-based utility functions is unclear. Both methods have known limitations. MAUA
encounters challenges in preference elicitation when applied to the evaluation of attributes with no
monetary equivalents. AHP on the other hand is prone to rank reversal issues when new attributes are
considered in the tradespace (Schenkerman 2003). None of these two methods deal when ambiguity is
introduced in group decision-making.
Expert elicitation is the discipline concerned with the synthesis of expert knowledge and opinions aimed
at providing tools for engineering and multidisciplinary analysis. Expert elicitation has been historically
used for the elicitation of probabilities of occurrence in safety analysis, such as the famous Rasmussen
report on nuclear reactor safety (Rasmussen 1975). Other historical applications of expert elicitation
include expert assessments synthesis for complex systems analysis (NAS 1975).
Expert elicitation techniques are of particular interest for engineering systems, as they allow the
quantification of subjective metrics that are of paramount importance to the design process. Elicitation
techniques has been used to estimate experts' preference structures for multi attribute analysis, such as the
ratio method (Edwards 1977), the swing method (von Winterfeldt and Edwards 1986) and the tradeoff
method (Keeney and Raiffa 1976). Focus group methods (Terpstra, Lindell et al. 2009) are routinely used
for elicitation of expert knowledge. While focus group and conventional group-decision making processes
are effective in improving convergence towards consensus, they suffer adverse behavioral effects
originating from peer pressure and hidden agendas. Focus groups are also ineffective in presence of the
highest degree of ambiguity originated by the unknown (such as forecasting of future events). The Delphi
method is a qualitative tool that has been originally developed to this end, to improve forecasting in
expert policy-making (Rowe, Wright et al. 1991; Adler and Ziglio 1996; Rowe and Wright 1999). Delphi
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synthesizes expert knowledge by anonymous elicitation of experts, while reducing adverse peer-pressure
effects through anonimity in expert elicitation. While Delphi has been used in the context of forecasting
and decision-making, this thesis engineers the Delphi process in a quantitative form and implements it in
the context of decision making, assessing advantages and disadvantages.
2.4. Identification of Research Gaps
This section identifies the research gaps to be address by this dissertation. Four gaps are identified, both at
the conceptual and methodological level: Identify, Characterize, Mitigate and Integrate.
The first gap (Identify) to be addressed by this thesis is to identify ambiguity in architecting systems with
a high degree of innovation and highly exploratory objectives. While (Ross and Hastings 2005) described
the impact of uncertainty in the definition of system requirements, they did not discuss comprehensively
the problem of ambiguity in the description of the systems to be designed - and how to identify ambiguity
as such - leaving room for a research opportunity in this field. (Hastings, Weigel et al. 2003) discussed an
application of financial portfolio theory to incorporate uncertainty in systems architecting and select
engineering portfolios with different risk aversion profiles. However, they assume known sources of
uncertainty, and do not address uncertainty in its highest degree, that is ambiguity. This thesis identifies
potential sources of ambiguity in systems architecting by means of ontological analysis, and develops a
framework to identify, classify and mitigate ambiguities, therefore covering this gap in the literature.
The second gap to be addressed (Characterize) is to characterize ambiguity as an adverse factor to
effective systems architecting. While traditional uncertainty has been investigated extensively in the
literature, less efforts where spent in characterizing ambiguity beyond the field of forecasting techniques.
This thesis provides a framework for management of ambiguities, called the descriptive Systems
Architecting Management Framework, and describes a taxonomy for classification of reducible and
irreducible ambiguities, as described in Chapter 3.
The third gap to be investigated (Mitigate) is the mitigation of reducible and irreducible ambiguities in the
functional intent of a systems architecture. The research is defined as a problem of requirements
definition under stakeholder ambiguity. This thesis presents a framework for quantitative analysis the
value delivery process (Crawley 2008) of a system, including the assessment of ambiguity in the
definition of stakeholder needs and in the functional intent process. It presents and informs strategies for
effective mitigation of multi-domain ambiguities in systems architecting.
The fourth gap to be fulfilled (Integrate) is the lack of integration of ambiguity expert elicitation
techniques with formal system architecting methods in conventional systems engineering practice. These
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steps are treated are separate in conventional lifecycle models. Figure 17 shows examples of waterfall
lifecycle processes taken from the INCOSE Systems Engineering Handbook that highlight this issue.
Typical models include requirements definition as upstream processes - such as NASA's Pre-Phase A
processes or DoD user needs definition process - with no feedback loops between requirements definition
tradespace exploration towards concept definition. Few iterations are performed upstream in spiral life-
cycle models (as shown in Figure 18), but with little iterations of requirements definition phases and no
explicit integration with down-stream spiral processes. This gap is filled in this thesis by integrating
quantitative expert elicitation for requirements definition with traditional design space exploration
models. The framework presented in the thesis allows the exploration of large design spaces through the
integration of hybrid MDO approaches.
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Figure 18 Spirial model for system deve lopmient (itage source: (Boehm 1988))
2.5. Summary
This chapter presented a review of literature relevant to the problem of the systems architecting under
ambiguous stakeholder objectives. Thesis objectives are framed in context to relevant literature of
ambiguity and uncertainty in engineering systems analysis and other disciplinary fields - including
political science, finance and economics, management and engineering design.
The literature review revealed four conceptual and methodological gaps concerning characterization,
defined as Identify, Characterize, Mitigate and Integrate. Following the identification of research gaps,
this chapter defined the research opportunity that has been pursued in this thesis. Based on these premises,
Chapter 3 describes the comprehensive approach for systems architecting that has been developed to fill
research gaps that have been identified.
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Chapter 3 : Comprehensive Approach for
Systems Architecting under Ambiguous Stakeholder Objectives
Chapter 1 described ambiguity as a threat to successful systems architecting. The literature review in
Chapter 2 has shown how multiple fields in science, engineering and social sciences cope with ambiguity.
Ambiguity has been characterized as the highest possible degree of uncertainty in systems architecture.
The review of the state of the art revealed gaps in the identification, characterization and mitigation of
ambiguities in systems architecting. This chapter fills the fourth research gap by presenting a
comprehensive approach for systems architecting under ambiguous stakeholder objectives. The chapter
presents the approach that has been developed to integrate upstream and downstream architecting
processes in a unified framework, to analyze and mitigate ambiguities as they present themselves in
systems architecting.
3.1 . Ontological Aialysis for the Ambiguity Identification
in UI.pstream Systems Architecting Processes
In his doctoral dissertation, Simmons described systems architect as responsible for the transformation of
a set of needs and goals into a systems architecture (Simmons 2008). This section presents an ontological
analysis of upstream systems architecting processes. The goal of the analysis is to identify potential
sources of ambiguity affecting the system architecting process, with emphasis on upstream processes of
elicitation of a functional intent and translation into a corresponding systems architecture. The analysis in
this section is analog to Suh's axiomatic approach to systems design (Suh 1998). However, for the scopes
of this ontological analysis the focus is on hierarchical mapping only, and the analytic tools of choice are
set theory and first-order propositional logic, instead of Suh's matrix operation relationships.
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Need 2 Function 2
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Figu re 19 Functional xiewN of u pstream systems architecting processes
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Figure 19 shows a functional view of upstream systems architecting processes. On the left hand side of
the figure are stakeholder group needs agreed by a consensus-driven group S formed by E stakeholders,
each eliciting individual needs sie: S= f1{SI, s21,...,ssI},{s12,s22,...ss2}1-.,sI s2E1--- 'SE -
Group needs are decomposed by system architect A in needs perceived by stakeholder group S:
N = N{N,,N 2 ,...,NN }A . Needs are mapped by the system architect to a set of intended system
functions F ^ = F {F,,F2,.FFA through afunction-need mapping MFN A - N = MF-+N (F) A
System functions are mapped to a set of elements of forms E A = E{E,E 2 --,EE A through a form-
function mapping MF-F A * N = MF-F (F) JA .
Case A (Injective and surjective (bijective))
Case C (Non-injective and surjective)
Case B (Injective and non-surjective)
Case D (Non-injective and non-surjective)
Figure 20 Possible mappings in form/function and function/need mapping assignments (images source: Wikipedia)
Figure 20 shows possible functional assignments that can be found in function-need and form-function
mappings. Acceptable function-need and form-function mappings are defined as mappings that are always
surjective (case A and C in the Figure), that is, where every function/form is mapped to at least one
need/function respectively. Non-surjectivity indicates incomplete mapping by the system architect, where,
for instance, not all elements of form are mapped to respective system functions they are supposed to
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perform. Mappings are injective (case A and B in the Figure - where only A is acceptable due to
surjectivity) when needs/functions and functions/forms are in one-to-one correspondence. Functional
commonality (i.e. the embodiment of multiple functions in one element of form) is represented by non-
injective mappings (case C and D in the Figure - where only C is acceptable on surjectivity grounds).
Figure 21 shows different types of form/function mappings - which can also be interpreted as
function/need mappings for this discussion. Form (function) elements sharing multiple functions (needs)
are represented by non-injective mappings, representing the case of functional commonality. Function
sharing across multiple elements of form (and likewise, need sharing across multiple functions) is
represented by inverse, non-injective forms/functions (function/needs) mappings. Function sharing
represents both the case of single functions performed by multiple elements of form independently (such
as the case of redundant systems), and the case of single functions that emerge from the interaction by
multiple elements of forms (emergent system properties).
F1  E1 E2
...]E F1  ...]F1
FF EMEE4
Multiple functions mapped to Single function mapped to multiple Single function mapped to multiple
one element of form independent elements of form concurrent elements of form
(functional commonality) (redundancy) (emergence)
Figure 2 1 T y pes of' UonnFunct ion Mapping!, (also applicable to Funiction/Need mappings)
Elements of form are connected each other through T interface types (such as mechanical, electrical,
fluid and logical interfaces), represented by associated affinity matrices , [I], Vt E T, where
0 elementiISNOT connected toelementj
1 element i IS connected to element j
Constraints between elements of form (E1,E 2 ,, EE A can be expressed with first-order logic
statements (Smullyan 1995) using conjunction (E A E 2 , i.e. AND), disjunction (E v E2 , i.e. OR),
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implication (El -- E2 , i.e. IMPLIES), biconditional (E, + E2 , i.e. IFF) and negation (E-E 2 , i.e.
NOT) logical connectives.
Constraints can be of mutual dependence ("both element E, AND E 2 <...>"), mutual exclusivity
(compatibility constraints of the form "either element E, OR E2 <...>"), and implication ("element E,
IMPLIES E2 ). Spatial (allocation) and temporal (precedence or scheduling) constraints are defined with
affinity matrices that are function of time and space , = I, (it).
Functions are connected each other through a concept of operations, where a subset of functions F' C F
is optionally constrained by a set of precedence/scheduling constraints defining links between terminal
functional events (start/finish), as shown in Figure 21, analogously to what is done with project





















Figure 22 Precedence/Scheduling Constraints betwCen System Functions applicable to Conclepts of Operations
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This thesis makes the following fundamental assumption on sources of ambiguity and the extent to which
ambiguity affects system architectures:
Potential sources of ambiguity are created in all upstream systems architecting processes where
human agents interact together to define value, and define means of value delivery.
In other words, this assumption is saying that all interaction opportunities among stakeholders
(represented by stakeholder group S), and between stakeholders S and the system architect A are potential
sources of ambiguity. Ambiguities are thought as externalities of group decision-making, such as adverse
peer pressure and individual hidden agendas. We do not consider internal sources of uncertainty in this
discussion (for instance in the definition of affinity matrices), as we focus the attention on ambiguity
sources. However, an analog ontological analysis could be performed on downstream systems
architecting processes to identify potential sources of uncertainty.
The fundamental assumption on ambiguity can be used in a backward examination of the ontological
analysis exposed above to identify potential sources of ambiguity in upstream systems architecting
processes. The following potential sources are identified:
Stakeholder group S - perceived needs (N A = N{N,N 2 ,---,NN})ote the use ofthe word
perceived - stakeholders perceive needs, driven by policies, user needs, one-time events, the
environment and so forth. Needs change over time, affected by the culture of the organization,
leadership styles, exogenous influences, and occurrence of low probability events. The net result
of ambiguity in this context is for stakeholders S and system architect A not to map real needs
with stated needs through perception in a satisfactory way. Consider for instance the unexpected
change in 2011 in the Swiss public policy for energy production, following the incident of the
Japanese Fukushima nuclear reactor (Kanter 2011). Stakeholders' need perception changed
dramatically after the occurrence of a low probability event bearing potentially catastrophic
consequences. Abrupt changes come to a cost of policy failures in a political science sense, and
introduce ambiguities in the perception process of the mapping between real and stated needs.
Other sources of ambiguity in perceived needs are hidden agendas, defined as the dichotomy
between stated and desired needs for a system architecture ("not the requirements but the
edesirements>>" (Ertekin 2012)). Another source of ambiguity is peer pressure in stakeholder
elicitation, defined as the influence of stakeholders to peers of the same stakeholder group (such
as the influence of senior scientists to junior scientists, and so forth).
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e Perceived set of intended functions (F A = F{ F,F 2,...,FF A ): the job of system architects is
to transform a set of perceived needs into a set of intended system functions, towards the
definition of a system architecture (Simmons 2008). A source of ambiguity is then identified in
transforming needs in functions. Such ambiguity can either be due to unknown, non accounted
factors, or to non comprehensive consideration of all stakeholders in the need elicitation process.
e Function/need mapping (MF-N JA ++ N = MF-N (F) A ) and Form/Function mapping
(MF-F A + N = MF-F (F) A): mapping processes are subject to ambiguity introduced by the
system architect, due to unfocused, incomplete or incorrect definition or documentation of the
mapping function. There are evidences of this type of ambiguity in the systems engineering
literature. For instance, the INCOSE Systems Engineering Handbook defines this as ambiguity in
initial system requirements for a system in its Development Stage (INCOSE 2010). Another
source of ambiguity is identified in evolutionary changes of function/need and form/function
mapping functions. This phenomenon is identified in the literature as scope creep, or
requirements creep. The PMBOK of the Program Management Institute identifies two forms of
requirements creep: business scope creep, andfeature (technology) scope creep (PMI 2004).
e Formal and Functional Constraints: constraints between elements of form and functional
constraints defined as a concepts of operations (conops) can be affected by the ambiguities
defined above, therefore posing threats to the value delivery process from the architecture to
stakeholders. Examples of ambiguities are in the definition of a concepts of operations or
interface issues in systems of systems such a space awareness or space weather infrastructure,
where multiple heterogeneous elements are supposed to cooperate together towards one goal.
Ambiguous specification of the conops can, in principle, prevent systems cooperation and the
achievement of desired goals.
This analysis identified several sources of ambiguity in upstream systems architecting processes by means
of formal ontological analysis. Therefore, it is now possible to classify ambiguities according to their
nature and mapping to systems engineering processes.
3.2. Classification of Ambiguities in Systems Architecting
Based on the ontological analysis discussed in Section 3.1, this section proposes a classification of
ambiguities according to their inherent nature in the systems architecting process. This thesis identifies
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Reducible ambiguity is defined as ambiguity generated by lack of understanding on known knowledge.
Reducible ambiguity derives from confusion in stakeholder elicitation and definition of functional needs
and mappings. This type of ambiguity is only apparent, as it can be reduced by appropriate mitigation
efforts, as described in the next sections of this chapter. Nevertheless, non mitigated reduced ambiguity is
a threat to systems architecting, as it impedes proper definition of the functional intent. Reducible
ambiguity lies in areas where consensus and compromise among stakeholders are possible. Typically, this
type of ambiguity affects highly specialized needs and functions, where a high degree of expert
knowledge is required. Consider for instance the definition of needs related to a highly specific sub-field
of science. Confusion arises as most stakeholders are not aware or do not understand said needs.
Comprehensive composition of the representative stakeholder group and the use of a structured
comprehensive systems architecting framework (such as the one proposed in this thesis) allow effective
reduction of said ambiguity. Another example of reducible ambiguity is derived by definition of
requirements in a planetary science mission. Scientists need to retrieve data to expand the knowledge in
their science fields, whereas engineers have the need to design an architecture to deliver required
performance, while meeting cost caps and other programmatic constraints. Those needs are often
clashing, and poor understanding among stakeholders' views are sources of reducible ambiguity. Part of
the job of the system architect is to bring a comprehensive analysis to the table and help reduce such
ambiguities. The framework proposed in this thesis is a structured toolkit to do so.
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Irreducible ambiguity is defined as lack of understanding on unknown knowledge. Ambiguity is the
highest degree of uncertainty when it deals with unknown information, such as future policy changes,
unknown scientific discoveries, unknown technological capabilities and so forth. Irreducible ambiguity is
a double-edged sword, as it provides the most threatening challenges in systems architecture as well as
the most rewarding areas of opportunities, such as breakthrough discoveries in science and the
development of key enabling technologies pushing the boundaries of the feasible design space.
Irreducible ambiguities include areas of open debate, and the embodiment of hidden agendas in
perceived stakeholder needs. Groups of stakeholders might reach to illusional consensus when dealing
with irreducible ambiguities, which is a threat if ambiguity is not explicitly recognized as such and related
requirements not designed accordingly and kept under control over time. Examples of areas of open
debate include definitions of scientific value, policy return, and intrinsic value associated with the
selection of destinations for human space exploration. Hidden agendas are even more subtle ambiguities,
are they can usually be traced as causes of cost growth and schedule slippage. Hidden agendas are driven
by individual stakeholder interests, which steer stakeholder groups from rational elicitation of perceived
needs. Hidden agendas are classified as irreducible ambiguities as they cannot be identified with absolute
certainty, therefore preventing mitigation. However, identification of potential hidden agendas is key
information to decision-makers and system architects should include such information as part of their
functional analysis towards the definition of a functional intent.
Both reducible and irreducible ambiguities are surfaced through elicitation of expert knowledge from
stakeholder groups. Expert elicitation, therefore, takes a central role in upstream systems architecting
processes. The following section reviews and characterizes expert elicitation techniques, that can be used
by system architects in systems architecting under explicit recognition of ambiguity in stakeholder
objectives.
3.3. Expert Elicitation for Systems Architecting under Ambiguity
in Stakeholder Objectives
Expert elicitation is a key process in upstream systems architecting. Expert elicitation techniques are used
for the definition of perceived needs, the definition of intended system functions and related mapping
processes, as discussed in Section 3.1. Three models for expert elicitation can be developed. Elicitation
can be performed using structured (following a formal process defined a priori) or unstructured methods.
Elicitation methods can either employ multiple iterations (iterative methods), or one-time assessments.
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Finally, elicitation methods can either ask for anonymous contributions by experts (anonymous methods),
or have experts identify their contribution to the process.
This section characterizes expert elicitation models across the taxonomy proposed above, and describes
advantages and disadvantages of categories of expert elicitation methods.




Bottom-up elicitation is an open approach consisting in the involvment of scientific, technical and
political communities at large in the definition of stakeholder needs. These methods includes workshops,
open questionnaires, surveys and requests for proposals. Bottom up elicitation can be used to define needs
for new systems, to redefine use of heritage systems or assess evolution options of existing systems.
While bottom up methods are useful for assessing the needs across a large set of users, they are prone to
the generation of reducible ambiguity due to the high volume of data to be processed and lack of
coherence in definitions and preliminary assumptions. Bottom-up elicitation techniques are typically
unstructured, non iterative, and can be performed with either anonymous or non anonymous elicitations of
knowledge.
Analogy-based elicitation infers stakeholder needs and defines functional requirements based on
retrospective analysis of analog systems that have been deployed for past applications. For instance,
system architects can reverse engineer a remote sensing satellite architecture to infer stakeholder needs
and associated functions to design in a new satellite constellation. The outcome of this type of elicitation
depends significantly on individual expert knowledge of the system architect. Structured approaches such
as formal systems decomposition languages (OPN (Koo 2005), OPM (Dori and Crawley 2002), ADG
(Simmons 2008), UML (Booch, Rumbaugh et al. 1996)) and axiomatic system design frameworks (Suh
1998) can be used to inform analogy-based elicitation. While analogy-based approaches have advantages
in reducing cost and elicitation schedule, they imply risks in neglecting ambiguities and emergent
behaviors unique to the architecture to be designed. Analogy-based expert elicitation is conducted with
structured or unstructured approaches, with multiple iterations. Anonymity is not a concern in analogy-
based elicitation.
Workgroup elicitation consists in composing expert panels representative of stakeholders of interest, and
elicit their knowledge towards definition of perceived needs and associated functional requirements.
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Methods for workgroup elicitation include panel group meetings, interviews, questionnaires, and surveys.
Structured approaches consist in quantitative methods such as utility theory (Fishburn 1970), decision
tree analysis (Zeleny 1982), the analytic hierarchic process (Saaty 1994) and the development of rule-
based expert systems (Ignizio 1991). Unstructured approaches are usually qualitative methods, such as
open-ended interviews, or the Delphi method (Rowe and Wright 1999). Quantitative methods have the
advantage of providing guidance for decision-making through rational frameworks. However, these
methods imply underlying assumptions and analysis limitations that must be well known by the system
architect for their effective selection and application. Qualitative methods offer the advantage of allowing
unconstrained elicitation of knowledge. Of those, the Delphi method is of particular interest to this thesis.
Delphi was originally developed during the Cold War by the RAND Corporation to design a military
response to unknown enemy threats (Rowe, Wright et al. 1991; Rowe and Wright 1999), finding later
applications in science and technology forecasting as well as policy-making. The key feature of the
Delphi method is the ability of eliciting expert knowledge in iterative rounds. This is achieved by
conducting structured surveys in anonymous form; the participants in a Delphi study do not know the
identities of other participating experts. Anonymity allows participants to express their opinions while
minimizing counter-productive behavioral aspects caused by high pressure situations such as science team
meetings or by organizational hierarchy issues. As the Delphi study is iterative, it allows experts to refine
their value judgment in light of the overall progress of the group towards reaching consensus. An
extensive overview of the Delphi method can be found in (Adler and Ziglio 1996). Limitations associated
with workgroup elicitation methods include the risk of non-representativeness of expert panels, the need
to achieve panel availability for the time required for a workgroup study, and risks associated with peer
pressure and hidden agendas in methods where those ambiguities are not accounted explicitly.
This section reviewed methods for expert elicitation that can be used to support upstream systems
architecting processes. Hybrid expert elicitation methods can be designed by combining the approaches
reviewed above. This thesis presents a Delphi-Based Systems Architecting Framework (DB-SAF), for
systems architecting under ambiguity in stakeholder objectives. The framework engineers the Delphi-
method, and extends it up to tradespace exploration for effective identification and characterization of
ambiguities. The DB-SAF framework is a structured process to inform effective strategies for systems
architecting under ambiguity. However, a prior classification of ambiguity mitigation strategies is
required to describe possible actions that system architects can take to mitigate ambiguities in their
sytems. This discussion is done in Section 3.4.
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3.4. Canonical Forim Classification of Ambiguity Mitigation Strategies
Following the identification of sources of ambiguity, their classification, and a review of tools available
for their elicitation, this section identifies ambiguity mitigation strategies and proposes a classification in
canonical forms. We define canonical forms fundamental set of strategies that can be applied across a
wide variety of disciplinary domains to mitigate ambiguity. Strategies have been identified by examining
different use cases in the literature of engineering systems, engineering, political science, finance and
economics, and management. Table 2 shows the results of this analysis.
Table 2 Canonical Forns of Ambiguity Mitigation Strategies
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Five fundamental actions to mitigate ambiguity are identified:
- Compromise: to achieve an optimal compromise decision based on currently available
information. This equals to the determination of optimal compromises between contrasting needs,
maximizing stakeholder group's value instead of individual stakeholders value.
- Consensus: to achieve agreement of opinions among experts. Consensus happens in presence of
reducible ambiguities, where experts agree on definitions, assumptions and associated value on
questions of interest.
- Buy Insurance: to minimize downside ambiguous risks with payment of an upfront cost. This
equals to the concept of robustness in engineering design, and to policy robustness as discussed in
this thesis.
- Defer Actions: to purchase the option to act at a later time. This equals to the embodiment of real
options in engineering systems, where an upfront cost to hedge future uncertain risks.
- Deterrence: to pose threats to adverse behaviors. This equals to freezing certain requirements in
the early stages of the design process, to avoid abrupt changes in future phases. As it might be
seen, this action has adverse effects in many cases. Its use is foreseen in rare cases, where other
mitigating actions fail in meeting their objectives.
The left-hand column of Table 2 shows the five canonical forms of ambiguity mitigation strategies
(Compromise, Consensus, Buy Insurance, Defer Actions, Deterrence). The next five columns show the
mapping of such strategies to the five disciplinary domains that have been investigated. The second row
shows specific use cases that have been taken in consideration in the analysis. The analysis shows how
canonical forms of ambiguity management strategies span a variety of disciplines while sharing
fundamental insights. The question is then how to identify which set of actions to implement to mitigate
ambiguities of interest. Section 3.5 answers this question, by presenting a descriptive framework for
management of ambiguities.
3.5. Descriptive Systems Architecting Management Framework
The implementation of ambiguity management strategies need to be informed by analysis from the
systems architect. This section presents a descriptive Systems Architecting Management Framework (SA-
MF), that supports system architects in this process developing a descriptive Partially Observable Markov
Model and describing a framework aimed at the identification of effective ambiguity management
strategies from the canonical forms that have been identified in Section 3.4.
SA-MF is a descriptive approach to systems architecting under stakeholder ambiguity. In SA-MF, the
systems architecting process is modeled as a set of Actions that the system architect implements to
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transition between system States. SA-MF goal is to identify an architecting Policy to maximize Rewards
in form of stakeholder objectives of interest, while reducing reducible ambiguities, identifying irreducible
ambiguities, and identifying Pareto-efficient system architectures of interest for further analysis by
decision-makers. Rewards are unknown due to ambiguity in stakeholder objectives. The goal of SA-MF
is to describe effective actions from canonical forms to implement as a next step in a systems architecting
process. The goal of SA-MF is not to dynamically simulate management action outcomes, as it would be
done in a control theory problem.
In SA-MF, actions are canonical forms of ambiguity management strategies as discussed in Section 3.4
(Table 2). Rewards are represented to contribution of the systems architecture to value as delivered to
stakeholders (for instance, value delivered to scientists or policy-makers). States are represented by
decision gates and stable forms of the architecture. Table 3 describes possible states, mapping to
examples from the five use cases considered previously for canonical forms. Policies are system
architecting strategies, representing the set of optimal state-action transitions across the lifecycle of the
system. System architects can develop SA-MF models of their systems of interest, and reason through the
model to identify ambiguities and ambiguity mitigation strategies. SA-MF has been developed using
generic concepts, to allow its implementation in any engineering domain of interest. Figure 24 shows the
general SA-MF model, where states are represented by nodes, actions are edges, and rewards are
outcomes - represented by clouds, meaning ambiguity affecting their quantification a priori by the
systems architect.
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Table 3 Systems Architecting Mhanagement Framewvorik States
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Consider the architecture of a Mars Sample Return (MSR) campaign as an application example. MSR is
developed as a full case study in Chapter 4; readers can refer to this chapter for a description of specific
details on the case study. We will consider here the development of SA-MF to this case.
Figure 25 shows the implementation of SA-MF to MSR. System architects can use the generic SA-MF
framework and the list of canonical forms of ambiguity mitigation presented previously in Table 2 to
develop a model specific to MSR. Program review is modeled as a decision gate to the definition of a
mission architecture, linked to tradeoff decisions between science, engineering and programmatic
objectives. Iterations between these states are identified and enabled by tradeoff studies and expert
elicitation processes. Possible ambiguity mitigation strategies to implement are programmatic robustness
(by splitting caching and fetching rovers), operational flexibility (by extending rover horizontal mobility),
and lock-in decisions on the total mass of samples to retrieve on Earth. Review decisions are backward
actions that refer to successive program reviews. By developing a SA-MF model of Mars Sample Return,
system architects gains insights on possible options for mitigation strategies and develop a tool for
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Figure 25 SA-M IF ApplicationI to tile Miars Samnple Return Use Case
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Selection of an ambiguity mitigation action is not a trivial task. Several options need to be considered.
Furthermore, system architects need to account that decisions takes in the functional domain bear
consequences in the formal domain in terms of performance, cost and risk trade-offs. A comprehensive
system architecting analysis including ambiguity is therefore required to select mitigating actions as
defined by SA-MF. The following section describes a tool that has been developed to this end, called the
Delphi-Based Systems Architecting Framework (DB-SAF).
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DB-SAF is a structured, iterative anonymous tool to inform ambiguity mitigation strategies as defined in
SA-MF (discussed in Section 3.5) in systems architecting under stakeholder ambiguity. The framework is
inspired by the Delphi method in policy-making (discussed in Section 3.3), and defines its systems
architecting version in the context of formulation of new, unprecedented systems. Figure 26 provides an
overview of DB-SAF. The framework integrates an engineered version of Delphi analysis Expert-Based
Systems Architecting under ambiguity in stakeholder objectives, in conjunction with existing expert
elicitation methods such as Score Cards and Multi Attribute Utility Analysis (MAUA) (Belton and
Stewart 2002; Gibson, Scherer et al. 2007; Abbas 2010). DB-SAF consists in a structured process
decomposed in the ten Steps. In the following description, we will refer to examples from the Mars
Sample Return case study (Chapter 4) to contextualize the description.
59
3.6.2. Step I - Literature Review and Systems-Specific Expertise
The process starts from a preliminary Literature Review and the system architect's System-Specific
Expertise. The purpose of the literature review is to gather existing information on the architecting
problem of interest and inform Problem Formulation (Step 2). Documents of interest include previous
point designs and architecting studies of the mission of interest and analog past missions, relevant
academic literature, program-level documents and science-prioritization documents. For Mars missions,
examples of point designs and architecting studies are the Mission Concept Studies developed in support
of the latest Planetary Science Decadal Survey; for instance the Mars 2018 MAX-C Caching Rover
Assessment Study (NASA 2010), the MSR Lander Mission Study (NASA 2010) and the MSR Orbiter
Mission Study (NASA 2010). An example of program-level document is the Planetary Science Decadal
Survey (NRC 2011), whereas examples of science-prioritization documents are Reports of the Mars
Exploration Program Analysis Group (MEPAG) (NASA 2010).
3.6.3. Step 2 - Problem Formulation
Step 2 - Problem Formulation
Figire 27 Step 2 - Problem Formulation
60
In Problem Formulation (Figure 27) the system architect defines the problem he/she wishes to address in
support of the customer's project. The step consists in two sequential iterative cycles. Iterations are
devised to refine each individual sub-steps, which definition benefits from the definition of the other sub-
steps in the cycle.
3.6.3. 1. Iterutie Cycle I
1) Identification of Beneficiaries Needs
This sub-step identifies the needs of the beneficiaries of the system, formulating questions of interest to
be addressed by his study. Examples of beneficiaries of a Mars Sample Return mission are astrobiologists
and geologists that are wishing to further their science by retrieving data from Martian samples. Questions
are formulated by direct interaction with the customer that is commissioning the study. Examples of
questions of interest from the MSR campaign architecting example include: What kind of sample types
should MSR bring back to Earth to maximize scientific value while being implementable from an
engineering and programmatic standpoint? What is the impact of the maximum drilling depth on the
overall performance/cost/engineering complexity of the MSR campaign architecture?
2) Goals Identification
System architects identify and characterize stakeholder goals to be fulfilled by the system. Stakeholder
goals derive from beneficiaries' needs as well as additional socio-political considerations. Primary
stakeholder goals can be identified with structured approaches such as quantitative stakeholder analysis
(Cameron, Catanzaro et al. 2006) - this thesis does not cover stakeholder analysis and assumes that
stakeholder goals have already been prioritized and documented. In addition to beneficiaries needs (such
as the science goals defined by MEPAG for the MSR campaign (MEPAG 2008)), example additional
goals that are set by stakeholders are policy robustness (i.e. ensuring the proposed mission is deemed
acceptable by NASA decision-makers, Congress and other involved policy-makers), economic
sustainability and education and outreach.
A non-exhaustive list of Stakeholder Goals for the Mars Sample Return campaign is presented in Table 4.
Table 4 Example Stakeholder Goals for the Mars Sample Return (ampaigon
Stakeholder GoalsI
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To Collect Samples of the Martian Surface
To Conduct In-situ Science on Mars
To Return Collected Samples to Earth
To Ensure collected samples comply with planetary protection requirements
3) Functional Decomposition
Stakeholder Goals are decomposed into Functions that the system needs to perform in order to
accomplish said goals. Functions are solution-neutral, as they do not depend on specific technologies or
architectures; functions can be performed with different architectural options.
Functional decomposition can be performed at multiple levels of abstractions and hierarchy (i.e.
decomposing functions, sub-functions, etc.). The level of abstraction depends on the type and purpose of
study being conducted and on the time and resources available for analysis; as a general rule of thumb,
campaign-level or program-level studies require functional decompositions to up to one or two levels.
The one-level functional decomposition for the Mars Sample Return campaign is shown in Table 5. A
two-level functional decomposition is a further specification of functions at a lower level of abstraction.
For instance, a two-level functional decomposition for MSR would specify the individual functions to be
accomplished "to entry the Martian atmosphere" (Function 3 in Table 5).
Table 5 Functional Decomposition for the Mars Sample Return Campaign
Functions
1 To reach Low Earth Orbit
2 To transit between Low Earth Orbit and Low Mars Orbit
3 To entry Martian atmosphere
4 To descend and land on Martian surface
5 To drill Martian Surface and prepare Sample Caches for Fetching
6 To fetch Sample Caches
7 To bring Sample Caches to Earth Surface
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3.6.3.2. Iterative Cycle 2
4) Enumeration of Possible Sets of System Requirements
System Requirements are quantitative specifications of the extent to which the architecture needs to be
designed to meet its Stakeholder Goals. In this step, the system architect enumerates all the possible sets
of System Requirements that the system could be designed for. Consideration of multiple set of
requirements is desired for successive evaluation of the overall architecture and its value in terms of
science performed, overall engineering complexity and cost (Steps 5-9). For instance, a set of possible
requirements for the MSR campaign architecture is the following:
Sample Types Collected: Sedimentary Material Only
- Total Number of Samples Collected: 20
- Sample Size: 1cm D x 5cm H (cylindrical sample)
* Sample Depth: up to 1Om
Horizontal Radius: up to 20km
The previous set of requirements is only one instance of all possible sets that could be conceived for a
MSR campaign. Suppose for instance the system architect is interested in evaluating architectures that
deliver from 10 to 40 samples of different type. Possible sample types are sedimentary materials,
hydrothermally and low temperature altered rocks, igneous rocks, regolith, dust and atmospheric gas.
Furthermore, the architect is interested in assessing architectures that retrieve samples of different size
(small-sized, medium-sized and large-sized samples) at different depths: surface (2.5cm), 1-meter and 10-
meter; he is also interested in exploring options where the baseline horizontal mobility is designed from 0
km (a lander configuration) to 50 km. Table 6 summarizes the set of possible options for each
requirement; this type of tabular representation is usually defined as structural morphological matrix
(Crawley 2008). A requirement set is defined by selecting one option per requirement. A full enumeration
leads to 2304 possible requirement sets. While there are no compatibility constraints in the MSR case, it
could be the case that not all possible sets are feasible. Constraints can be used to prune unfeasible
requirement sets out of the tradespace and leave only feasible options for study.
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Table 6 Structural M1orphological Matrix of Possible Requirement Sets for the Mars Sample Retuirn Campaign
Options Number
Requirements of
1 2 3 4 Options
Drilling System SurfaceMaximum Reachable (-2.5cm) 1-meter 10-meter 3
Depth
Total Number of 10 20 30 40 4Samples Collected
Small Medium Large
Sample Size (0.5cm D x (1.0cm D x (5.0cm D x 3
1.0cm H) 5.0cm H) 15cm H)
Horizontal Diversity 5 km 10 km 25 km 50 km 4(characteristic radius)
Collect Sedimentary Yes No 2Material Samples
Collect Hydrothermally &
Low Temp. Altered Yes No 2
Samples
Collect Igneous Rock Yes No 2Samples
Collect Regolith, Dust & Yes No 2Atm. Gas Samples
Total No# of Possible 2304
Requirement Sets
5) Function-Form Mapping
Functions defined in sub-step 3 (Functional Decomposition) can be mapped to corresponding alternative
options of Form. This thesis adopts Crawley's definition of form as "the physical/informational
embodiment which exists, or has the potential to exist" (Crawley 2008). For instance, Function 2 in Table
5 (to transit between Low Earth Orbit and Low Mars Orbit) can be performed with different elements of
form, such as the upper stage of a launch vehicle (such as a Centaur upper stage (Dawson and Bowles
2004)), a dedicated NTO/N 2H 4 or LOX/LH 2 propulsion modules. Form options can be summarized in a
structural morphological matrix analogously to what has been done in sub-step 4 for requirements. The
structural morphological matrix that synthesizes form options for the Mars Sample Return Campaign is
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presented in Table 7. Each row represents possible options for each element of form. Evaluation of
alternative options for an element of form is traditionally referred to as a trade study. An architecture is
defined by selecting one option per element of form. A full enumeration renders 96 possible architectures.
Similarly as in the case of requirement sets, constraints can be used to prune non-sense architectures out
of the tradespace. While cost constraints could be included during enumeration, it is recommended not to
include them at this stage as this precludes a sensitivity analysis of performance as a function of cost as
shown in later stages of the approach.
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6) Development of Evaluation Metrics
Evaluation metrics are required to assess the overall value of architectures. Metrics can be classified
as objective metrics and subjective metrics.
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Objective metrics are quantities that can be measured or estimated either by direct measurement, first-
principle modeling, parametric modeling or analog estimates. Examples of objectives metrics are dry
mass, design velocity, time and lifecycle cost.
Subjective metrics are quantitative measures of subjective judgments. Examples of subjective metrics
are perceived technical risk, perceived engineering complexity and perceived delivered value to
scientists. Subjective metrics are estimated either by heuristic rules defined by experts, or by
structured methods. An example of heuristic rule is to associate a higher perceived technical risk to
architectures that feature a higher number of development projects and/or a higher number of
operations perceived as potentially "risky" by the system architect - such as for instance in-orbit
refueling in a space transportation architecting study. In addition to heuristic rules, several structured
methods exist to measure subjective metrics.
This thesis adopts two different structured methods for subjective metrics evaluation: score cards and
multi-attribute utility theory. A selection of a structured methods depends on the characteristics of the
problem at hand and types of property values to be assessed. Strenghts and limitations of these
methods as identified by this thesis are discussed.
Before getting into this discussion, it is useful to make the distinction between ordinal and cardinal
metrics that can be developed for systems architecting. Ordinal metrics are used provide a ranking
between competing architectures. They are therefore metrics for relative ranking. Cardinal metrics, in
turn, are absolute metrics for relative ranking. Cardinal metrics are possible when incremental units
are constant and objective. As this is seldom the case in subjective value metrics, subjective metrics
as defined in this thesis must be intended in an ordinal sense. Indifference analysis for the
identification of Pareto-efficient architecture is still possible, in fact, with ordinal metrics.
Score cards is the first method we use for the development of subjective value metrics. Score cards
consist in eliciting knowledge by asking experts to rate property variables of interest on a pre-defined
ordinal Likert scale (Likert 1932). The level of resolution of the Likert scale is a choice of the system
architect, where a trade-off is made between the amount of information available to make a judgment
and the level of granularity allowed by the metric. In a human spaceflight case study, for instance,
one could ask experts to assign a score to the value associated with time of flight seen as a health of
proxy risk for a mission beyond Low Earth Orbit (as shown in the example in Table 8). The
preliminary assumption is that lower time in orbit is better, as it exposes astronauts to less of a health
risk due to solar and cosmic radiation. Experts can also be asked to provide motivations to back up
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their scores, which forms valuable documentation for traceability and credibility of the subjective
value metric being developed.
1 = very high
health risk
Table 8 Score card exaniple
2 = high 3 = moderate
health risk health risk
4 = low health
risk
5 = very low
health risk
Time of Flight 0.5y 1.Oy 1.5y 2.Oy 2.5y
[yrs] (as proxy
of health risk)





Pl1 = PI )Y P2 ) --- ..
Based on current knowledge on adverse health risks due to long-
term permanence of astronauts beyond Low Earth Orbit. This
rating is based on current (2012) knowledge and technology
available for radiation protection.
be asked for other property variables of interest. Let
Pr () ]E be the vector of property variables assessed by expert E,
with i being the input design vector that defines the requirement set. Score cards can then be
integrated in a joint value metric as a weighted linear combination or other representative functions of
interest. Weights can be either elicited by experts (as discussed in 3.6.6) or assumed by the systems
architect. The main advantage of score cards lies in their simplicity, and general applicability to any
types of property variables. In particular, they are useful in evaluating property values with no
monetary equivalent. However, they have less of a rigorous mathematical foundation than utility
theory (discussed below), and scores might prove being challenging to assign when no "anchor
points" are available, i.e. reference points on which experts can base their judgment. Score cards have
been used in the human spaceflight case study in Chapter 5.
Utility theory (Fishburn 1970) is a second approach to subjective evaluation. Utility theory comprises
several approaches used in finance and econometrics to estimate perceived value - for instance of
value that an investor associates to some capital investment. In recent years, utility theory has been
applied to estimate value in engineering systems analysis problems (Ross and Hastings 2005). As
detailed in Steps 5-6, the proposed framework makes use of a utility theory approach (Multi Attribute




manager of a project. Table 9 summarizes the evaluation metrics that have been developed for the
Mars Sample Return Campaign case study. Total technical risk is defined heuristically as the total
number of development projects within an architecture.
Table 9 Evaluation metries for the Niars Sample Return Campaign case stud)
Total Dry Mass kg Utility to Scientists
Total Wet Mass kg Utility to Engineers
Total Lifecycle Cost FY15 M$
3.6.4. Step 3 - Expert Panel Formation
This step is concerned with the formation of the panel of experts to be involved in the study. In this thesis,
the word "panel" refers to the aggregate of experts being involved in the study. However, it must be noted
that experts do not meet during the decision-making process, as they interact by means of a moderator.
Advantages and disadvantages of this approach have been explored through the retrospective validation
case study in Chapter 6. Selecting experts is a critical step in the framework as the quality of the results is
strongly dependent on the quality of the answers given by the expert panel as a whole. The architecting
team in charge of the study identifies a first set of individuals to be involved. A larger set of study
participants can be identified using "snowballing" sampling methods (Mason 1996), i.e. by asking
existing participants to identify additional participants among their acquaintances. The process can be
repeated until the architecting team is satisfied with the number of experts available for the study. The
panel should be a good representative of the community of stakeholders interested in the mission, in order
to represent all views and biases in an equal and fair manner.
(Rowe, Wright et al. 1991) identifies four key characteristics that define a "good" expert:
1. Knowledge and experience with the issues under investigation
2. Capacity and willingness to participate
3. Sufficient time to participate in the study
4. Effective communication skills
Once a panel of experts is formed, the architecting team will start the first round of interviews by
reviewing the initial problem formulation, as outlined in Step 4.
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3.6.5. Step 4 - Problen Forniulation ReviewN, with Expert Panel
This step ensures the validity of the problem formulation developed in Step 2, improving the alignment of
the study to the issues that are felt relevant by the expert panel and the stakeholders. Iterations are
required to review the problem formulation until the architecting team reaches a satisfying
conceptualization of the problem. A typical review list consists of the following items:
e Ensure the validity of modeling assumptions adopted in the framework;
e Ensure the validity and completeness of the list of questions to be addressed by the study (do the
questions help to reduce ambiguity in the definition of a mission/campaign proposal?);
* Ensure the completeness of the needs perceived by the beneficiaries (do the needs represent all
the relevant scientific questions of interest to the scientific community?);
e Ensure the completeness of the list of stakeholder goals and their biunivocal mapping to
beneficiaries' needs (are there any redundant / untraced stakeholder goals? Are they required or
is there any need that is not well represented in the current list?);
e Validate the minimum and maximum boundaries of interest for each requirement option that
involves a quantitative assessment (such as the minimum and maximum number of retrieved
samples to be considered in the study);
e Ensure the completeness of the list of system functions and their biunivocal mapping to
stakeholder goals;
e Ensure the completeness of the list of requirements and their biunivocal mapping to system
functions;
* Ensure the completeness of the list of options of form and their biunivocal mapping to the list of
system functions;
e Ensure the validity of the evaluation metrics as developed.
Once the architecting team is satisfied with the revised problem formulation, it proceeds performing the
elicitation of knowledge from the experts by designing a survey or interview (Step 5) and synthesizing
their value judgment (Step 6).
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3.6.6. Step 5 - Design of lInterview
Designing the interview is a crucial step of the framework, as it involves careful consideration of the
questions to be answered by the study as defined in Problem Formulation (Step 2), as well as considering
behavioral aspects on choosing the best method to elicit knowledge from experts. This thesis presents a
taxonomy of utility elicitation methods and toolkit of associated methodologies, based on score cards,
utility theory and decision-making theory with particular focus on Multi Attribute Utility Analysis
(MAUA).
Estimation of utility functions for attributes varying on continuous domains
Classical utility functions from utility theory are effective tools to represent value judgment for attributes
varying on a continuous domain. Utility theory assumes that value can be represented by a normalized
function of some attribute of interest. Figure 28 shows an example of single-attribute utility value of
science value (for one given science interviewee) as a function of total number of samples retrieved on
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Figure 28 E xample (of single-attribute utility function
However, it is often the case that value is function of multiple attributes of interest, for which more
articulated theories must be employed for value elicitation. MAUA is a decision analysis tool to represent
an expert's value assessment as a function of multiple attributes. MAUA has been extensively surveyed in
the literature (see (Wallenius, Dyer et al. 2008; Abbas 2010) for an extensive review), and therefore this
thesis only covers the fundamentals and describes practical implementation techniques.
The two classical MAUA functions are the additive utility function and the multiplicative utility function.
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The additive utility function assumes that aggregate utility (i.e. the total utility resulting by a particular
combination of attributes) is a weighted sum of single-attribute utilities:
N
U(Z = kiu;(x ) ()
i=I
Where Z = [x;] is an attribute set and kg are scaling costants representing expert's priorities among
attributes. Scaling constants in additive utility formulations are normalized to 1:
kg = 1 (2)
Nevertheless, it is often the case that aggregate utility is a non-linear combination of value associated with
single attributes. The multiplicative utility function represents non-linear value expressions when
preferential independence and utility independence (Keeney and Raiffa 1976) are satisfied. Those two
conditions assume that preferences within an attribute set are independent of the values assumed by other
attribute sets. For instance, they hold in a car purchasing situation where preferences over vehicle color do
not depend on the particular type of vehicle being considered. It is possible to test the validity of those
conditions for the problem of interest (Keeney and Raiffa 1976) and it is often the case that the problem
can be formulated or refined in such a way to enter in this category of problems.
The mathematical expression of the multiplicative utility function is:
U(Z) = I(J[Kkju(x) + 1] - 1) (3)
Where kg are multi-attribute scaling constants, ui(x;) are single-attribute utility functions and K is a
normalizing constant that scales U(Z) from 0 to 1. K can be calculated by numerical solution of the
following equation:
I+K=FJ(l+Kki) (4)
Figure 29 shows an example 3D plot of multiplicative utility function depending on two attributes of
interest.
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Figure 29 Fxample of iuti Attribute Utility iunetion
Methods used for estimation of single-attribute utility functions and weights depend on the type of
attribute being assessed and on their mathematical expression - whether they are discrete values or span a
continuous range of possible values. Utility function estimation methods are reviewed in (Keeney and
Raiffa 1976). Two popular methods for utility elicitation are the Certainty Equivalent Probability (CEP)
(Keeney and Raiffa 1976) method and the Lottery Equivalent Probability (LEP) (McCord and de
Neufville 1986) method.
The CEP method requires the interviewee to estimate which probability p makes him/her indifferent
between choosing a scenario where he is given an outcome O with 100% probability, and a scenario
where he either obtains an outcome 01 with p probability or an outcome 02 with (1-p) probability (Table
10). Once p is known, the utility associated with O can be estimated as:
U(O,) = pU(0) + (1- p)U(0 2 ) (5)
The LEP method poses a similar question to the interviewee where he/she is asked to state his/her
probability value for indifference between a scenario where he/she is given a 50% chance of receiving
outcome O, and a 50% chance of receiving outcome 02, and another scenario where he/she is given a
probability p of obtaining 01 and a (1-p) probability of obtaining outcome 02 (Table 11). Utility in this
case is estimated analogously as in equation (5). In LEP, probability values for p lie in between 0 and 0.5
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in order to achieve consistent answers. CEP and LEP questions are usually "chained" such that successive
questions make use of previously estimated information.
The chain of interviews probes experts for indifference questions between one outcome of unknown
utility value (for instance the middle point of the range of interest) and two outcomes of known utility
value. The chain is "primed" by using the extremal points of the range of interest: Omin for which utility
value is arbitrarily set at 0 and Om, for which utility value is arbitrarily set as 1. Utility sampling is
performed evenly across the range of possible values to obtain a set of single-attribute utility
observations.
While a minimum recommended number of utility points to determine is around 5-7 to obtain a good
estimate of utility across the range of interest, there is no maximum recommended number of interviews -
this is usually set by practical limits such as the time available for the interview and the total number of
questions to ask the expert in a questionnaire.
The final utility curve is obtained through least-square fitting of known utility models (such as the
negative exponential utility function formulation (Keeney and Raiffa 1976)) or through piece-wise
interpolation. The latter method is found to be more useful in engineering analysis, as "pre-canned"
formulations were developed with specific purposes for different types of applications - such representing
risk aversion in investment selection in finance and econometrics (Meyer 1987) - and do not account for
typical situations encountered in the "real world" of engineering design practice. For instance, a common
finding that emerged in this study is the existence of middle-range regions where utility functions exhibit
flat plateaus. Such regions represent non-variations of utility in some ranges, for instance when
engineering difficulty does not change significantly when designing a rover for 20km or 30km horizontal
mobility. Piecewise cubic Hermite interpolation has been found significantly effective in correctly
representing expert value judgments in this setting. CEP and LEP methods can be used concurrently to
obtain redundant measurements and therefore estimate the uncertainty within the answers provided by the
interviewee. The academic literature provides methods with which calibrate answers depending on the
degree of consistency of experts and evaluate the quality of the overall assessment (Morgan and Henrion
1990).
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Table 10 Certainty Eqivalent Probability (CEIP) method example
What probability value p would make you indifferent in






Table I I Lottery Equialent Probability (I EP inethod example
What probability value p would make you indifferent in
choosing between the following scenarios?












In both the additive and multiplicative formulations of multi-attribute utility, weights play the role of
representing priorities across attributes as specified by experts. There are several weight elicitation
procedures that have been proposed in the literature.
Three weight elicitation procedures that have been commonly used in engineering literature are the ratio
method (Edwards 1977), the swing method (von Winterfeldt and Edwards 1986) and the tradeoff method
(Keeney and Raiffa 1976).
The ratio method requires experts to rank attributes by importance. The least important attribute is given
a weight of 10. The expert then specifies weights multiples of 10 for the other attributes, reflecting their
relative importance.
The swing method presents experts an attribute set where each attribute is set at its worst value. The
expert is then given a choice to select one attribute to "swing" to its optimal level, maximizing his utility.
The first swing is assigned 100 points. Successively, the expert is asked to make a second swing and
assign points to it, and iterate the procedure until complete evaluation of all weights.
The tradeoff procedure presents experts two scenarios differing for a pair of attributes (holding all other
attributes at equal and constant values). The first scenario has the best value on the first attribute and the
worst value on the second attribute. The second scenario presents a reversed situation. The expert is asked
to select which alternative he/she prefers, therefore eliciting his ranking between associated weights. The
actual value of the weights is determined by a CEP or LEP procedure by either worsening the value of the
best attribute in the chosen scenario or improving the value of the worst attribute in the same chosen
scenario. The indifference probability elicited determines the weights.
The ratio and swing methods are effective in determining weights for an additive multi-attribute utility
formulation (where weights are successively normalized to 1). These methods are characterized by ease
of implementation and understanding by interviewed experts. The tradeoff procedure, instead, is a more
rigorous procedure for weight elicitation. The selection of a weight elicitation method on another depends
on the type of attribute being probed and results from a balance in available time and number of questions
presented in the interview and desired accuracy of results. Typically, a mix of methods is tested during
the initial review of the problem formulation with experts, leading to a final method selection.
Estimation of utility functions for attributes varying on discrete domains
The CEP and LEP methods discussed previously are not suitable methods for utility estimation if
attributes vary on discrete domains such as when assessing the utility provided by the collection of
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samples of different types, varying between sedimentary materials, hydrothermally and low temperature
altered rocks, igneous rocks and regolith - or a combination of those.
Discrete attributes are classified between mutually excluding attributes and complementary attributes.
Mutually excluding attributes are defined as attributes which can take only one value among a range of
possibilities. An example of mutually excluding attribute is the size of a sample of Martian soil. The
sample can either be small, medium or large, but cannot be small and large at the same time.
Complementary attributes are defined as attributes which can take more values among a range of
possible options. An example of complementary attribute is the diversity of a sample portfolio; a MSR
mission can be designed to sample only sedimentary materials, or a combination of sedimentary
materials, regolith and igneous rocks.
Different methods for utility estimation are proposed in this thesis for utility functions that depend on
mutually excluding attributes and complementary attributes.
Estimation of utility functions for mutually excluding discrete attributes
Examples of mutually excluding discrete attributes abound in engineering applications: the size of a
sample (small or large), the shape of a component (rectangular or cylindrical) and types of attitude control
method (3 axis stabilized or spin stabilized) are all examples of attributes that span a discrete domain of
possible choices. By necessity, utility in this case is defined by the interviewee relatively to a reference
choice (which utility is normalized to one).
A modified version of the ratio procedure discussed for weight elicitation can be employed for utility
estimation of mutually excluding discrete attributes. In the proposed procedure, the experts are asked to
rank alternative values of the attribute of interest. The first-ranking (best) attribute is given 100 points.
The interviewee is then asked to assign decreasing points - multiple of 10 - to the other alternatives. As a
consistency check, a second round of interview can be conducted where now the last-ranking (worst)
attribute is given 10 points. This time, the expert is asked to assign increasing points to the remaining
alternatives. Successive normalization to the best-ranking alternative will yield utility values for the
attribute of interest.
This proposed procedure features high ease of implementation and rapid understanding from interviewed
experts; however, it is not as rigorous as what it could be achieved using a tradeoff procedure such as the
one discussed in weight elicitation. Selection of a method over another will result from a balance of
available time and complexity in the interview, and is left to the judgment of the architecting team
implementing the proposed framework.
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Estimation of utility for complementary discrete attributes
Portfolio compositions are typical applications that can be described using complementary discrete
attributes. For instance, a portfolio of sample types to be retrieved on the Martian surface can comprise
different types of samples (NASA 2010):
e Sedimentary Materials
e Hydrothermally and Low Temperature Altered Rocks
* Igneous Rocks
* Regolith, Dust and Atmospheric Gas
A combined implementation of an additive utility formulation and CEP/LEP interviews for weight
elicitation can be used to estimate utility associated with a complementary discrete attribute set.
Associated utility equals:
U(Z)= Ikiui(xi) (6)
Where u;(x;) are binary single-attribute utility functions that assume value 0 if attribute option i is
selected if selection is deemed beneficial by the expert and value 1 if attribute option i is not selected, if
selection is deemed non beneficial. Utility values are reversed if selection is deemed as non-beneficial and
non-selection as beneficial.
Normalized weights k; represent the relative importance of each attribute value selected in the attribute
and are estimated through CEP/LEP interviews.
3.6.7. Step 6 - Elicitation of Expert Value Judgment
Elicitation of expert value judgment consists in the administration of the interview designed in Step 5
with each expert via individual face-to-face meetings, phone meetings or using a custom designed web
tool. The interview is required to comply the requirements of a Delphi study that is, ensuring anonymity
of participants of the study and verifying the expert complies with requirements discussed in Step 3
(Expert Panel Formation). Significant behavioral aspects emerged during the administration of value
judgment interviews with experts involved in the MSR campaign case study.
The following list summarizes ten lessons learnt that derived from behavioral aspects emerged
consistently during interviews:
1. Ask the right question: careful effort must be spent to tailor the interview to the
background and personality of the interviewee. Different interview styles are recommended
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depending on his/her background and bias deriving from varying research interests. The
interviewer must clarify in the interview that results will be released in anonymous form
(therefore reducing social pressure) and that the interviewee will have a chance to review
results and change his mind in subsequent rounds of the process. For instance, while
determining the value of increasing horizontal mobility for a rover system, one might want to
ask a scientist what is the added science value of driving additional kilometers. If the
question was addressed to an engineering audience, one would ask what is the perceived
added penalty introduced in the system by extending the mobility range. While the
interviewer should try to drive the expert in formulating accurate response, he/she must not
look for double-digit precision answers as they both intimidate the expert and they do not
add value to the quality of the results.
2. Ask the question right: Many engineers and scientists are used dealing with quantitative
analysis on observable quantities. Some will refuse a priori the idea of attempting
quantifying non-observable, subjective measurements such as value. For this reason, it is
critical that the interviewer conducts a thorough literature review and it uses the proper
terminology in formulating questions. While the same concepts can be expressed with
different words having the same meaning, it is recommended that the interviewer adapts his
terminology to what is commonly used in the organization in which the interview is being
conducted. So for instance, while the words "campaign" and "program" can be synonyms in
some contexts, this might not be the case in the organization of interest. Improper use of
terminology may introduce unwanted biases or may let the interviewee not to understand
questions, therefore reducing the quality of the final results.
3. Set boundaries to insatiability: Experts may face sometimes difficulty in setting boundaries
for the attributes for the study. This is due to the fact that most of the times the subject of the
investigation is unknown and highly exploratory - therefore experts face high degrees of
uncertainty in defining their own value judgment. This is found to be true in particular
among scientific communities. Science as a whole is a highly complex and exploratory
endeavor; therefore it is hard (if not impossible) in certain instances to define boundaries of
interest. Several scientists that were asked for the maximum number of samples they were
willing to consider for a MSR campaign, answered that infinite was the correct answer ("the
more, the merrier"). Although this answer may sometimes correspond to the actual truth, it is
required to guide the expert towards setting a reasonable boundary to allow elicitation of
value judgment. Setting of a boundary is required nevertheless to eventually specify a system
requirement for the actual mission. The interviewer should facilitate this process by
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proposing some number based on his expertise and preliminary literature review. The
interviewer should attempt reaching an initial agreement with the interviewee. The answer
being selected does not necessarily need to be the right one, as it will likely change during
the course of the study in further iterations. As prescribed by Delphi guidelines and
discussed in Step 8, the interviewer and interviewee have a chance to negotiate and attempt
reaching consensus while analyzing aggregate data from each study iteration - researchers of
the Delphi method proved that this approach yields eventually to the true result, or at the
very least provides a reasonable approximation that reduces ambiguity from initial stages of
the study (Rowe and Wright 1999).
4. Ensure that answers are not biased by implicit tradeoffs: The interviewer should not let
the interviewee take the place of the model, that is, give answers based on implicit tradeoffs
thus dampening the expert's actual preference. This is true in particular with interviewees
involved in multidisciplinary aspects of a project. The interviewer should remind the
interviewee to give answers that are based on his/her perspective only, since tradeoffs will be
conducted successively by quantitative modeling and aggregation of opinions.
5. Record the justifying rationale of each answer: Recording rationale is critical to ensure
credibility of the model to the customer and to conduct subsequent iterations of the study,
where experts are asked to revise their answers in light of the aggregate of the answers given
by the rest of the expert panel (as discussed in Step 8). If rationale is not recorded, the whole
modeling effort will lose credibility to the eyes of both the experts and the customer. It is
critical for the modeler to be able to understand the "physics" of the problem and to be able
to justify every single aspect and implication of the results of his work.
6. Avoid prejudices and perception of conflicts of interest: The interviewer must make clear
that his study will not compromise the position of the interviewee in the organization by all
means, as answers are maintained anonymous at all times and shown in aggregate form only.
If an interviewee is found to be uncooperative in contributing to the study, participation
should not be forced. An effective contribution is provided only by mutual cooperation
between the interviewer and interviewee.
7. Minimize difficulty and help overcoming lack of confidence in exploring unknown
areas of knowledge: Experts might be hesitating providing answers in multidisciplinary
areas of knowledge that include aspects that are not exactly their field of expertise. While
careful selection of experts in Step 3 is designed to identify individuals with broad expertise
in the problem being assessed, omniscience is seldom achieved by anyone. This is
particularly true in modem engineering: arguably, no engineer is able to design a MSR
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campaign by himself, hence showing the necessity of achieving group consensus.
"Guesstimates" are often the only resource available, especially in situations or areas of
knowledge that have never been probed in science or engineering. The iterative use of the
Delphi method and the use group knowledge lead to more accurate answers than the ones
expressed by individual alone.
8. Recognize difficulty in expressing judgment on "extreme" situations: Several
interviewees showed difficulty in expressing judgment when asked to elicit preference
among "extreme" situations. Such is the case when presenting an engineer to express an
indifference probability between a scenario where he is asked to design a mission to carry an
average number of samples with certainty (assume for instance 20 samples), and a scenario
where there is a probability p where he will be asked to design to easier system requirements
(assume 10 samples), or a (1-p) chance where he will be asked to design the system for an
extremely challenging requirement, such as for 200 samples. One answer received by one of
the interviewees in the MSR case study was: "If there is even a slight chance that the
adverse condition will occur, my career would be ruined, I am not willing to take that risk by
all means and therefore I will setp at 100%". The problem with this answer is that it will
contradict other similar judgment statements, showing irrational behavior and invalidating
the outcome of the study. This type of answers emerges when the interviewer does not
explain properly the scope of the study. In the example before, it would have sufficed to the
interviewer to explain that high risk aversion (such as the one demonstrated by the expert in
question) can be expressed with a high probability value between 0 and 1 (but not equal to 0
or 1). Furthermore, the interviewer must stress to the expert that he will be able to review his
answer in subsequent rounds in light of the aggregate judgment expressed by other experts -
therefore providing more confidence in his value judgment.
9. Minimize the bias induced by reverse engineering attempts: Experts might try to give
their answers based on their personal attempt of reverse engineering the methodologies used
in the study, and providing answers that will most likely satisfy the scope of the investigation
itself. For this reason, the interviewer should not disclose the "mechanics" of the methods
being used to the interviewee during the course of the interview, as this could implicitly bias
his/her answers. For instance, if the interviewee gives answers to CEP/LEP questionnaires
based purely on expected value calculations, the interview will be invalidated in that biases
and marginal preferences will not be represented in the resulting quantitative model.
10. Validate and verify the results: Follow up with the expert after each round for results
review before data aggregation is very important to validate the overall modeling effort.
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Review usually provides insight to both the interviewer and the expert himself, who might
find the results useful for his own purposes as well (for instance, reusing them in other
projects or similar proposals). A final review of the outcomes of the study with the expert
panel is also recommended before releasing documentation and recommendations to
management and decision makers (Step 10).
3.6.8. Step 7 - Results AnaIalsis
After collecting data from experts, results are processed and incorporated into a systems architecting
analysis model.
Objectives of Results Analysis
The objectives of the results analysis are:
1. To identify a set of optimal requirements and architectures of interest for further
consideration by decision-makers by identifying the set of Pareto-efficient architectures among
the feasible architectures within the design space and providing a first-order scenario analysis;
2. To understand the impact of requirement options in the overall performance of feasible
architectures by performing a multi-performance architectural analysis of the design space;
3. To understand the impact of architectural options in the implementation of all possible sets of
requirements for a mission or campaign by performing a trade-off architectural analysis in the
design space.
The framework presented in this thesis enhances systems architecting analysis by proposing a
Delphi-based integrated framework to reduce ambiguity in the definition of objectives as elicited by
stakeholders and supporting their negotiations.
'he proposed D)elphi-hased integrated f*ramework supports stakeholders in reaching consensus in
the dlefinition of objectives, wlien appropriate, and to identily areas of open debate. For instance, it
allows scientists and engineers to reach consensus and effective compromises in the definition of
overall scientific value of a mission or campaign.
Mathematical definition of Pareto dominance and Pareto efficiency
In typical aerospace applications, architectures are evaluated by performance cost metrics (such as total
dry mass of an architecture), total cost, and other quantitative metrics as developed in Problem
Formulation (Step 2). In a Pareto efficient architecture, no metric can be improved without worsening
performance along other metrics. In other words, Pareto-efficient architectures feature optimal metric
trade-offs in the design space of feasible solutions. A rigorous definition of Pareto-efficiency and its
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relevancy to systems architecting and engineering design is better clarified by introducing the concept of
dominance in design space exploration.
An architecture can be represented by a design vector Z=[xi], where the x;'s represent the values for
each option in the integrated architectural assessment matrix discussed in Problem Formulation (Step 2)
and reported in Table 12. An objective vector i (ZM= [jjiX(Z is associated to each architecture Ai in
the design space of feasible architectures D = {A 1 . It is assumed that all objectives jj7(Z) in the objective
vector are to be maximized. In this case, architecture Am is said to be dominated in a Pareto sense by
architecture An if in > m for all pairs (imini) E (Jm ,n). In other words, a decision-maker is always
better off selecting architecture An over architecture Am as architecture An always features superior
performance with respect to Am. On the other hand, architecture An is said to be non-dominated in a
Pareto sense by architecture Am. Architecture An is said to be Pareto-efficient if it results non-dominated
with respect to all the others architectures within the feasible design space. The set of all Pareto-efficient
architectures in the design space constitutes the so called Pareto frontier, or set of Pareto-efficient
architectures.
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Pareto analysis in design space exploration
Figure 30 provides an example of identification of Pareto efficient architectures in design space analysis.
The figure shows a sample bi-dimensional tradespace where each blue dot represents a feasible
architecture as evaluated by two objective metrics defined by system architects.
Assuming that maximization of both metrics is desired, it is possible to identify the utopia point, which
is the ideal point where both objectives are at their maximum. The set of Pareto-efficient architectures
(red dots in the figure) are the ones which tend towards the utopia point and exhibit efficient trade-offs
between objectives.
In the notional example in the figure, Pareto-efficient architectures are options of interest to decision-
makers, featuring optimal solutions at different levels of engineering and scientific satisfaction;
architectures with high engineering scores (featuring ease of implementation) will most likely result into
architectures of low scientific value. This situation could represent, for instance, a MSR campaign where
the caching element is represented by a lander with a scoop payload that only retrieves 10 grams of dust
samples to Earth. On the other hand, architectures with high value delivery to scientists will most likely
result to increased engineering difficulty. In the 2D notional example presented in Figure 30, Pareto
efficient architectures are those that for a constant level of one objective (for instance, utility to engineers)
provide the maximum level of the other objective (such as utility to scientists).
Pareto analysis allows the identification of combinations of interest of requirements and system
architectures, to be considered for further decision-making and analysis.
Patreto analysis is an effective tool to facilitate the achievenient of an optimal compromise betw een
scientific ambitions, engineering requirements and program management constraints.
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Design space exploration allows further elicitation of insights beyond simple Pareto analysis. It can be
used to:
- Analyze the variation in performance/utility on system architectures due to change in
requirements (multi-performance architectural analysis).
- Analyze the variation in performance/utility due to the implementation of different options to
implement an architectural function of interest (trade-off analysis).
Design space exploration assumes consensus between homogeneous groups of stakeholders. This implies
that, for instance, engineers reached consensus in the definition of engineering value (as represented by
the "utility to engineers" function in the previous notional example) and that scientists reached consensus
likewise in the definition of scientific value. Consensus implies that utility functions representing value in
both group are representative of all opinions and therefore are "deterministic" (meaning that there is no
uncertainty surrounding those functions). This condition is rarely verified in initial phases of a mission
lifecycle. In reality, ambiguity in the definition of objective implies that utility functions are surrounded
by uncertainty, and that the actual value judgments cannot be represented by univocal functions. Results
analysis provides the means to reach optimal compromise between heterogeneous stakeholder groups -
for instance, between the engineering and scientific communities. However, preliminary reaching of
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consensus is required within homogeneous groups of stakeholders. This is achieved through negotiation;
the following step provides structured tools to guide those negotiations and progressively guide experts to
agree towards an optimal definition of objectives.
3.6.9. Step 8 - A\ggregate Results Discussion with Individual Experts
The Delphi method requires iterations to discuss results with individual experts. The goal is to guide
experts revising their answers towards reaching consensus in the group. (Rowe 1991) describes the
advantages of considering the aggregate response of a panel of experts towards reading the true answer
being sought by the study: "the so called 'theory of errors' assumes that the aggregate of a group will
provide ajudgment/forecast that is generally superior to that of most of the individuals within the group:
when the range of individual estimates excludes the true answer (T), then the median (M) should be at
least as close to the true answer as one half of the group, but when the range of estimates includes T, then
M should be more accurate than more than half of the group. This indicates the advantage of taking a








Figure 31 Theoretical change in group response over rounds (adapted from (Rowe, Wright et al. 1991))
Figure 31 exemplifies this concept showing the tendency of the group to move towards the true answer
over iterations (defined "rounds" in Delphi jargon). Experts who gave outlier answers in the statistical
aggregates are classified as Holdouts and Swingers. Holdouts are experts able to provide sound reasons
justifying their outlier position. Swingers are experts showing less confidence on the answer and are
willing to rely on group's knowledge by changing their answer even significantly. The overall result is
that of driving the group towards the area containing the true answer over rounds.
Round iterations as prescribed by the Delphi have been by showing stakeholders aggregate boxplot charts.
In descriptive statistics, boxplots describe groups of data through their five-number summary: the lowest
observation (sample minimum), lower quartile (Ql), median (Q2), upper quartile (Q3) and largest
observation (sample maximum) (Moore, McCabe et al. 2007). Figure 32 shows a boxplot example as
referred to the probability density function of a normal population of data. In a boxplot, whiskers
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represent the lowest and largest observation. The edges of the box represent the lower and upper quartile
(25% and 75% percentile), while the central bar represents the median.
Q1 - 1.5 x IQR
-40 -30 -2o 1C
-2.698c -0,6
24.65%
-40 -30 -20 -10
5.73%










O la 2a 3o 4a
0O 10 20 3C 40
FiIulrc 32 Boxiplot exam1 ple as referred to a probability densit y v fiction of a normal population of data
(adapted from (Wikipedia 2011))
After each round, experts are asked to review their answer in light of the aggregate answer of the group.
Figure 33 shows an example of chart that used to facilitate discussion with experts, showing boxplots for
each weight and utility function data derived during the Elicitation of Expert Value Judgment (Step 6).
The pink dots represent the actual answer of the expert being interviewed. For each boxplot experts were
asked to justify their answer and to either change it in light of the group's response, or keep it while
providing justification in case the answer represents an outlier or lies outside of the edges of the box.
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Overall, Delphi iterations reduce ambiguity that surrounds the definition of objectives for a system's
architecture. Figure 34 shows this concept of progressive reduction of ambiguity during rounds of Delphi
iterations. The figure represents the trend observed in the case studies conducted in this thesis, showing
that most of the ambiguity is reduced during the first rounds of the Delphi exercise, while additional
rounds serve the purpose of refining answers. This confirms previous empirical observations by
researchers in social science (Rowe and Wright 1999). Furthermore, this thesis has found that when the
subject of the investigation is mostly unknown (such as the case of the exploration of Mars), there exists
an irreducible amount of ambiguity that cannot be resolved. This irreducible ambiguity can only be
resolved after the mission being studied has actually been flow. For instance, it is impossible to know a
priori that a given experimental design will lead with certainty to the proof of existence (or non existence)
of life on Mars. Nevertheless, the goal of the system architect is fulfilled by Delphi iterations as reducible
ambiguity has been eliminated, therefore ensuring that concept selection has been performed making the
best use of the available rationale, therefore maximizing the expected value delivered to stakeholders and
beneficiaries of the project.
An additional result of interest is to assess the impact of identified ambiguities on the tradespace of
feasible system architectures. Ambiguity Impact Analysis can be done with several analytic and numeric
methods, including:
* Design of Experiments (DoE) and Sensitivity Analysis: performing a full or factorial experiment,
with ambiguous variables as factors (i.e. the property variables of the MAUA functions), and a
number of percentile values as levels (such as the 0 [min] / 25 / 50 [median] / 75 / 100 [max]
percentiles). Main effects and main interactions can be measured on a set of variables of interest,
such as architectural utility values, mass, cost, and so forth. By this analysis, one can rank
ambiguities by their overall impact on selected variables. This approach can be applied to
compare individual system architectures, or to measure overall effect of ambiguities on the
tradespace. We will demonstrate the application of this approach to this case.
e Correlation Analysis: In correlation analysis the goal is to identify correlations of the tradespace
with ambiguous variables of interest. This is done by the examination of the tradespace with
proxy metrics for variability induced by ambiguity. For instance, one could choose the standard
deviation of subjective utility metrics associated with each architecture (where the spread is given
by differences in opinions of individual experts in their respective panels). This approach is
suitable for assessment of ambiguity impact on the tradespace as it does not require the definition
of arbitrary weights, while allowing the analysis of a large dataset. We will use this as a second
approach to confirm findings obtained with Design of Experiments.
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Monte Carlo Analysis: Monte Carlo is a popular approach for quantification of effects of multi-
domain uncertainties. Its popularity is derived by the relative simplicity of implementation, and
the widespread availability of computing capability required by this method. Monte Carlo
approaches are also applicable to the analysis of ambiguities. In this setting, a Monte Carlo
analysis implies the definition of stochastic value metrics, defined by assuming distribution
shapes to fit ambiguous data of interest (such as normal or triangular distributions). Stochastic
value metrics are used to evaluate the tradespace a large number of times, therefore deriving
statistics of interest to assess variability induced by ambiguity on output metrics of interest. The
assumption of a distribution is arbitrary in this context, as there is no firm rationale on how to
choose a distribution over another. Monte Carlo is a valid choice for comparison of selected
architectures. However, the large size of the tradespace involved (which in this example is of the
order of 105) prevents the use of a Monte Carlo approach.
3.6.10. Step 9 - (ivergenice Criteria
DB-SAF is stopped when a criterion for convergence is met. Typical convergence criteria are the
achievement of a pre-defined number of iterations, the achievement of consensus and the stability of
results when variations in answers between two rounds are less than a pre-specified tolerance criterion.
The median or mean results are used at the end of the Delphi process. The standard deviation at the final
iteration represents the variability induced by the estimated irreducible ambiguity.
3.6.11. Step 10 - I)ocuinentationi and Development of Recoimendations
Once convergence has been met, the results of the resulting design space exploration are documented and
used for the development of recommendations to the customer.
3.7. Summary
The job of a systems architect is to transform a set of needs and goals into a systems architecture
(Simmons 2008). Successful systems architecting is threatened by ambiguities in the definition of
stakeholder needs and goals and the definition of a functional intent (i.e. upstream systems architecting
processes). This chapter developed an ontological analysis that identified perceived needs, intended
functions, function/need and form function mapping, formal and functional constraints as potential
sources of ambiguity in systems architecting (Section 3.1). In Section 3.2, ambiguities are classified in
reducible and irreducible ambiguities, defining the need of a set of strategies for their mitigation. Section
3.3 presented tools that are used in elicitation of perceived stakeholder needs and other upstream
architecting processes, and discussed their vulnerability to ambiguities that have been identified.
Following this analysis, Section 3.4 presented a set of canonical forms for systems architecting under
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ambiguous stakeholder objectives, integrated within a descriptive Systems Architecting Management
Framework (SA-MF, Section 3.5). System architects can use SA-MF as a descriptive tool to reason
through ambiguities in their systems architecting process of interest. SA-MF requires comprehensive
analysis to inform the selection of an ambiguity mitigation action. The analysis is performed by the
development of a Delphi-Based Systems Architecting Framework (DB-SAF) in Section 3.6. DB-SAF is a
structured, iterative anonymous tool for systems architecting under stakeholder ambiguity. The chapter
presents a step-by-step implementation description of DB-SAF, describing tools that are available to
system architects to model their architecting problems of interest.
This chapter developed the theoretical background and the integrated framework for systems architecting
under ambiguity in stakeholder objectives. The remainder of the thesis applies this framework to
application case studies in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5, and describes a retrospective validation case study of
the methodology in Chapter 6.
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Chapter 4 : Case Study 1 - Mars Sample Return Campaign
Figure 35 Mlatrs Sample Return - Artist Concept (inage credit: NASA)
4.1. Introduction
The first application case study of this thesis is an independent systems architecting study of the Mars
Sample Return campaign. The study was formulated by the author between June 2011 and September
2011 at Caltech/NASA's Jet Propulsion Laboratory, and proceeded through December 2011 at MIT. The
study involved expert panels with a total of 12 experts (senior engineers and scientists) from JPL, ESA,
and academia. This chapter shows how the study successfully identifies ambiguities, proposes their
classification and enables their reduction. Ambiguities are studied both in the definition of scientific
objectives and engineering complexity for a MSR campaign, that is, the mapping between stakeholder
needs and system functions. The framework integrates this requirement study with a conventional
architectural assessment. The resulting design space exploration identifies Pareto efficient at different
levels of cost and performance, with optimal compromises between science and engineering
requirements. A benchmark against the existing 3-element campaign baseline as presented in recent
Mission Concept Studies (NASA 2010) provides validation to the study.
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4.2. Motivations and Context
Mars Sample Return (MSR) has been the holy grail of planetary science for many decades. Scientists
have advocated a sample return mission to Mars for the past thirty years (NRC 2011). Nevertheless, MSR
is still being studied in its formulation phase, trying to match the ambitious goal of returning samples
from the Martian surface with the more terrestrial requirement of meeting the budget. Between March and
April 2010, NASA published three Mission Concept Studies to support its Planetary Decadal Survey and
propose a three-element architecture for a MSR campaign. Although being a mission of high scientific
value and despite the efforts in spreading cost and technical risk in three mission elements, the MSR
campaign still faces the challenge to reconcile its goals with available means. The Decadal Survey
committee noted: "<...> The highest priority large mission for the decade 2013-2022 is the Mars
Astrobiology Explorer-Cacher (MAX-C), which will begin a three-mission NASA-ESA Mars Sample
Return campaign extending into the decade beyond 2022. At an estimated cost of $3.5 billion as currently
designed, however, MAX-C would take up a disproportionate share of the NASA's planetary budget.
<...> The committee recommends that NASA fly MAX-C in the decade 2013-2022, but only if it can be
conducted for a cost to NASA of no more than approximately $2.5 billion FY2015. If a cost of no more
than about $2.5 billion FY2015 cannot be verified, the mission (and the subsequent elements of Mars
Sample Return) should be deferred until a subsequent decade or cancelled." (NRC 2011).
Ambiguity in the definition of objectives for MSR stems from difficulty of compromise between science
and engineering requirements, and from lack of consensus within both communities. Programmatic
constraints are considered, such as cost caps, representing the challenge faced by program management in
meeting ambitious objectives defined by scientists and technical boundaries defined by engineers under
given cost caps.
Scientists involved in planning have different views on how a particular objective should be defined, such
as how many samples collect from Mars to achieve a set of scientific goals. A clear example that has been
identified in the study is the difference in value judgment between astrobiologists and geologists in the
evaluation of alternative sets of requirements for the campaign. Figure 36 shows an example of science
utility associated with different sample depths, as seen by two different stakeholders.
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In this example, experts were asked for their value judgment as a function of different attributes of
interest. Value judgments were successively codified in utility functions. Sample depth could vary
between surface drilling (2.5cm depth), 1-meter drilling, 10-meter drilling and deep drill (100m). Results
were normalized to the maximum utility value for each set. The results showed that geologists were
mostly interested in surface samples: 2.5cm in depth allows the collection of samples that have not been
altered significantly by atmospheric processes (unweathered samples (Gooding, Arvidson et al. 1992))
while providing relevant information on the geologic processes that shaped the Martian surface. Deeper
sample collections are deemed less valuable as their vertical distribution history is harder to keep during
coring operations, rendering science hypothesis formulation and testing harder and less reliable. On the
other side of the spectrum, astrobiologists indicated 10 meters as their most interesting sample depth,
having higher likelihood of finding signs of life at those depths. Several analog examples can be
identified in the data that has been collected for the study presented in this thesis.
This case study investigates the impact of such diversity in opinion on simultaneous consideration
of system requirements definition and systems architecture definition in terms of performance, on
cost and risk metrics. Recommendations are eventually made on the selection of the system






This case study identifies, classifies and reduces ambiguities with emphasis on science value and
engineering complexity as perceived subjective value metrics. The analysis uses multi-attribute utility
theory as a formal means for expert elicitation. The specific goals of the analysis are the following:
- Characterize and identify reducible and irreducible ambiguities in the definition of a Mars Sample
Return campaign architecture. The debate on scientific value and compromises with engineering
complexity is analyzed and discussed;
- Enumerate possible requirements sets for a Mars Sample Return campaign, evaluating
requirement sets with subjective value functions obtained with utility interviews;
- Identify requirement sets of interest for further analysis by system architects, and integrate them
with a technical and programmatic analysis of system architectures, identifying alternative
architectures and classifying them by cost using a Rough Order of Magnitude (ROM) mass-based
cost metric.
- Identify architectures of interest for further consideration by decision-makers.
4.4. Application of the Framework
4.4.1. Step I - Literaltire Review and Systems-Specific Expertisc
A literature review concerning the Mars Sample Return campaign has been conducted to inform the
present study. The description of this review is out of the scope of this thesis; a review on the evolution of
the Mars Sample Return campaign is provided by (Mattingly, Matousek et al. 2004). MEPAG reports are
comprehensive accounts on current thinking for a Mars Sample Return mission. The MEPAG report or
science priorities for a MSR mission is of particular interest to this thesis (MEPAG 2008). Mission
concept studies from 2010 describe the three-element architecture of MSR developed by the Jet
Propulsion Laboratory (NASA 2010; NASA 2010; NASA 2010; NASA 2010).
4.4.2. Step 2 - Problemn Forinulaioii
4.4.2. 1. Identlification oJquestions of interest
Through discussions with MSR management, experts and survey of the literature, eight questions
emerged for research:
1. Does the current MSR architecture provide an efficient compromise between desired science
returns and engineering complexity? (i.e. how far is it from ideal Pareto efficiency?)
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2. What other Pareto-efficient MSR architectures could be devised for different levels of total cost?
3. What sample portfolio should MSR be designed for to maximize scientific returns?
4. What sample size should MSR be designed for optimal tradeoff between scientific returns and
engineering complexity?
5. Is it worthwhile for MSR to accept the risk and invest in technology to retrieve samples beyond
surface drilling (i.e. > 2.5cm)?
6. Is it worthwhile for MSR to accept the risk of extending horizontal mobility for distributed
sample caching and in-situ science investigations?
4.4.2.2. Goals idtentific-ation
As shown in the methodological discussion in Section Two, Table 13 presents campaign goals that have
been identified for MSR.
Table 13 inample Stakeholder Goals for the Mars Sample Return Campaign
Stakeholder Goals
To Collect Samples of the Martian Surface
To Conduct In-situ Science on Mars
To Return Collected Samples to Earth
To Ensure collected samples comply with planetary protection requirements
4.4.2.3. F-unctional decomposition
The MSR architecture has been decomposed in functions derived from stakeholder goals (Table 14); the
study recognized areas of interest for design space exploration within the functions regarding operations
on the Martian surface and the transportation infrastructure beyond Trans Mars Injection (TMI). The
study did not consider transportation options where an Earth Departure Stage was developed in addition
to the upper stage of the launch vehicle. As the development of launch infrastructure is a given for a flight
project and since most planetary missions can be performed with existing capabilities, this study assumed
that existing launch capability would be used. Furthermore, the study considered an MSL-analog
architecture for Entry, Descent and Landing; it considers the use of an Aeroshell and Sky Crane - derived
landing system (NASA 2010).
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Table 14 IFinctional decomposition for the MSR campaign architecture
Functions Included In DesignSpace Exploration?
To reach Low Earth Orbit No
To transit between Low Earth Orbit and Low Mars Orbit No
To entry the Martian atmosphere No
To descend and land on Martian surface No
To drill Martian Surface and prepare Sample Caches for Fetching Yes
To Fetch Sample Caches Yes
To Bring Sample Caches to Low Mars Orbit Yes
To transit between Low Mars Orbit and Low Earth Orbit Yes
To re-enter Earth atmosphere Yes
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4.4.2.4. Requirements Enumeration




Drilling System SurfaceMaximum Reachable (-2.5cm) 1-meter 10-meter 3
Depth
Total Number of 10 20 30 40 4Samples Collected
Small Medium Large
Sample Size (0.5cm D x (1.0cm D x (5.0cm D x 3
1.0cm H) 5.0cm H) 15cm H)
Horizontal Diversity 5 km 10 km 25 km 50 km 4(characteristic radius)
Collect Sedimentary Yes No 2Material Samples
Collect Hydrothermally &
Low Temp. Altered Yes No 2
Samples
Collect Igneous Rock Yes No 2Samples




Table 15 shows the identification of requirements and enumeration of requirement options for the MSR
campaign. The study focused in the investigation of requirements in the following areas:
Sample Types Collected: The composition of the portfolio of samples being collected is important to
allow scientists to answer science questions of interest.
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Following the literature review in Step 1 (with particular reference to science priorities identified by
MEPAG (MEPAG 2008)), samples have been grouped in the following categories of interest:
e Sedimentary Materials
e Hydrothermally & Low Temperature Altered Rocks
* Igneous Rocks
e Regolith, Dust and Atmospheric Gas
In this study the collection of polar ices has been neglected as this type of sample entails particular
challenges in terms of sample collection, sample preservation and planetary collection (being thermal
control one of the most technical challenges), and it is not foreseen by the majority of experts as a sample
type that will most likely be collected in a MSR campaign in the near future'. However, as this study is
meant as a "proof of concept" and since all major relevant sample types are collected, this assumption is
deemed appropriate for the type of analysis being conducted. In Table 15, different sample portfolios can
be represented by selecting different combinations of Yes/No options for each sample type in the
portfolio.
Total Number of Samples: different numbers of samples to be retrieved by MSR were investigated in the
study. Most scientific experts expressed an ideal desire of retrieving infinite amount of samples to carry
their investigation (see further discussion in Step 6). However, as naturally expected a number of samples
to be retrieved must be determined to provide a requirement to design and perform a preliminary sizing of
the architecture. The concept of relevant samples emerged during discussion with experts. Not all samples
collected are relevant to answer specific questions of interest. Uncertainty in sample relevancy is hedged
in the current MSR architecture by having the option of selecting samples during surface exploration.
Nevertheless, this will not provide definite guarantee of relevancy of samples, which can only be proved
by actual analysis on Earth. This study assumes that only 30% of collected samples are relevant for the
purposes of expert value judgment elicitation. The study further assumes that the architecture retrieves the
same amount of samples for each sample type within the portfolio. As a result of these assumptions, an
MSR architecture designed to collect a total number of 100 samples of four different types will be
expected to retrieve 25 samples per each sample type category. Of those 25, only 7 or 8 samples will be
expected to be relevant to answer science questions of interest.
' Source: private conversations with JPL engineers
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Sample Depth: the study investigated four different orders of magnitudes for sample depth to be
considered as design reference for sizing of drilling payload and development of a concept of operations
for sample coring and retrieval. The study investigated the following four sample depths:
e Surface (2.5cm) - the 2.5cm value has been selected to reflect the value being used in the current
MSR baseline. 2.5cm allow retrieval of unweathered samples, i.e. samples that were not modified
by surface atmospheric processes;
e 1-meter
e 10-meter
e Deep Drill (100-meter)
Sample Size: the study assumes collection of cylindrical samples of equal volume for each sample type in
the portfolio. Three sample sizes were considered for investigation:
e Small (0.5cm D x 1.0cm H)
e Medium (1.Ocm D x 5.Ocm H)
- Large (5.0cm D x 15.0cm H)
Horizontal Diversity: Implementation of mobility in the MSR architecture allows systems to explore
areas for in-situ science and enhanced capability of selecting samples for caching. A characteristic design
radius to which the mobility system needs to be designed represents horizontal mobility. Options explored
include mobility for 5km, 10km, 25km and 50km. Lander options (0km horizontal mobility) were initially
considered for study and subsequently removed from the design space as discussion with science experts
revealed a marked preference for mobility. With current landing site selection criteria in fact, engineers
usually select flat regions for landing safety purposes. However, regions of interest to scientists are hills
and terrains featuring geologic diversity, therefore eliciting the need of moving the caching system from
its landing site to reach areas of high likelihood to have relevant samples for caching and retrieval.
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4.4.2. F. ntion-Form Mapping
Table 16 Function-forin mapping
Functions Forms
To drill Martian Surface and prepare Sample Caches for Drilling and Caching Rover
Fetching
To Fetch Sample Caches Fetch Rover
To Bring Sample Caches to Low Mars Orbit Mars Ascent Vehicle
To transit between Low Mars Orbit and Low Earth Orbit Mars Ascent Vehicle (MAV) or
Earth Return Vehicle (ERV)
To re-enter Earth atmosphere Mars Ascent Vehicle (MAV) or
Earth Return Vehicle (ERV)
Table 16 shows the mapping between functions and elements of form as intended in this study. Options
are presented in Table 17 for each form. In this table, the number of elements refers to the partitioning of
functions across different flight missions. Functions are:
- Drill: to retrieve samples from the Martian surface by drilling and to prepare them for return by
caching;
- Fetch: to retrieve a sample cache on the Martian terrain and move it to the Return system;
- Return: to return samples from the Martian surface to Earth.
The "Return" function can be further partitioned in two options: either samples are returned via a
combination of a Mars Ascent Vehicle (MAV) and an Earth Return Vehicle (ERV) (i.e. an Orbiter on
Low Mars Orbit), or a MAV is designed to bring samples directly from Mars surface to Earth. Both the
MAV and ERV can be conceived with a different number of stages; typically, one would consider
between 1-3 stages for a MAV and between 1-2 stages for an ERV given the nominal delta V involved in
their trajectory design. As a rule of thumb, one would expect that a 3 stage MAV would be required for
direct sample retrieval (where the third stage would serve mainly for Trans Earth injection); a 2-stage
ERV in a MAV+ERV scenario would serve the purpose of reducing the overall mass of the mission (the
extent of said gain to be assessed by the architecting model), albeit at the additional technical and
operational risk of adding staging operations to the MAV. Two propulsion options are assessed for the
MAV (Solid propellant vs NTO/N 2H4), whereas only one propulsion option is assumed for the ERV -
although featuring higher specific impulse, LOX/LH 2 stages are not suitable in an MSR scenario due to
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out gassing constraints on mission lifetime, rendering this option unattractive due to long cruise times
required to reach Mars and do the mission.

















(MAV) Number of Stages 1 2 3 3
Earth Return Vehicle
(ERV) Number of Stages 1 2 2
Mars Ascent Vehicle Solid Storable 2(MAV) Propulsion Type NTO/N2H4
Earth Return Vehicle MAV +
(ERV) Platform Type MAV only Orbiter 2
Earth Return Vehicle Storable 1
(ERV) Propulsion Type NTO/N2H4
The resulting design space exploration model (Table 18) combines requirements and architecture
enumeration rendering a total of 221,184 possible architectures.
As discussed in Section Two, the quantitative model identifies feasible architectures within the domain of
possible combinations by applying technical and logical constraints. The following constraints have been
applied to the model:
- Maximum total campaign cost = $10B 2
- Maximum total campaign dry mass = 20mt3
- Maximum allowable payload diameter = 4.5m
- MAV height < 4.Om
- ERV height < 4.Om
2 Although in Section Two we recommended not to include cost constraints, an upper limit has been set in this case after a first
analysis of results, to improve visualization on the region of interest of the design space (thus eliminating architectures with a
large number of large samples) and non-convenient architectural implementations - such as 1-stage MAVs returning samples to
Earth directly).
' This upper limit has been set for the same motivation of the cost constraint discussed above.
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4.4.2.6. Architecting Model
The architecting model has been implemented in MATLAB@ and structured in modules as shown in the
waterfall diagram in Table 194. The model has been partitioned not to have feedback loops between
modules. Feedback loops are usually found in system design models (a typical feedback loop in
spacecraft design can be found between power and thermal subsystem models). Based on the experience
of the author, such is rarely the case in architecting models featuring transportation architectures sized
through first principles (i.e. rocket equation calculations). All units in the model are S.I. unless otherwise
noted.
Table 19 Model mplementition Waterfall Diagram
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The following modules have been implemented:
- Model Inputs: This module includes parameters that have been assumed throughout the analysis.
Table 20 provides a synopsis of the parameters used in the architecting model.
Table 20 Paranieters used in a rchitecting model
Parameter Name Parameter Value Parameter Description
MI_SampleContainerDimOverhead 1/17 Sample Container Size
Overhead Parameter
MI_SampleContainTareFraction 0.04 Sample Container Tare
Fraction
MIMAVDiameter 0.40 MAV Diameter
MIMAVInterstageHeightFraction 0.61 MAV Interstage Height
Fraction (w.r.t. Total
Tanks Height)
MIERVInterstageHeightFraction 0.61 ERV Interstage Height
Fraction (w.r.t. Total
Tanks Height)
MIEDLMassFraction 0.30 EDL Payload Mass
Fraction
MIEDVDiameter 4.50 m EDV Diameter
MI_EDVPropulsionType 1 EDV Propulsion Type
(NTO/N2H4)
MI_SampleDensityMatrix(1) 3000 kg/m3 Sedimentary Materials
Density
MI_SampleDensityMatrix(2) 2500 kg/m3 Hydrothermally & Low T.
Altered Rocks Density
MI_SampleDensityMatrix(3) 2750 kg/m3 Igneous Rocks Density
MI_SampleDensityMatrix(4) 1100 kg/m3 Regolith and Dust
Density
MI_dVLEOLMO 4500 m/s Delta V from Low Earth
Orbit (LEO) to Low Mars
Orbit (LMO)
MI_dVLMOMS 1400 m/s Delta V from LMO to
Martian Surface (MS)
MI_dVMSLMO 4100 m/s Delta V from MS to LMO
MIdVLMOLEO 2600 m/s Delta V from LMO to LEO
MIdVLEOGND 0 m/s Delta V from LEO to
Earth Surface (GND)
MIEDVPropellantDensity 130 kg/m3 EDV Propellant Density
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MIEarthGravity 9.81 m/s2 Earth Gravity
MIOrbiterContingency 0.43 Orbiter Mass Contingency
MIRoverSystemContingency 0.43 Rover Systems Mass
Contingency
MIRoverInstrumentPackMass 30.6 kg Rover Instrument Package
Total Mass
MIFetchPayloadMassFraction 0.09 Fetch Rover Payload Mass
Fraction
MICachingPayloadMassFraction 0.18 Caching Rover Payload
Mass Fraction
MILOXDensity 1141 kg/m3 LOX Density
MI_LH2Density 130 kg/m3 LH2 Density
MIAeroShellDiameter 1200 kg/m3 Aeroshell Diameter
MIERVDiameter 4.5 m ERV Diameter
MIFetchRoverSystemContingency 0.30 Fetch Rover System
Contingency
- Samples Module: The samples module assumes a sample container payload mass fraction to size
the sample container as a function of the total mass of collected samples.
- Caching (Driller) Module: The caching module provides a preliminary sizing of the rover
system based on payload mass fraction principles. Payload mass fractions have been estimated
from the MSR baseline. Payload mass is estimated as the sum of in-situ science instruments mass
(defined as parameter in the model) and drilling payload mass. Drilling payload mass is estimated
using a parametric model that has been developed based on actual and proposed drilling payloads
(see Appendix 9.2 for details on this model). Drilling payload mass is estimated as a function of
drilling depth.
- Fetch and Mars Ascent Vehicle Module: The fetch rover is estimated using payload mass
fractions. Fetch payload is incorporated in drilling and caching payload in corresponding 2
element architectures where drilling and fetching functions are incorporated, allow mass savings
in that a dedicated fetch rover is not required. It further estimates the dry and wet mass of the
Mars Ascent Vehicle. The delta V capability of the MAV depends on the concept of operations
selected in the architecture, i.e. whether the MAV is supposed to deliver the Sample Container in
Low Mars Orbit or to deliver the Sample Container directly to Earth surface.
- Earth Return Vehicle Module: This module estimates the dry and wet mass of an Earth Return
Vehicle (i.e. an orbiter) based on payload mass fractions and first principles (i.e. rocket equation
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calculations). Those masses are zero in architectures where the MAV retrieves samples directly to
Earth surface.
- Entry Descent and Landing Module: this module estimates the mass of the Entry Descent and
Landing (EDL) system required to land an entry mass estimated by the other modules of the
model. The module incorporates the model that has been developed and is presented in Section
Three that estimates EDL mass as a function of entry velocity, entry mass and an average ballistic
coefficient estimated through comparison with analog Mars missions.
- Earth Departure and Mars Arrival Vehicle Module: this module estimates the mass of an
Earth Departure vehicle. This feature being deactivated in the latest version of the model where it
is always assumed that the launch vehicle will provide the delta V for Trans Mars Injection. It is
maintained as legacy module in case future studies will desire to consider Earth Departure Stage
tradeoffs in design space exploration.
- Feasibility Check Module: this module prunes unfeasible architectures from the design space
based on pre-defined user constraints. Constraints implemented in the current version of the
model are on allowable payload volume to fit within existing launch capability and logical
constraints such as prune architectures featuring unfeasible transportation options.
- Architecture Evaluation Module: this module evaluates architectures according to pre-defined
metrics that include objective metrics such as dry mass and cost and subjective metrics.
- Stakeholder Evaluation Module: this module evaluates architectures according to subjective
metrics estimated through value judgment elicitation from experts such as scientific and
engineering multi-attribute utility functions.
4.42. M Jodel Vifidation
The model has been validated by simulating mass performance of a MSR architecture resembling the
baseline presented in the National Academy Reports. Table 21 and Figure 37 show the data resulting from
the validation of the model showing an adequate overall mass accuracy below 20%. Greater error in EDL
mass results from discrepancies in the assumptions in the entry velocity and ballistic coefficient of the
current NASA baseline that were not available in the public literature. Should this data be available at
some point for comparison, the model should provide better outcomes in validation of the EDL module.
Section Three shows the validation of the model on past missions for which the ballistic coefficient and
entry velocity were known, showing better accuracy in mass estimates.
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FigIture 37 - Model Validation - Benchmark with ISR Architectire Baseline
Table 21 iodel Validation - MSR Architecture Baseline Validation Data
0 498.7 N/A
Driller Rover 354.3 364.5 -2.8%
Other Elements (EXO-Mars, Pallet) 627.5 627.5 0.0%
Caching Mission EDL System 3202.3 2855.9 12.1%
Cruise Stage 0 571.2 N/A
Fetch Rover + Sample Retrieve Lander 708.0 603.304 17.4%
Mars Ascent Vehicle 64.1 72.2 -11.2%
Lander Mission EDL System 3321.9 2485.84 33.6%
Return Mission Orbiter 926.8 942.9 -1.7%
Total Dry Mass (CBE + Cont) 9204.9 9022.0 2.0%
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1. Development of Evaluation Metrics
The metrics that have been developed for evaluation of architectures are presented in Table 22.
Ible 22 Evaluation metrics for the Mars Sample Return Campaign case study
Total Dry Mass kg Utility to Scientists-
Total Wet Mass kg Utility to Engineers-
Total Lifecycle Cost FY15 M$
Multi-Performance Architecture Enumeration
The model enumerates 221,184 possible architectures as overview previously in Section 4.4.2.6.
4.4.3. Step 3 - x1 pert Painel Formatioi
The expert elicitation questionnaire has been tested and calibrated with 5 "test pilot" interviews conducted
with engineers and scientists at JPL and ESA. These interviews were not included in the assessment as
they were used to refine the expert elicitation procedures. Two experts panels were composed for this
study, representing science and engineering respectively. Experts were selected for the decision-making
roles held in their organizations. Experts were recruited on a volunteer basis. Ideally, the goal was to
obtain a balanced US-EU panel. However, as the study employed "real" senior experts and decision-
makers and relied on voluntary contributions, a perfect 50/50 distribution could not be achieved.
Obtaining expert availability outside of JPL (where the study was started) proved to be a challenge. More
than 30 experts were contacted worldwide to obtain a total of 12 participating representatives. However,
low participation was offset by proven experience and role of individual experts in their respective
organizations. Furthermore, the study has been cross-validated a posteriori by comparison with current or
previous Mars exploration architectures, and by presenting final results to larger poll of scientists and
engineers. Lack of availability of ESA experts from the science side has been offset by recruitment of two
scientists with Principal Investigator roles in European missions, affiliated to European universities. The
number of scientists has been doubled with respect to the number of engineers as the observed variability
on science measures was considerably higher than that observed for engineering assessments (as
discussed in Section 4.4.8). An overview of expert panels composition is shown in Table 23.
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Ta ble 23 Fxpert Panel Com position
Experts JPL ESA Academia (EU) TOTAL
Affiliation
"Test pilot" 6 2 - 8
interviews
Scientists 6 0 2 8
Engineers 3 1 0 4
GRAND TOTAL 20
4.4.4. Step 4 - Problem Formiuation Review with Pa<nel
An initial problem formulation has been outlined using information obtained by surveying the public
literature on the Mars Sample Return campaign and on personal expertise of the author in space systems
modeling. Successively, the formulation of the interview has been refined and extended through a "Round
0" interaction with "test pilots" from NASA JPL Mission Concepts Section and the JPL Mars Office.
4.4.5. Step 5 - Design of interview
The interview has been designed using a multi-attribute utility. Two types of interview questionnaires
have been elicited:
e An interview of Scientists, to estimate the scientific value of a given set of requirements for a
MSR architecture;
e An interview of Engineers, to estimate the engineering difficulty perceived for the
implementation of a given set of requirements (as a proxy of complexity and technical risk).
The interviews have been designed with the assumption that all interviewees are rational utility-
maximizing individuals. That is, a utility value of I in the scientific interview translates to 100%
satisfaction of the given science with a particular set of requirements. A utility value of I in the
engineering interview means 100% satisfaction from an engineering perspective (100% ease in
implementing the prescribed set of requirements). A utility value of 0 corresponds to no scientific value
and very high-perceived difficulty in engineering implementation respectively.
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Both the Scientific and Engineering interviews were based on MAUA formulations developed on the
following attributes:
* Sample Types
e Total Number of Samples
* Sample Depth
* Sample Size
* Horizontal Traverse Distance
Sample Types have been modeled using a complementary discrete utility model. Total number of samples
and horizontal traverse distance have been modeled as continuous utility functions using a combination of
CEP/LEP interviews. Sample Depth and Sample Size have been modeled using mutually excluding
discrete utility models.
4.4.6. Step 6 - Elicitatioi of Expert Valie Judgment
Expert elicitation has been done through interviews conducted by the thesis author at NASA JPL, and by
phone with experts in other institutions.
4.4.7. Step 7 - Results AnalyOsis
Design space exploration results are analyzed at each step of the study to prepare the discussion in
successive rounds with experts. If convergence is met (as discussed in Step 9), results analysis provides
the data for documentation and development of recommendations (Step 10).
The study evaluates the design space of MSR architecture across 5 dimensions:
- Total Campaign Mass (Dry/Wet)
- Total Estimated Lifecycle Cost (FYI 5)
- Total Scientists Utility (as a proxy for science value)
- Total Engineers Utility (as a proxy for engineering difficulty)
Due to the multi-dimensionality of the problem, a set of multiple group scatter plots will be used in the
discussion of the results. The analysis is structured to answer the questions formulated in Step 2 (Problem
Formulation).
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The remainder of this Section discusses results as derived from implementation of subjective value
metrics for science value and engineering complexity as obtained at Round 3 of the analysis.
1. Does the current MSR architecture provide an efficient compromise between desired
science returns and engineering complexity? (i.e. how far is it from ideal Pareto efficiency?)
Finding 1: The current MSR architecture provides an efficient compromise between science and
engineering at its level of cost (Figure 38 - $5.3B + -0.5B for sample handling and containment as
estimated by the model). Alternative architectures are conceived at different levels of cost and other
levels of efficient science/engineering tradeoffs.
Figure 38 shows the design space of MSR architectures in utility space. Architectures are color-coded
based on their estimated total campaign lifecycle cost. The x-axis represents utility provided to scientists
(i.e. science value), the y-axis represents utility provided to engineers (i.e. engineering complexity). The
larger red dot on the upper-right corner of the plot shows the current MSR baseline architecture as
evaluated by the model. The MSR baseline lies on the Pareto frontier as defined by utility functions
elicited by experts. This provides confidence on the coherence of results of the design space exploration
with existing value judgments. As some of the experts were directly involved in the definition of the
baseline, they would be expected them to provide a positive evaluation of their own architecture. Once
validated, the same value judgment criteria can be applied with increased confidence to the other options
available in the tradespace.
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2. What other Pareto-efficient MSR architectures could be devised for different levels of total
cost?
Finding 2: Two element architectures are alternatives of interest for reduction of cost and schedule
slippage (by reduction of total number of development projects). A two-element architecture of
interest consists in transferring Fetch functionalities to the Drilling and Caching Rover, while
extending the rover's operational lifetime and not requiring a dedicated fetch rover in the Return
mission. If cost reduction is a concern, consider surface drilling operations only. Moderate
reductions in total number of collected samples provides an alternative means of cost reduction,
with its effectiveness being larger for architectures with 1-m and 10-m drilling payloads.
Figure 39 and Figure 40 show that two or three element architectures at different values for total dry mass
are available in the tradespace. One element architectures result infeasible with current launch capabilities
not being able to carry all the mass required for a MSR architecture in one flight - the problem being both
in payload mass and fairing volume capabilities. Two element architectures entail additional operational
risk as they require the first Drilling and Caching rover to operate until landing of the Retrieve mission.
Further analysis is encouraged to estimate the additional complexity in including Fetch payload in the
first rover, and studying the break-even point in the tradeoff between extending the lifetime of said rover -
therefore adding an additional marginal operational cost - versus development and operational costs of the
Fetch rover concept. It is expected that the benefits of the first will outrank the latter.
The model provides additional information in terms of other efficient architectures that can be conceived
at varying levels of cost. Comparison of Figure 38 with Figure 41 shows that total cost is largely driven
by the total number of samples to be collected on the surface. On the other hand, comparison of results
across further dimensions show that total cost gradient features a strong dependence on desired drilling
depth. This is shown by assessing the impact of drilling depth on the overall campaign architecture. Three
clusters of architectures can be identified in the design space - mapping to three different classes of
feasible architectures. The analysis conducted in Figure 44 shows that those three architectural classes
refer to the three different drilling depths examined in the study (surface - I m - 10m), featuring three
different gradients of total cost (increasing gradient per increasing drilling depth). The fourth drilling
depth initially explored for study (I 00m) was taken out from the design space as it clearly emerged
consensus from all experts in considering such depth extremely hard to achieve in a medium-long term
time span and of science value not justifying such large technology investment.
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3. What sample portfolio should MSR be designed for to maximize scientific returns?
Finding 3: Sample portfolios with all types of samples dominate all other options.
Figure 42 shows that architectures with complete sample portfolios ('YYYY' architectures) lie in the
Pareto front of the design space. This result is due to the fact the sample type providing the majority
of scientific value (Sedimentary Materials) also results being the sample type with the highest density
across all sample types (3000 kg/m3). Therefore, for the same mass of retrieved samples,
architectures including sedimentary materials always result of higher scientific interest than sample
portfolios without sedimentary material.
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4. What sample size should MSR be designed for optimal tradeoff between scientific returns
and engineering complexity?
Finding 4: Small and medium samples are feasible options in the design space. Medium-sized
samples (such as the ones in the current MSR baseline) provide a systematic advantage in
science utility with respect to small samples for a small increase in engineering complexity.
Figure 43 shows that medium-sized samples are closer to the Pareto frontier than small-sized samples.
The ratio between the variation of science value and the variation in engineering complexity for an
increasing number of samples of the same sample size is greater than one across all architectures.
This shows that therefore medium samples are always preferred to small samples. Large-sized
samples are ruled out from the feasible region of the design space resulting in architectures either
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5. Is it worthwhile for MSR to accept the risk and invest in technology to retrieve samples
beyond surface drilling (i.e.> 2.5cm)?
Finding 5: Surface drilling alone provides up to -80% of the scientific value while retaining
>-90% of the engineering utility across all the architectures in the feasible region of the design
space.
This result is based on the assessment by experts in Round 1 of this study. This result will be refined
in successive interview rounds, although it is not expected to vary significantly. While deeper drilling
depths enable fulfilling a greater number of scientific questions (in particular in the field of
astrobiology), they involve a significant decrease in engineering utility reflecting the added technical
complexity, technical and operational risk involved in developing "deep drilling" of the Martian
surface. Challenges in planetary drilling include constraints in mass due to launch capability and
allowable fairing volume, constraining the available Weight on Bit5 (WOB) and posing issues in
thermal control, drill bit cooling, bit preservation and fluid circulation to enable deeper drills.
Surface
1 + 1 m drill
. . . 10m drilI








* ~ ~ ~ 0 4t9.* ; *
0.3- * +.. # * *
0.2
01
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
Utility to Scientists
Figure 44 ISR Desigin Space, Scieice/En 1 gineerig,/)rilling iDepth \ iew
5 Weight on Bit is the force that can be exerted on a drilling bit, which is directly related to the performance of a given drilling
payload. Further detail is available on the description of the drilling payload sizing model discussed in Section 9.2.4.4
(Appendix).
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6. Is it worthwhile for MSR to accept the risk of extending horizontal mobility for distributed
sample caching and in-situ science investigations?
Finding 6: Extended horizontal mobility increases expected science value as it adds flexibility in
sample selection and landing site selection. The associated cost in decreased engineering utility
is small if comparing architectures with mobility systems.
Figure 45 shows the impact of the requirement in horizontal mobility in the design space of feasible
architectures. Horizontal mobility provides the operational flexibility to the caching and sampling system
of choosing samples for successive collection. As scientists are concerned with the ability of selecting
samples to increase the likelihood of relevancy to answer questions of interest, it is critical for sampling
systems to attain mobility. For this reason, lander systems (i.e. caching systems with no horizontal
mobility) have been ruled out in the formulation of the study. Once mobility is implemented, design space
analysis shows that additional range in mobility is attained for a small marginal decrease in engineering
utility, while providing a moderate-to-high marginal increase in perceived scientific value. Further study
is recommended to study the marginal operational cost in extending the lifetime of the caching/sampling
rover to allow an increased horizontal mobility, or alternatively study the marginal increase in operational
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4.4.8. Step 8 - Aggregate Results Discussion
Section 4.4.7 has discussed Round 3 results. This section provides additional discussion of the evolution
of results during iterative rounds of analysis and discusses the impact of requirements ambiguity on the
architectural tradespace.
Boxplot charts have been used to aggregate results and facilitate negotiations with individual experts
during DB-SAF elicitation. Experts have been asked to revise their answers in light of the aggregate of
the answers provided by other experts in the group. Figure 46 (Round 1), Figure 47 (Round 2), and Figure
48 (Round 3) show the evolution of answers in the three Rounds for the engineering panel, whereas
science panel evolution is shown in Figure 49 (Round 1), Figure 50 (Round 2), and Figure 51 (Round 3).
The first empirical observation to make is the significant difference in convergence between engineering
and science panels. Engineers were able to achieve agreement more rapidly and in more areas between
Round 1 and Round 2. A significantly larger relative divergence was observed in the science panel. As an
initial mitigation to this phenomenon, the science panel was doubled in size, by interviewing additional
experts. These experts were given Round 1 interviews, and their answers were included in Round 2
computations. This addition of experts did not increase or decrease observed variability significantly,
therefore confirming preliminary findings.
Larger variability on science value with respect to engineering complexity metrics is reasonable to expect.
While engineers have a firm sense on what are current and foreseen technological constraints, science is
more concerned with the exploration of the unknown. Scientists do not know value associated to a
mission until a mission is actually flown, and experimental hypothesis verified on the field. While science
value is linked to breakthrough discoveries and the exploration of the unknown, engineering follows a
more predictable process, meaning that if the system is designed with appropriate margins of safety, and
integrated, verified and validated against properly stated requirements, little is left to the unknown.
For instance, engineers were very efficient in reducing ambiguities on contributions given by sample
types and sample depth in their complexity assessment (compare engineering round I results in Figure 46
with round 3 results in Figure 48). Design complexities associated with sample types were associated
with technological challenges associated with coring and sampling operations with sample materials of
different mechanical properties. Likewise, sample depth was associated with complexities in drilling
operations, such as the need for I-meter drilling and below to split the drilling rod in multiple segments
and require a drilling rod assembly mechanism, compared to surface and sub-surface drilling that can be
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performed with rock abrasion tools. Ambiguities on those property variables were immediately
recognized and reduced by the engineering expert panel in Round 2 interviews, through anonymous
exchange of opinions by means of the interviewer. Ambiguities in the definition of engineering
complexities were all reduced, as engineers came to consensus. Such was not the case for the science
panel.
Scientists were driven by different and sometimes contrasting goals. The first challenge was reaching an
agreement in ground assumptions and definitions. While this could be done in several instances - for
instance, in assuming that only 30% of collected samples are supposed to be scientifically relevant after
analysis on Earth - disagreement remained in several areas. In particular, no agreement was reached on
science value associated with igneous rock samples - which are of interest only to scientists with interest
in planetary interiors and planetary dating, for instance. Likewise, no agreement was reached on the value
associated with target drilling depths beyond 1 meter. While astrobiologists associated very high value to
these depths, geologists preferred obtaining shallower samples for their purposes. Both these areas were
categorized as irreducible ambiguities, in terms of open debates. This conclusion helped inform the results
discussed in the previous section. The dichotomy in "needs" and "wants" of astrobiologists and geologists
has been clearly identified by the study.
It must be highlighted that both panels were composed by senior experts and high-level decision makers,
with multiple years of experience in contributing to the systems architecting process of exploration
missions to Mars. This is, however, a double-edged sword: while the expert sample is fully representative
of the Mars Sample Return decision-making community from American and European perspectives, a
potential bias is introduced in having the majority of panelists being senior experts in their respective
fields. Biases are introduced by their professional experience in the field, having analyzed systems trade-
offs for MSR in multiple occasions. This bias is confirmed in the analysis - but it would be strange
otherwise - by the fact that the MSR baseline was included in the Pareto frontier in the results discussed
in Step 7. This aspect has been partially mitigated by having an international composition of the panel
with both American and European perspectives - as US and EU space agencies are the historical major
developers of robotic exploration missions. Nevertheless, this is an aspect to account for as an inherent
feature of the proposed framework. Results of the model are no better than the inputs that were provided.
Nevertheless, the model that has been developed is able to evaluate quickly a very large amount of system
architectures, by using the same logic employed by the panel of experts. This feature allows decision-
makers to screen a much higher number of requirement sets and architectures that could be done by
conventional pre-phase A study. This represents one of the main value-enhancing contributions of the
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We now assess the impact of irreducible ambiguities that have been identified on performance evaluation
within the architectural tradepsace using Ambiguity Impact Analysis as discussed in Section 3.6.9.
Figure 52 shows the results of a main effects analysis on ambiguity impact. The x-axes on the plots show
requirement variables and possible values they can assume in accordance to the requirements
morphological matrix discussed previously in Section 4.4.2.4. The y-axis on the plots is the average effect
of requirement variables on campaign cost normalized to the maximum and minimum cost values
observed in the architectural tradespace - absolute cost numbers are not relevant in this context as we are
interested in relative rather than absolute effects. Campaign cost is a proxy variable for architecture
performance, as the model employs mass-based cost models. The analysis shows that requirement




3. Total Number of Samples
4. Total Number of Missions
5. Sample Types
6. Horizontal Mobility
This result shows that main impacts are largely related to requirements driving the sizing of payload
masses on the Martian surface. By comparing impact analysis results with the DB-SAF results shown in
Figure 48 and Figure 51, drilling depth emerges as the area in requirements analysis where system
architects will need to concentrate on. Drilling depth has significant impact on campaign cost (rank #2),
while being the area with most irreducible ambiguity, with particular reference to science value associated
with drills of increasing depth. On the other hand, it is shown that ambiguity on sample types to be
collected on the Martian surface has little effect on the architecture, given the assumptions that have been
used in this model. Particular care should be exercised in the interpretation of this result, as this requires
confirmation by a detailed design iteration of caching and handling mechanisms required with different
sample types, which could represent significant drivers to total cost.
Another result of interest, confirming findings that have been previously described, is the main effect on
total cost of the number of missions in the architecture, representing different packaging of functions
within a varying number of elements. The 2-element architecture where Drilling and Fetch functions are
combined minimize total cost (hence minimize total mass) due to the elimination of the Fetch rover
platform from architecture. It must be noted though that operation risk increases in this type of mission, as
125
more responsibility is given to the Caching/Drilling rover - which reliability therefore is on the critical
path for successful completion of the mission.
Consider now the interaction between requirement variables to investigate the occurrence of interactions
between requirement variables and their impact in the architectural tradespace. Sample types are taken out
from this analysis for simplicity, as their interaction analysis confirmed the finding of their little relevance
in affecting the overall tradespace. Figure 53 shows the results of this analysis; this matrix plot shows
interactions between variable pairs. Features of interest include crossings - indicating inversions in the
effect structure - and magnitude of effects. Such magnitude is comparable to what has been found in the
main effects analysis, and no major interactions are highlighted. This analysis therefore confirms results
found with the main effects analysis of ambiguity impact on the tradespace.
We now apply correlation analysis to study the impact of ambiguities in the tradespace from a different
perspective. Figure 54 shows a scatter plot diagram with results for correlation analysis as conducted on
the Mars Sample Return case study. Each plot results from the intersection of 5 metrics, namely campaign
cost, utility to engineers, utility to scientists, standard deviation associated to utility to engineers, and
standard deviation associated to utility to scientists. For instance, the subplot on the second row, third
column, compares utility to scientists with utility to engineers - the same plot analyzed before in Figure
38. Plots on the diagonal show the distributions of each metric in the tradespace. Note that the plot is
symmetric with respect to the diagonal.
Results of interest for the analysis of ambiguities can be found on the 4 th and 5h rows and columns,
associated to standard deviations in engineering and science panels respectively. Conclusions can be
derived by assessing the impact of the variable of interest on the tradespace. Consider for instance the
assessment of ambiguity associated with maximum drilling depth in engineering (Figure 55) and
scientific value (Figure 56) assessments. By comparing these charts, it is clear that such ambiguity has a
significant effect in engineering complexity with increasing drilling depth. This is confirmed by
conversations with engineers involved in the design of drilling payloads in exploration missions, as
discussed previously in this chapter. Associated benefits of deep drills, as shown in Figure 56, are modest
if compared to associated complexities. Decision-makers can use correlation analysis, for instance, to
defer the implementation of new drilling systems, waiting for ambiguity to unfold. Similar analysis can be
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4.4.9. Step 9 - Coinvergence Criteria
A set number of three iteration rounds was chosen as convergence criteria for the study. This criteria was
selected to adapt to the time available for the study, the availability of the panel of experts, and verified
by final round interviews. At its third iteration, experts felt no more need to change their assessments as
they believed to have reached a valid representation of their opinions.
Figure 57 and Figure 58 show two matrices of bar plots with the convergence history for the engineering
and science panels respectively. Rows in each matrix represent the different property variables that have
been probed. The vertical axis on each graph plots the coefficient of variation, that is, the observed
standard deviation normalized by the mean value of the sample. Round number is shown on the x-axis of
each graph. Areas of reducible ambiguity are represented by plots where the coefficient of variation is
reduced significantly between rounds. For instance, the variability on science value associated with the
maximum horizontal characteristic radius (traverse distance - HorizRad Max in Figure 58) shows a
decrease in ambiguity of -90% in -3 rounds. Other measures, such as sample depth on the sample plot,
reveal areas of irreducible ambiguity that could not be reduced by framework iterations.
Convergence information as shown by the plots is valuable information for decision-makers, regardless of
whether they identify areas of reducible or irreducible ambiguity. By providing knowledge on reducible
ambiguities, system architects improve their confidence on their models, and substantiate the rationale for
their conclusions. In cases where areas of open debates are identified, the framework allowed system
architects to be aware of areas of uncertain value, where further discussion or analysis is required. As
discussed in the Descriptive Systems Architecting Management Framework Approach, these are areas
where decision-makers could consider delaying investments or developments, waiting for ambiguities to
reveal in the future. Once convergence is declared, system architects can use DB-SAF for the last piece of
analysis - that is, the informed development of reccomendations to decision-makers, using descriptive
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4.4.10. Step 10 -Deveelopment of Recomimenlations
This chapter constitutes the documentation for the study. Further documentation and MATLAB code for
the model developed for MSR is available in Appendix 9.2.
The following recommendations emerge from the analysis of results.
Question 1: Does the current MSR architecture provide an efficient compromise between desired
science returns and engineering complexity? (i.e. how far is it from ideal Pareto efficiency?)
Recommendation 1: If MSR will face tighter cost caps, cost-effective means to re-architect the
campaign are to consider architectures de-scoped in the total number of retrieved samples while
investing in sample recognition technology. Keep high operational flexibility in sample collection by
maximizing sample diversity and maximizing horizontal mobility.
(Compromise and Buy Insurance in SA-MF)
Question 2: What other Pareto-efficient MSR architectures could be devised for different levels of
total cost?
Recommendation 2: Consider a 2-element MSR campaign where Fetch functions are allocated to
the Drilling and Caching rover to reduce foreseeable cost and schedule overruns by reduction of
number of development projects. Initiate a study to evaluate the break-even point between
extended operational lifetime of the caching rover and savings in development costs obtained by
reduction in total number of development projects.
(Buy Insurance in SA-MF)
Question 3: What sample portfolio should MSR be designed for to maximize scientific returns?
Recommendation 3: Maximize scientific value delivered by maximizing the diversity in sample
portfolio, collecting Sedimentary Materials, Hydrothermally & Low Temperature Altered Rocks,
Igneous Rocks, Regolith, Dust and Atmospheric Gas within the MSR campaign.
(Consensus in SA-MF)
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Question 4: What sample size should be MSR designed for optimal tradeoff between scientific
returns and engineering complexity?
Recommendation 4: Maintain baseline size specifications for collected samples
(1.0cm D x 5.0cm H).
(Consensus in SA-MF)
Question 5: Is it worthwhile for MSR to accept the risk and invest in technology to retrieve samples
beyond surface drilling (i.e. > 2.5cm)?
Recommendation 5: Consider deferring 1-m and 10-m drilling payload implementations in the
MSR architecture if faced with the need of meeting tighter cost caps. Invest in technology
assessment areas to increase Technology Readiness Level and therefore reduce ambiguity
surrounding complexity/science tradeoffs of deep drills.
(Defer Action in SA-MF)
Question 6: Is it worthwhile for MSR to accept the risk of extending horizontal mobility for
distributed sample caching and in-situ science investigations?
Recommendation 6: Consider extending horizontal mobility range for rover systems to enhance
expected scientific value delivery and providing flexibility / added safety margins in landing site
selection.
(Buy Insurance in SA-MF)
4.5. Case Study Suminary and Conclusions
The systems architecture of Mars Sample Return is a representative case study where ambiguities in
upstream architecting processes have significant impact on downstream systems architecting definition
processes. This case study assessed how ambiguities in defining science and engineering requirements
impact campaign architecture on performance and cost metrics. Sections 4.1 and 4.2 provided an
introduction and historical motivations to the study. Section 0 outlined specific objectives of the case
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study. Section 4.4 described the application of the Delphi-Based Systems Architecting Framework to the
case of Mars Sample Return.
The study has been informed by a literature review (Step 1) and expert interviews at the NASA Jet
Propulsion Laboratory. Following this preliminary phase, the analytic framework was developed. Step 2
describes Problem Formulation, including: identification of questions of interest, identification of goals,
functional decomposition of the architecture, function-form mapping, architectural model description and
model validation. Step 3 describes the international panels that have been formed for the analysis. The
panels were composed of senior experts and high-level decision-makers involved with the current
architectural baseline of the Mars Sample Return campaign. Steps 5 and 6 describes the design of the
interview and the expert elicitation processes. Steps 7 and 8 discuss results, while Step 9 defines the
convergence criteria used in this study. Step 10 develops recommendations based on the analysis.
The contribution of this case study to this thesis is to show the application of the Delphi-Based Systems
Architecting Framework to a case with significant ambiguity in definition of subjective value metrics
(such as science value and engineering complexity). The specific contribution of this study to MSR, in
turn, is the identification of areas of ambiguity, the reduction of science and engineering ambiguities
when appropriate, and the elicitation of areas of open debate and their impact in the systems architecting
process such as sample weathering tresholds, having downstream impact on system design of the overall
exploration and transportation infrastrucure. Recommendations to decision-makers are further
contributions provided by the study. The hope of the author is to see Mars Sample Return campaign
become a reality in the next thirty years.
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Chapter 5 : Case Study 2 - Transportation Infrastructure for
Future Human Spaceflight Missions Beyond Low Earth Orbit
The shuttle tomorrow is truly like laying the last spike on the transcontinental railroad, only much more so. And
whether or not we're going to see in in the next 10 or 20 years, there are people alive today who will see
manufacturing in space from moon materials or from asteroids.
- Jerry Brown, Governor of California, 1977.
(image source: NASA)
5.1. Introduction
Chapter 4 presented an analysis of Mars Sample Return (MSR) as a case study characterized by
ambiguity within the underlying systems architecture. Recommendations have been developed on
ambiguity-mitigating actions and alternative architectures for the program under analysis.
Notwithstanding its challenges in meeting the budget and identifying effective science-engineering
compromises, MSR is motivated by a crisp overarching objective: to retrieve sample from the Martian
surface and return them to Earth.
Chapter 5 presents a more difficult engineering challenge featuring a higher degree of ambiguity: the
architecture of in-space transportation infrastructure for human space exploration. Peculiar traits of this
case study are ambiguity on objectives themselves ("What destination should we explore?") and on the
definition of value-creating processes ("What is value for space exploration?"). The goal of this chapter is
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to demonstrate how the proposed DB-SAF framework can be used to mitigate this higher level of
ambiguity - that is, ambiguity in the functional intent of the systems architecture.
This chapter presents an application of DB-SAF to a systems architecting analysis of the in-space
transportation infrastructure for future human space exploration beyond Low Earth Orbit. The study has
involved the formation of an international panel composed of 15 experts and high-level decision-makers
from NASA, ESA, academia and industry. Experts have been engaged in three rounds of interviews each,
for a total of 45 interviews and approximately 90 hours total of expert elicitation. Experts contributed to
the study in anonymous form. Those of whom agreed to identify their participation are acknowledged at
the end of the chapter - while specific contributions remaining anonymous as per the framework that has
been developed. Data has been successively processed and integrated with a systems architecting
engineering model for enumeration, evaluation and identification of architectures of interest. Internal
validation has been achieved by comparing model-generated system architectures and past conceptual
studies by NASA. The analysis is focused on characterization and mitigation of multi-domain ambiguities
affecting this case.
The chapter is structured as follows. Section 5.2 provides motivations and historical context, framing the
case study as relevant to the human spaceflight program of the first half of the XXI century. Section 5.3
describes the specific objectives of this case study discussing their relevance to the general objectives of
this thesis. Section 5.4 describes the implementation of the Delphi-Based Systems Architecting
Framework, and provides an overview of the underlying engineering model. Case study - specific results
are discussed in Section 5.4.9. Recommendations are formulated for consideration of decision-makers
concerned the development of the future in-space infrastructure for human exploration. Section 5.5 closes
the chapter, summarizing findings and drawing conclusions from the case study.
5.2. Motivations and Context
While writing this thesis, NASA is called to charter a path for its future plans for human exploration. In
2004, President Bush started the Constellation Program with the ambitious plan of returning astronauts to
the surface of the Moon (NASA 2004). Following six years of development and a cumulative investment
of $9B billion USD (Chang 2010), a Presidential panel was chartered with the goal of assessing the status
of the US Human Spaceflight Program and provide recommendations to the White House for future
development of the American manned spaceflight program (the "Augustine Committee") (NASA 2009).
The Committee found the US human spaceflight program to be "on an unsustainable trajectory <...>
perpetuating the perilous practice of pursuing goals that do not match allocated resources" (NASA
2009). Following this review, the Obama Administration cancelled Constellation and the programs
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cancelled therein, such as the Ares I and Ares V launch vehicles (Connolly 2006). Eventually, in July
2011 the Space Shuttle completed its last flight and transitioned to its decommissioning phase, marking
the end of an era in human spaceflight (Chang 2011).
Since 2010, the design of a man-rated transportation system has been a primary concern for NASA.
Several teams within the Agency and industry in the US were called to assess alternative designs for a
heavy lift launch vehicle (Braukus and Harrington 2010). Academia has also been involved in these
studies. One instance was an independent analysis by the MIT Space Systems Architecture group that
considered 192 launch vehicle architectures and possible launch vehicle family developments including a
"super" heavy lift launch vehicle baseline (Aliakbargolkar, Wicht et al. 2011). In September 2011, NASA
announced the development of the Space Launch System (SLS) as the next generation launch vehicle for
future human exploration (NASA 2011). While most efforts have been focused on the development of the
launch system, little efforts seems to have been spent upfront (at least in the public domain) on the
definition of objectives and goals of the human spaceflight program. Stakeholders do not share a unified
vision on what constitutes "value" for the exploration enterprise. Unclear goals translate into an uncertain
need for a launch capability for future missions - therefore posing ambiguities on the definition of
requirements for SLS and on the in-orbit exploration infrastructure.
Ambiguity is a double-edged sword in space exploration : stakeholders have variegate perspectives on the
intrisic value of space exploration. Contrasting views on upside opportunities and downside consequences
associated with space exploration can be identified in the literature on the role of space exploration in the
world economy, policy and science. Debates generate both reducible and irreducible ambiguities, that
must be mitigated to define a robust architecture for future space exploration infrastructure. Policy
robustness is a key characteristic system architects need to consider to ensure steady value delivery to
stakeholders (MIT and Draper 2005).
Thefinancial context plays a significant role in setting objectives and constraints for space exploration. Its
influences varies significantly depending on the aggregate stakeholders' value-at-risk attitude. NASA is a
government entity funded through non-defense domestic discretionary spending. The annual
appropriation process has adverse effect on NASA long term planning of exploration activities, as
discretionary funding is perhaps the spending category most susceptible to overall budget restrictions in
economic downturns (Auerbach 2008). Sustainability (Rebentisch, Crawley et al. 2005; Cameron,
Crawley et al. 2008) and policy robustness (MIT and Draper 2005) are therefore primary concerns of risk-
averse stakehoders. On the other hand, risk-taker stakeholders perceive exploration as an opportunity for
the creation of a space economy, based on in-situ resource explotation funded by private investments
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(Casini 2010). The overall influence of the financial environment on space exploration (the equivalent of
a social welfare function in economics (Coleman 1966)) is therefore a weighted average of these
perspectives - among others - subject to time-evolving ambiguity on weights ("which stakeholders are
more important to consider in setting requirements?") and perspectives ("what is value in space
exploration?"). The debate is further complicated as stakeholders have different views on what
destinations should be targeted as first steps for human exploration; the Augustine Report provides an in-
depth discussion of these issues (NASA 2009).
Policy guidance is a second primary driver of exploration. US space policy is subject to potential changes
every 2 years (a Congressional mandate), 4 years (a one-term Presidential mandate) and 8 years (a two-
term Presidential mandate). Exogenous influences contributing to reducible and irreducible ambiguity
include - among others - the debate on international cooperation in space exploration (Peter 2006), the
European Space Agency's juste retour principle in planning and managing programs and industrial
procurement (Bonnet and Manno 1994), congressional pork barrel policy in the US (Johnson-Freese
2004) and the debate on US export control regulation on space programs (Blount 2008).
Lastly, the role of science has been a pivotal point of debate since the beginning of the human spaceflight
program. One side of the space community believes that science is the primary raison d'tre of space
exploration - in a 2005 statement on NASA's Vision for Space Exploration, the American Astronomical
Society stated that "Exploration without science is tourism" (Society 2005). Other stakeholders argue that
robotic missions should be preferred over human missions, as the former accomplish science goals more
easily and satisfactorily (Spudis 1999) at a fraction of the cost. This view is opposed to those who believe
that humans are enablers of science (Pfarr, Calabrese et al. 2006). Astronauts have unique characteristics
that differentiate them from robots, such as dexterity and the ability to change plans and adapt in real
time. Human presence on a space mission allows plans to change and be flexible to unexpected
discoveries, while allowing the execution of complex experiments in real-time (White and Averner 2001).
Other stakeholders in turn support the societal role of human exploration (Huntress 2003), believing that
exploring is an innate desire of humankind. From this perspective, science is regarded as a complement to
human exploration, and not as a primary goal.
This overview showed a variety of perspectives on the definition on human spaceflight and surveyed the
literature for sources of ambiguities surrounding the architecture of the exploration. The characterization
and mitigation of those ambiguities is of paramount importance for effective definition of the architecture
of the in-orbit transportation infrastructure for future human exploration. The goal of this chapter,
therefore, is to show how DB-SAF can be effectively applied for this purpose, in the case of in-orbit
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infrastructure where objectives and goals are (yet) not clearly defined by. The study features inputs from
fifteen experts including high-level decision-makers from NASA and ESA. While individual
contributions remain anonymous, the names of those who agreed to identify their participations are
gratefully acknowledged at the end of the chapter.
5.3. Specific Objectives
Section 5.2 provided motivations and context for the case study, laying out the ground for the analysis.
This section describes specific objectives being pursued by the case study, and discusses their mapping to
the general objectives of the thesis. This study looks at a case with unclear and strongly ambiguously
defined objectives for future human space exploration - the elicitation of perceived needs, as per the
ontological analysis of Section 3.1. The analysis achieves this goal by meeting the following objectives:
- Characterize and identify reducible and irreducible ambiguities in the definition of the
architecture for in-orbit transportation infrastructure. Characterize the debate on value definition
for an in-orbit transportation infrastructure as defined by representative decision-makers;
- Enumerate possible requirements sets for the human space transportation infrastructure and
evaluate them according to representative stakeholders' value propositions;
- Identify requirement sets of interest for further analysis by system architects by achieving Pareto-
efficient compromises between exploration, science and policy needs and goals, as measured by a
set of subjective stakeholder value metrics informed by interviews to representative decision-
makers.
- Enumerate feasible architectures for the human space transportation infrastructure complying
with requirement sets of interest. Evaluate architectures according to proxy metrics for
performance, cost, schedule and technical risk;
- Develop recommendations to decision-makers by identifying system architectures of interest for
additional analysis.
5.4. Application of the Framnework
5.4.1. Step I - Literature Reviex
The literature in human spaceflight mission architectures is very rich, as several proposals and mission
architectures were studied in the last fifty years. A very comprehensive archive of this literature is
available online at the Human Space Exploration Library maintained by Developspace Inc.
(Developspace 2012). The main references considered in this thesis are the major efforts starting from
2000 with particular emphasis on NASA and MIT human spaceflight studies. In response to the Vision
for Space Exploration, MIT and Draper Labs. conducted a Concept Exploration and Refinement
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Exploration Systems Architecture Study for a broad tradespace exploration of Moon and Mars mission
architectures (MIT and Draper 2005). Successively to this study, NASA developed an Exploration
Systems Architecture Study (ESAS) to enact the Vision for Space Exploration laid out by the Bush
Administration with the Constellation Program (NASA 2004; NASA 2005). The ESAS architecture was
conceived and developed as a precursor program for future manned exploration of Mars. In the meantime,
the NASA Johnson Space Center led conceptual design efforts in refining a Design Reference
Architecture for a human Mars mission. This culminated in 2009 with the publication of Design
Reference Architecture 5.0, which represents to date the most updated version in the public domain of
NASA's approach for human Mars exploration (Drake 2009). Several other concepts for Mars exploration
have been developed; their comprehensive overview is out of the scopes of this thesis. A major re-
analysis of the Constellation Program occurred with the formation of a Presidential Committee in 2009
called by the Obama Administration and led by former Lockheed Martin CEO Norm Augustine. The
Augustine Report laid out the idea of a "flexible path" for the future human spaceflight program, with an
evolutionary approach for early value delivery to stakeholders and to phase program spending to reduce
expenditure with respect to the original Constellation Program (NASA 2009). In 2010, the Obama
Administration called for a new course for NASA's exploration program, eventually directing the Agency
towards studies for an initial human mission to a Near Earth Asteroid. A Human Architecture Team
(HAT, former Human Exploration Framework Team - HEFT) was formed by the agency to study human
missions on NEAs. While HAT's work is still ongoing and no final report has been drafted at the time of
writing of this thesis, preliminary findings can be found in NASA presentations available in the public
domain (NASA 2010; Culbert 2011).
5.4.2. Step 2 - Problei Formulation
5.4.2. 1. Identification of questions of' inerest
Given the current degree of ambiguity on the direction of the human spaceflight program (as of Q1 2012),
this case study aims to address the following questions to inform requirements definition and highlight
areas of interest for further conceptual study and definition of the systems architecture of the array of
possible missions of interest for the next step in the human spaceflight program. In particular, this case
study is focused on the architecture of the in-space transportation infrastructure required for future human
exploration beyond Low Earth Orbit. Questions of interest include:
- What destinations should we consider pursuing for the US human exploration program of the next
thirty years?
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- What types of mission (orbit / surface / short stay / long stay) should we consider as effective
compromise between exploration value, science and policy return?
- What are the main tradeoffs in exploration value, science return and policy return in architecting
the in-space transportation infrastructure for human exploration? How do these metrics affect the
architecting process as evaluated by performance, cost and risk metrics, and what is the impact of
ambiguity in this context?
5.4.2.2. Goals identification
Stakeholder goals for the architecture of the in-space transportation infrastructure are not always clear and
ambiguously defined. As the rationale for human space exploration is fairly diverse within stakeholders,
there is no crisply defined goal on which stakeholders agree. Cameron proposed a value flow mapping
approach for stakeholder analysis, which he applied to the case of human exploration to identify priorities
within multiple stakeholder needs, modeled as stakeholder value flows (Cameron, Crawley et al. 2008).
For the purposes of this thesis, we will consider a subset of the main Key Supporting Objectives (KSO)
for human space exploration defined by the Global Exploration Roadmap (GER) of the International
Space Exploration Coordination Group (ISECG 2011) relevant to the in-space transportation
infrastructure architecture:
- Extend Human Presence [KSO 1]
- Develop Exploration Technologies and Capabilities [KSO 2]
- Perform Science to Support Human Exploration [KSO 3]
- Stimulate Economic Expansion [KSO 4]
- Perform Space, Earth, and Applied Science [KSO 5]
- Engage the Public in Exploration [KSO 6]
The Global Exploration Roadmap derives objectives from these goals, however, it does not provide
rationale on how these objectives are linked to each other and how should they be prioritized in the
program. For instance, boil-off control and in-situ resource utilization are both objectives mapped to KSO
2 in GER; however, a comprehensive assessment of technology investment is required to identify
interactions and synergies between technology programs. A focused study on technology investment is
out of the scopes of this thesis but is an interesting area of future research in support of decision-making
in space exploration. This thesis instead is inspired by this problem to identify associated main trends and
trade-offs, and analyze ambiguity in stakeholders evaluation (as elicited by expert panels) of different
architectures for the infrastructure.
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Functions are form-neutral statements derived from the goals as expressed by stakeholders. The in-space
transportation infrastructure has been modeled with the following functional decomposition:
- Providing Habitation to astronauts at all phases during the length of the mission
- Transporting People and Cargo from Low Earth Orbit to the Destination
A detailed functional decomposition is shown in Figure 59. Note the two main ambiguities that have been
underlined in the high-level functions above. The length of the mission is determined by the mission
mode, the time spent at the destination and the choice of the destination itself. Destinations are part of the
debate as their choice drives value delivery to exploration, science and policy stakeholders. While
functions in the Mars Sample Return case study were crisply defined, this is not the case for this case. A
higher degree of ambiguity is involved, as ambiguity includes the definition of the functinoal intent. The
study of both ambiguity in the choice of a destination and assessment of mission length (as measured by
total time of flight) is included in this chapter.
Figure 59 Functional Decomposition of the I n-Space Tranlsportat ion In frastructu re \rch iteclture
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5.4.2.3. F'unctional decomposition
Areas of potential ambiguity impacting definition of requirements include the following requirement
variables:
- The choice of a destination (affecting value delivery to stakeholders in goals KSO 1, KSO 2,
KSO 3, KSO 4, KSO 5, KSO 6)
- Characteristics associated with NEA destinations, such as characteristic size and internal
composition (affecting value delivery to stakeholders in goals KSO 2, KSO 3, KSO 4, KSO 6)
- The number of crew in the mission (affecting value delivery to stakeholders in goals KSO 1,
KSO 2, KSO 3, KSO 6)
- Exploration time available at the destination for exploration and science activities (affecting
value delivery to stakeholders in goals KSO 1, KSO 2, KSO 3, KSO 4, KSO 5, KSO 6)
- The time of flight of the mission, as a proxy measure of health risk to astronauts due to
exposure to the harsh radiation environment beyond Low Earth Orbit (affecting value delivery to
stakeholders in goals KSO I and KSO 2)
Table 24 shows the requirements morphological matrix that has been formulated to study these
ambiguities in more detail, by specific alternative options to be considered for each requirement variable.
The size of the unconstrained tradespace of requirements in this formulation is of 21,600 possible
requirement sets (unconstrained estimate). To allow comparison with existing architectural baselines, the
analysis is focused on a representative mission portfolio comparable to existing NASA baselines such as
the ones defined by HAT for NEAs, ESAS for the Moon, and DRA 5.0 for Mars, as outlined in the
literature review in Section 5.4.1.
Table 25 shows logical constraints that have been formulated to generate this portfolio of representative
missions.
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Table 214 Reqiremvients Nlorphologiocald Nlal rix
1 2 3 4 5 6
Mas Low Energy High
Destination Moon Mars NEA Enrgy 4
NEA
Characten'stic Destination Size <30m 30m-100m 100m-500m 500m-1km >1km N/A (Dest. 6is not NEA)
Characteristic Destination Composition Carb. Silic. Metallic Other N/A (Dest. 5is not NEA)
Number of Crew (# crew) 3 4 6 3
Exploration Time at Destination (days) 7d 21d 30d 180d 550d 5
Maximum Total Mission Duration at Full-
Scale Capability (years) -Health Risk <= 6m ly 1.5y 2y 2.5y 3y 6
Proxy
Mission Mode Orbit Surface 2
21600
ITable 25 Requirenents Constraints
Description
IF Destination is Moon, OR IF Destination is Mars, AND
Characteristic Destination Size IS NOT N/A OR Characteristic
Destination Composition IS NOT N/A, THEN Architecture is
Infeasible
IF Destination is Mars, AND (Exploration Time is 1 m AND Total
Mission Duration is NOT EQUAL TO 1y), OR (Exploration Time is
1.5y AND Total Mission Duration is NOT EQUAL TO 2.5y), THEN
Architecture is Infeasible
If Maximum Total Mission Duration LESS than Exploration Time at
Destination, THEN Architecture is Infeasible
If Mission Mode is Flyby and Exploration Time at Destination IS
NOT Od, THEN Architecture is Infeasible
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Value associated with requirement sets is defined by a multiplicative multi-attribute utility (MAU)
function combining the following property variables:
- Total time of flight (as proxy for health risk)
- Exploration time at destination
- Delta V capability beyond Escape orbit
- Number of crew
- Destinations
- Object size (if destination is NEA)
- Object destination (if destination is NEA)
MAU functions are elicited by interviewing three panels of experts representing stakeholders for
exploration, science and policy as discussed next in Section 5.4.3. Single-attribute utility functions are
normalized functions where 0 is assumed as no value and 1 is assumed as full value delivered to
stakeholders. Property variables are elicited using the score card method as discussed in Chapter 3. Equal
complementary MAUA weights have been assumed for this analysis. Not all property variables are
assumed equally relevant to the three panels. Table 26 shows the assumptions that have been used
regarding relevance of each property variable for the science, exploration and policy panels that have
been formed. These assumptions have been defined by an iterative verification process involving
interviewees of all panels.
Table 26 Valie attributes and their assumed relevance to expert panels
Value Attributes and their Relevance Science Panel Exploration Panel Policy Panel
to Expert Panels
Total Time of Flight (Health Risk) Less Relevant Relevant Relevant
Exploration Time at Destination Relevant Relevant Relevant
Delta V Capability beyond Escape Orbit Less Relevant Relevant Less Relevant
Number of Crew Less Relevant Relevant Relevant
Destinations Relevant Relevant Relevant
Object Size (if NEA) Relevant Less Relevant Relevant
Object Composition (if NEA) Relevant Less Relevant Less Relevant
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5.4.2.5. Function- ru mnapping
Functions of the in-space transportation infrastructure architecture defined in Section 5.4.2.3 were
mapped to elements of form as shown in Figure 60. The architecture is defined by a set of habitat
elements and transportation elements. The mapping assumed here is not the only one possible for a
transportation architecture. This mapping has been chosen to be compared with existing baselines such as
DRA 5.0, Apollo, and NASA HAT studies. Mapping functions to a varying number of elements of form
can be modeled as a set partitioning problem, which an avenue of interest for future research in this
specific application. Different technology options for each element of form have been identified and
organized in an architecting model, as described in the following discussion.
Figure 60 Funcetion-Formu Mlapping of the I n-Space Transportation Iifrast ructure Architecture
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5.4. 6. A rehiin model
Architectural decisions and corresponding alternatives for the elements of form outlined in Section 5.4.2.5
is shown in Table 27. The design space is composed by 576 possible architectures per requirement set
(constrained estimate). This results into an (unconstrained) integrated design space size of -12.4m
architectures.




- Initial Mass in LEO (IMLEO)
- Architecture Risk Ranking (ARR)
Architecture Risk Ranking (ARR) is defined as an ordinal metric to rank architectures according to an
overall risk assessment based on requirement-related (Table 28) and architectural-related (Table 29) risks.
Risks are ranked with an ordinal scale from 1 (low risk) to 3 (high risk). Architectural risks are further
distinguished by past flight heritage, as defined by proxy units of measure (such as landed mass for an
aerocapture system). Architecture Risk Ranking is a normalized weighted sum of these two risk types.
This discussion presents the analysis assuming equal weights.
The morphological matrix allows a comprehensive overview of available options for the infrastructure
architecture. Cargo pre-deployment refers to the option of splitting crew and cargo payload in two
separate flights; a cargo flight would be inserted in a low energy trajectory propelled by a Solar Electric
Propulsion module, such as done in DRA 5.0 and in the NASA NEA mission as outlined by the HEFT
architecting team - thereby reducing the overall architectural IMLEO. Propellant boil-off control is an
additional option available for IMLEO reduction, by reducing boil-off of propellant - a critical feature in
cryogenic propulsion systems such as those using LOX/LH 2. Boil-off control is an enabling technology
for cryogenic propulsion in long-duration missions, when cryogenic propulsion stages are used only in
later stages of the mission, therefore offsetting advantages in specific impulse with high mass penalties
due to boil-off of propellant. In-Situ Resource Utilization (ISRU) and aerocapture are other possible
technology investments to reduce IMLEO, at the cost of increased development costs and added
operational and technical risks due to lacking operational experience, as measured by the architectural
risk ranking metric as defined above. Other choices consider alternative propellant combinations for
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propulsion stages. The integrated assessment of this technology portfolio and possible requirement sets as
elicited by stakeholders make this a comprehensive model of interest to assess ambiguity in the definition
of the infrastructure architecture. The model assumes that elements in the infrastructure are always sized
to allow future expansion to surface missions. For instance, in an orbit mission, the Earth Departure Stage
would be sized to accommodate descent/ascent elements in future missions, designed for the same
destination being considered in that architecture.
T'able 27 Architectural ,Morphological Matrix
Cargo Pre-Deployment via SEP Flight Yes No 2
Propellant Boil-off Control Yes No 2
In-Situ Resource (tilization Yes No 2
Aerocapture Yes No 2
Trans-Departure lnjection Propellant LOX/LH2 LOX/LCH4 NTR 3Type
Descent Propellant Type LOX/LH2 LOX/LCH4 2
Ascent Propellant Type LOX/LH2 LOX/LCH4 2
Trans-Earth Injection Propellant Type LOX/LH2 LOX/LCH4 NTR 3
576d
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500m-1km 1 Time of Flight Risk
>1km 1 6m 1
N/A 1 1y 2
1.5y 2
Object Composition (if NEA) Risk 2.Oy 3
Carb 1 2.5y3
Silic 1 3.Oy 3
metal 1
Other 1 Mission Mode Risk
N/A 1 Flyby 1
Sortie 2












'Table 29 Architectiural Risk Eleients
Architectural Risk Elements
Boiloff Control Proven Heritage No Heritage
Heritage Unit: Not Relevant N.A. N.A.
Yes 2 2
No 1 1
ISRU Proven Heritage No Heritage
Heritage Unit: Not Relevant N.A. N.A.
Yes 3 3
No 1 1
Aerocapture Proven Heritage No Heritage
Heritage Unit: Landed Mass [int] N.A. N.A.
Yes 2 2
No 1 1
Transit Vehicle Propellant Type Proven Heritage No Heritage
Heritage Unit: Prop. Mass [mt] <= 120mt > 120mt
LOX/LH2 1 2
Heritage Unit: Prop. Mass [mt] N.A. All
LOX/LCH4 1 2
Heritage Unit: Prop. Mass [mt] <= 75mt > 75mt
NTR 2 3
Ascent Vehicle Propellant Type Proven Heritage No Heritage
Heritage Unit: Prop. Mass [mt] <= 120mt > 120mt
LOX/LH2 1 2
Heritage Unit: Prop. Mass [mt] N.A. All
LOX/LCH4 1 2
Descent Vehicle Propellant Type Proven Heritage No Heritage
Heritage Unit: Prop. Mass [mt] <= 120mt > 120mt
LOX/LH2 1 2
Heritage Unit: Prop. Mass [int] N.A. All
LOX/LCH4 1 2
TEl Vehicle Propellant Type Proven Heritage No Heritage
Heritage Unit: Prop. Mass [mt] <= 110mt > 11Omt
LOX/LH2 1 2
Heritage Unit: Prop. Mass [mt] N.A. All
LOX/LCH4 1 2
Heritage Unit: Prop. Mass [mt] <= 75mt > 75mt
NTR 2 3
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5.4.2 .1- Model Validation
The model has been validated by comparison with existing architectural baselines. The validation
consisted in evaluating DRA 5.0, Apollo 11, and NASA HAT studies for NEA missions with the
architecting model integrating exploration/science/policy value metrics, a performance/cost proxy metric
(defined by IMLEO), and an ordinal architectural risk metric (the ARR defined in the previous section).
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Architectural Risk Ranking: 0.88


































































































Architectural Risk Ranking: 0.21
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This chapter integrates DB-SAF with the IMLEO estimation model for in-space infrastructured developed
by (Rudat and J.B. 2012) - who also validated IMLEO numbers using the same reference architectures
used in this case study - and with the novel ARR model defined in Section 5.4.2.6. Table 30 shows model
evaluations for exploration, science, policy value and ARR for reference architectures. Section 5.4.7
provides validation by locating said measures in the architectural tradespace and estimating their
proximity from model-generated Pareto fronts.
5.4.3. Step 3 - Expert Panel Formlation
Three expert panels were forned for this study, representing Exploration, Science and Policy
stakeholders. All panels were composed by senior experts and decision makers involved in the
architecture of the future human spaceflight infrastructure in the United States and in Europe. A total of
15 experts was used in the study, where each expert has been engaged in a three-round DB-SAF process.
Expert contributions are provided in anonymous form, as agreed with individual experts. Some experts
agreed to be identified as participants of the study; their participation is acknowledged at the end of the
study. In no case contributions are explicitly attributed to any of those experts to protect their anonimity.
Table 31 provides a synopsis on the composition of expert panels.
Table 31 Expert Panels Composition
Exploration Panel
4 Senior Systems Architects & Decision Makers from NASA and ESA
1 Professor from Academia (US)
Science Panel
3 Professors from Academia (US)
1 Senior Scientist from a US Research Institution
1 Senior Scientist from a European Industrial Organization
Policy Panel
2 Decision Makers from NASA and ESTEC
1 Senior Expert (former President of a EU Space Agency)
1 Senior Advisor from a US Research Institution
1 Professor from Academia (US)
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5.4.4. Step 5 - Design of Interview
Interviews have been designed using the score card method, as discussed in Chapter 3. These have been
deemed more appropriate for the property variables to be assessed in this case, rather than using formal
utility function elicitation methods.
5.4.5. Step 6 - Elicitation of Expert Value .Jdginent
A total of 45 interviews were conducted to inform this study. Interviews were conducted in person,.on
VoIP teleconference and over the phone between September 2011 and February 2012.
5.4.6. Step 7 - Results Analysis
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Figure 61 shows results for the exploration panel at round 3. Experts in the exploration panel reached the
best consensus among panels. The figure shows six plots, each one representing one value metric. The
sixth pane shows weights assigned to value metrics in the aggregate multiplicative (hence nonlinear)
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well - is that of value-maximizing stakeholders. A value I represents full stakeholder satisfaction, whereas
a value 0 represents no stakeholder satisfaction. The following discussion reports an aggregate summary
of expert opinions that have being gathered during three rounds of the elicitation procedure. Points of
consensus and open debate are highlighted to identify areas of reducible and irreducible ambiguity.
Time of Flight (as a proxy for health risk): time of flight is a proxy of health risk as astronauts are more
likely to face adverse conditions from exposure to the harsh radiation environment beyond the Van Allen
Belts. In this metric, zero time of flight (no mission beyond LEO) represents no risk (maximum value to
stakeholders). The shape, gradient and horizontal offset of the underlying curve is information of interest
to system architects.
The shape and gradient on this curve depend on risk aversion of individual experts in the panel. Two
opposing risk averse and risk taker perspectives surfaced rapidly in the panel. As risk takers were the
majority in the panel, they are all included within 25th and 75th percentile of the box plots. A risk averse
perspective was expressed by an outlier. Risk averse experts argue that safety is a key feature for any
future mission of the human spaceflight program. the These experts argue that loss of human lives put the
entire program at stake, and risk freezing the development of future missions - or even to threat the
development of any mission at all - for several years after such accident. For risk averse experts , system
architects need to minimize time of flight (for instance, by investing in breakthrough propulsion
technology such as NTR) to reduce risks on astronaut health as induced by the environment. One expert
expressed a risk taker view on this issue. Risk taker experts point at an excessive stress to safety as one of
the main causes of cost growth and schedule slippage in past exploration programs. They argue that
exploration as such is an inherently risky venture. Therefore, risk should be accepted as part of the
program to enable sustainable access to new destinations in the Solar System. Risk taker experts make the
point that the high safety record achieved by modem aviation is in part also due to lessons learnt during
the last century, also at the cost of fatal accidents. They further point out to military systems, with
different safety standards than analog civilian systems. It must be noted that six months were deemed safe
by both risk taker and risk averse views due to legacy experience with the International Space Station
(although this argument could be questioned, as the ISS does not operate in a deep space environment).
Health risk aversion is in part affected by underlying expert assumptions, as the radiation environment
beyond the Van Allen Belts is mostly unknown. Humans have in fact no operational experience in a deep
space environment. This aspect is considered by experts in setting the horizontal offset of the curve,
which is driven by the time of flight for which they set value at zero. Most experts set their zero value
between 2.5 and 3 years, as this is approximately the time of flight range for a conjunction-class human
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mission to Mars as specified by the NASA's Design Reference Architecture 5.0 (DRA 5.0), with two 6-
month inbound and outbound trips, in addition to a ~550 days stay on the surface (Drake 2009). The
assumption behind DRA 5.0 is the technology capability required for radiation protection of astronauts.
Therefore, the horizontal offset of the curve is a function of technology available for radiation shielding
and mitigation: experts expressed their opinions assuming the development of said enabling technology,
including of a safe haven in pressurized habitats.
Time at destination (Moon/Mars): experts in the exploration panel were able to reach consensus on value
associated to surface stay times on large planetary bodies. The underlying curve is an S-curve, where the
shape and the gradient are representative of the marginal value increase or saturation associated with short
stay and long stay durations. Experts agree that value associated to surface stay time has increasing
marginal returns for short stays, as contribution to exploration value in the first days of exploration is
significant, as new areas are explored and new operations initiated on the surface. The right-hand side of
the curve shows diminishing marginal returns, meaning that the added value of an additional day on the
surface when several months have already been spent there is low. The curve saturates at approximately
24 month stay durations for both Moon and Mars. While the policy panel required to make the distinction
between these two cases, this was not the case for the exploration panel. Experts were specifically asked
not to include orbital constraints in their assessment. For instance, some experts pointed out that not all
surface stays are available on the Mars surface with current (chemical) propulsion technology, as return
dates are constrained by the difference in Mars-Earth synodic periods. While this aspect is certainly true,
experts were asked to think at value as decoupled by enabling technology. This was motivated by the
intent to derive a curve to compare technologies in a second phase of the analysis. The analysis in this
case would include enabling and future technologies allowing surface stay times not feasible under
current technology assumptions.
Time at destination (NEA): time at NEA destinations was measured on a different time scale as agreed
with experts. This was mainly driven by characteristic NEA object sizes, which are orders of magnitude
smaller than planetary surfaces. Significant irreducible ambiguity is shown in this plot with value
associated with 2-week and 3-week sorties to NEA surfaces. The open debate in this context can be traced
to different assumptions by experts on time required for preparatory and system check-out operations.
Experts argue that only a fraction of available days will be spent in value-delivering exploration activities,
as initial days are spent in characterizing the NEA surface, assessing exploration risk, and verifying
system operations to enable exploration. Such ambiguity could not be reduced in three rounds of
iterations among experts, despite sharing expert opinions on those matters. Further discussion and
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drafting of a specification in this context with particular reference to detailed concepts of operations in the
public domain of a NEA mission are advisable to reduce this ambiguity.
Number of crew: value associated with 1 to 3 crew is shown for completeness, although experts reached
consensus in that 3 (same crew size as Apollo 11) is the minimum number of crew required for any
exploration beyond LEO. Marginal value returns with added crew members is mostly linear as being
proportional to the cumulative number of exploration operations that could be conducted on the mission.
However, the curve suggests a slight bent at 4 crew, therefore showing diminishing marginal returns after
that. This is in coherence with the current baseline of the Multi-Purpose Crew Exploration Vehicle
(MPCV) as developed by NASA.
Relative weights: experts agree that the choice of a destination for exploration and time spent at the
destination are primary drivers in the evaluation of exploration architecture. Relative ranking between the
two is unclear, as the two boxplots mostly overlap, signaling a tie in this context. Number of crew is the
second most relevant attribute from an exploration perspective. Time of flight is predominantly seen as
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Destinations: the choice of a destination shows the most irreducible ambiguity in all panels that have been
involved in the study. The study was intentionally broad in this regard, and included non conventional
destinations for a human spaceflight program such as Venus. The debate on destinations is found to be
strongly opinionated - while in previous decisions experts were willing to compromise, DB-SAF
iterations on destinations showed little room for negotiations. While evolutionary patterns between fly-by,
orbit, sortie and long stay mission modes were widely recognized across the panel, the relative ranking
between destinations was not. Furthermore, some destinations generated interest only with some experts -
such as EMLI or Venus. Notably, NEAs are part of this category. While NASA's current efforts (as per
2012) are focused on the development of a mission to a NEA, not all experts agree on the validity of such
approach. A detailed discussion of motivations for NASA to pursue a mission architecture to a Near Earth
Asteroid instead of going to larger bodies in the Solar System such as Moon and Mars goes beyond the
scopes of this thesis - the discussion being mainly driven by high development cost associated with
surface landings not sustainable under current budget projections, and an evolutionary path to develop
infrastructure capability over time for a manned mission to Mars as an end goal. A more in-depth
discussion of this program architecture can be traced to the "Flexible Path" presented in the Augustine
Report.
During the elicitation process, experts analyzed the choice of a first destination as a first step of in-orbit
infrastructure development for a Flexible Path scenario. Arguments in favor or against each destination is
discussed below.
Earth-Moon Lagrange Point Li (EML1)
Advantages: EMLI is a natural staging point for in-orbit assembly operations; as stationary orbits on
EMLI are stable, they mitigate operational risk associated with rendezvous and docking during assembly
when compared to analog operations in Low Earth Orbit. Furthermore, the delta V associated with a LEO
- EML 1 burn is comparable to a LEO - Earth Escape burn, therefore enabling hardware commonality in
Earth Departure Stages with other mission architectures beyond LEO for the same payload mass.
Disadvantages: EMLI has no exploration value per se. It does not qualify as a valuable destination, but
only as an intermediate staging point.
Mars Flyby
Advantages: first step in gaining experience and developing capabilities for a surface mission to Mars.
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Disadvantages: Exploration preparation does not justify a human flyby mission to Mars. Test human
flyby missions were done to the Moon during the Apollo program (Apollo 8) due to the short transit time
involved - 3 days instead of 1 year for a Mars conjunction-class flyby. Associated risks to human health
and development costs do not justify such a mission.
Mars Orbit
Advantages: Enabling tele-operations of rovers and hoppers on the Martian surface with astronaut
operators in orbit to reduce operational constraints due to communication lags in conventional robotic
mission architectures. Enabling the development of a permanent outpost for remote sensing and other
studies on the planet. First step in gaining experience and developing capabilities for a surface mission to
Mars.
Disadvantages: Significant existing experience in Mars orbit missions with probes and orbiters and
associated lower development costs make human orbiting platforms less attractive for science purposes.
Mars Surface Sortie
Advantages: First human presence on Mars. A 30 day stay allows a "short" Mars conjunction class to
occur, therefore minimizing health risk induced by long-term stay on the first Mars surface mission.
Disadvantages: Low return on investment: 30 days surface time for a 1 year round trip. Requires the
development of Entry Descent and Landing technologies for large payload masses (>10 mt), which is
beyond current technological capabilities.
Mars Surface Long Stay
Advantages: Significant step forward in human space exploration. The panel agrees on the value of such a
mission as the ultimate goal of the next thirty years of exploration. Architectures of long stay surface
missions have been studied by NASA in several Design Reference Architectures. A long stay mission
consists in a -550 surface stay time (1.5 years) for a 1 year-long total travel time. The latest baseline is
Design Reference Architecture 5.0, released in 2009.
Disadvantages: Long-stay missions require the development of several technologies that are not available
today. Technologies include radiation protection/mitigation and enhancing capabilities such as in-situ
resource utilization, boil-off control, aerobraking and entry descent and landing for large payload masses.
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Moon Flyby
Advantages: Develops technology towards a future Moon surface landing, analogously to what has been
done with Apollo 8.
Disadvantages: No real technological advancement, as this has been demonstrated multiple times in the
past.
Moon Orbit
Advantages: Develops technology towards a future Moon surface landing. Enables remote sensing
science on the Moon surface. Does not require development costs associated with man-rated
descent/ascent systems.
Disadvantages: Remote sensing science has been demonstrated with unmanned probes with proven
success.
Moon Sortie
Advantages: Precursor mission for Moon long stay and technology development for future Mars
missions.
Disadvantages: Already demonstrated by Apollo program up to 7 days on the surface. Little hardware
commonality on certain technology developments such as ISRU.
Moon Long Stay
Advantages: Development of a permanent lunar settlement capability on the lunar surface. Logical
prosecution of the ISS experience. Enables lunar ISRU for in-orbit propellant depot supply and ISRU-
based space resource commercialization (Sanders, Romig et al. 2005).
Disadvantages: Requires specific technologies not required or with large difference in requirements for
systems required for Mars exploration. A commonality study is required to develop this insight in more
detail.
NEA Flyby
Advantages: Develops technology towards a future NEA sortie.
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Disadvantages: NEA mission very unlikely not to include surface rendezvous. NEA mission will most
likely include interaction with NEA surface as well.
NEA Orbit
Advantages: Develops technology towards a future NEA sortie.
Disadvantages: Very unlikely to happen. NEA mission will most likely include interaction with NEA
surface as well.
NEA Sortie
Advantages: Develops technology towards a future Mars mission at a fraction of the cost of a return to the
Moon (i.e. Constellation program).
Disadvantages: Requires specific technologies not required or with large difference in requirements for
systems required for Mars exploration. A commonality study is required to develop this insight in more
detail.
Phobos/Deimos
Advantages: Enabling Mars proximity exploration without development of entry descent and landing
systems required for Mars surface missions.
Disadvantages: Requires I-year travel time and development of ascent/descent technology with higher
cost than what is required for NEA missions.
Sun-Earth L2 (SEL2)
Advantages: On-orbit servicing of new generation observatories (such as the James Webb Space
Telescope)
Disadvantages: No other purpose than on-orbit servicing.
Venus Flyby
Advantages: First mission to Venus. Technology preparation for future missions in the Solar System.
Disadvantages: Harsh radiation and thermal environment. Limited evolutionary path due to impossibility
of conducting surface missions.
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Venus Orbit
Advantages: First mission to Venus. Technology preparation. Remote sensing on Venusian surface.
Disadvantages: Harsh radiation and thermal environment. Limited evolutionary path due to impossibility
of conducting surface missions.
5.4.6.2. Exploration Panel - Maini Highight
The following points emerge as main highlights from the development of representative value functions
for the exploration panel:
- Time at Destination (NEA):
- Exploration value between 14-days and 21-days is an irreducible ambiguity in different
assumptions on Concept of Operations (CONOPS) - in particular due to different
assumptions on time required for system check-out and testing before commitment to
NEA surface operations.
* The development of a common and open standard on a detailed mission CONOPS for
NEA missions is recommended.
- Destinations:
* Highest degree of irreducible ambiguity. At the same time, the panel ranked destinations
as first most important attribute in the evaluation procedure.
. Debate is highly opinionated, impossibility of reaching consensus.
e Open debate on destination selection is highly recommended to reduce associated
ambiguity within NASA and with international partners. Of particular interest is
reduction of ambiguity on NEA mission architectures, which evaluation in terms of
exploration panel appears bimodal, with experts giving high value to NEA missions
versus experts giving zero value to NEA missions. Both parties did not agree in
modifying their position at any point during the debate due to fundamental different value
assumptions.
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While the science panel on Mars Sample Return in Chapter 4 was the most affected by irreducible
ambiguity among other panels, this was not the case in the human spaceflight case study. Science experts
shared the opinion that science in a human spaceflight program is a complementary objective, certainly
important but not primary. While scientists agree that unique advantages associated with astronaut
presence are enablers and enhancers of science (in particular in sample return and geology field work),
they also recognize that a vast majority of science objectives can be pursued with robotic platforms for a
fraction of the cost of a human mission. With this assumption in mind, this discussion presents the
rationale of experts in the science panel to provide a first-order science return evaluation of a given
systems architecture.
The set of property variables of interest to scientists included exploration time at destination, NEA
characteristic size and composition, and choice of a destination. A detailed discussion on those property
variables follows.
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Time at destination (Moon/Mars): A linear trend in science return emerged after three rounds of
iterations: science return is perceived as proportional to exploration time at the destination. While this
result is intuitive, this exercise provided validation to this statement.
Time at destination (NEA): Value associated with time on NEAs featured a double plateau, due to
different types of science that could be done on that mission. Remote sensing and internal tomography of
NEA interiors is possible via orbit operations, therefore representing early value delivering activities such
a science program. Additional time spent (associated with NEA surface operations) increases value
significantly by enabling sample return and geological field work activities. A maximum time of 3
months is foreseen on the surface for a first NEA mission.
Object size (NEA): for NEAs with a characteristic size greater than 30m (objects that would be too small
pursuing for a human NEA mission), science value is insensitive to object size.
Object composition (NEA): object composition is an important discriminator in NEA selection for human
missions. While all compositions are of interest to answer questions in planetary science, carbonaceous
objects emerge as clear priorities due to their importance in answering relevant questions in astrobiology
and planetary formation. Carbonaceous NEAs are samples of thermally unprocessed, pristine material
from the origin of the Solar System (due to Calcium Aluminum inclusions - CAs - analog to the ones





Figuire 64 CAI inclusions in chiondritic meteorites (image sorce: v i)
Relative weights: the science panel followed a value-driven approach, where the choice of a destination
was clearly recognized as the first priority in evaluation. Second to it object composition, although this
opinion varied according to whether the expert in question was concerned with science related to NEA
composition (such as geologists). Time spent at the destination emerged as third priority. Object size and
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Figure 65 Science Pinel - Destination Choice - Round 3
Destinations: the science panel showed more agreement in defining science value associated to
destinations. Clear evolutionary trends are found in Mars, Moon and NEA missions. While NEA missions
were considered of lower exploration value than Moon and Mars missions, a different judgment came
from the science panel. As NEAs are valuable evidence to study planetary formation and the origin of the
Solar System, they were retained by the panel of high science value. A similar argument holds for
Phobos/Deimos. No or little science value was associated to EML1, SEL2 and Venus manned flyby/orbit
missions, as neither of those benefit of humans as enablers of science.
5.4.6.4. Science Panel - Main Ighlights
e Humans are seen as enablers of certain science (such as sample return and geology field work)
and evaluations calibrated accordingly.
e Carbonaceous are a privileged NEA category as they are samples of thermally unprocessed,
pristine material answering questions on planetary formation and the history of the Solar System.
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e Object composition is key for NEA mission selection. NEA size does not matter, unless looking
at specific NEA science questions such as rubble pile versus onion shell theories for NEA internal
composition, which can also be answered by use of tomography instruments.
5.4.6.5. Policy Panel - Elicitation of Valie Functions
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Round 3 Results
The policy panel followed more qualitative logics and provided different types of motivations than the
exploration and science panels in substantiating their answers. The following discussion overviews the
rationale elicited by this panel.
Total time of flight (as proxy for health risk): time of flight was not seen only in light of technical
constraints, but also considering policy constraints such as short-term policy return. Some policy experts
in the panel motivated his answers based on the fact that US Congress changes in 2 year cycles, and a US
President in 4 year (one term) and 8 year (two terms) cycles. Ambiguity on this value function could be
effectively reduced in three iterations.
Time at Destination (Moon): the panel proposed to consider this measure separately for Moon, Mars and
NEAs. For the Moon, the maximum was identified in 6 months for a lunar base settlement, in agreement
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with previous experience with the International Space Station. The trend over time follows a curve with
diminishing marginal returns. However, ambiguity remains in defining clearly a point of diminishing
marginal returns. Value was estimated as zero for a seven day Moon sortie, as experts stated the desire for
new Moon programs to advance from the Apollo era and have an impact on media and the public opinion.
Time at Destination (Mars): a step-wise trend was identified by the panel, marking the difference between
30 day sortie and 550 sortie mission modes. The DRA 5.0 baseline for surface stay (-18 months) is on the
point of diminishing marginal returns of the curve.
Time at Destination (NEA): a clear trend showing diminishing marginal returns was identified by the
panel. Value saturates at I month of exploration, with substantial value delivery (> 50%) at 2 weeks of
exploration. This was motivated as policy experts believe such a mission would have greater impact on
media and the public in the short term rather than in the long term. This conclusion suggests to keep
mission duration in the order of one month, in accordance with NASA studies on NEA missions
conducted in 2012 by the Human Spaceflight Architecture Team (HAT).
Number of Crew: the panel took the Apollo program as a reference considering a crew range between 3
and 6 crew members, with a linear increase in value in this range.
Object Size: value increases proportionally to object size showing diminishing marginal returns. Object
size is related to the impact on the media and the public associated with the mission. Note that object
composition was deemed irrelevant by policy experts. An exception is made by experts advocating for the
development of a space economy, who are therefore interested in NEA objects which composition suits
the needs for the development of commercial ventures (such as asteroid mining activities).
Relative Weights: an unclear priority ranking was elicited by the panel. High irreducible ambiguity is due
to the plurality of non reconcilable intents.
This last result implies the lack of strong leadership driving worldwide policy opinions. This is also
confirmed by looking value judgment results associated with destinations.
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No clear evolutionary trends.
Surface mission value not agreed by all experts.
Orbit missions valuable to some experts due to
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Figiure 67 Policy Pa nel - Destination choice - Rounid 3
Destinations: this panel feature the greatest degree of irreducible ambiguity associated with destination
across panels. No clear evolutionary trends were identified between missions modes (flyby, orbit, sortie
and long stay). Value associated with surface missions was not agreed by experts; for instance, not all
experts associated maximum value to a Mars surface mission as expressed by the vast majority of experts
in the exploration and science panels. In some cases, orbit missions were deemed more valuable than
surface missions as experts believed these alone deliver significant impact to the media and on public
opinion, while enabling exploration opportunities provided by tele-robotic exploration on planetary
surfaces - therefore mitigating communication lags.
5.4.6.6. Policy Pantl - Main H1,ihlights
e No clear leadership or consensus emerging, which implies the need to bring concepts for further
evaluation.
e Time scale arguments were based on impact on media and public opinion, and were based on
coherence with possible political changes rather than scientific/engineering rationale, such as for
instance using the following timescale of events:
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e 2 years: Congress lifecycle
e 4 years: One-term President
e 8 years: Two-term President
* No evolutionary trends in destination choice was found between mission modes (flyby, orbit,
sortie and surface long stay) as perceived by other panels.
- Orbit missions were deemed valuable by some policy experts for their impact on media and
public opinion (such as in Apollo 8).
5.4.7. Step 8 -Aggregate Results Discussion
A first result of interest can be achieved with a first-order benefit-cost analysis of the in-space
transportation infrastructure. In this context, a proxy for benefit is defined as the weighted average of
median values delivered to expert panels (exploration, science, and policy) as measured in Round 3 of
DB-SAF iterations. Weights represent decision-maker preferences to different panels, i.e. to different
categories of experts - a sensitivity analysis to weights is conducted to assess robustness of the analysis.
A proxy for cost is defined as the total delta V that the infrastructure needs to provide for a given
destination / mission mode (for instance Moon Sortie, or Mars Long Stay). We neglect Venus in this
analysis, as DB-SAF results have shown this choice was dominated in value in all panels by other
destinations. Table 32 shows the input data for this analysis. Sensitivity analysis results to different panel
weights are shown in Figure 68, Figure 69, Figure 70, and Figure 71.





























































































Mars Sortiew Stay HINEA








0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Weighted Average Value
Figure 68 Benefit-Cost Analysis Restilts - Lqual Weights (33.33% Exploration, 33.33% Science, 33.33% Policy)
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The following results emerge from the first-order benefit/cost analysis shown in the abovementioned
figures:
NEA destinations are always on the Pareto front. Low-energy NEAs represent efficient
benefit/cost tradeoffs being on the kick of the curve. This result is confirmed in all the scenarios
considered in the sensitivity analysis.
* While high-energy NEAs are always dominated in a Pareto sense, they represent destinations of
interest as they require higher capabilities in terms of delta V, better approaching energy
requirements of future Mars missions.
* Value associated with mission duration and mission mode (flyby vs orbit vs sortie vs long stay) is
moderately panel dependent. Said value is higher for exploration and science biased scenarios, for
which longer durations are preferred. Value is lower in the policy-biased scenario, as policy
experts showed preference for shorter mission durations for early value return within Presidential
and Congressional mandates.
* Value associated with EML1 and SEL2 destinations is highly panel dependent. They show high
value (close to the Pareto front) in the policy-biased scenario, as these destinations comply with
current policy guidance (as of Ql 2012), and represent a gateway for future exploration as
discussed previously. An exploration-biased assumption returns moderate value from these
destinations, since technology development is enabled by these destinations (while having lower
exploration value when compared to other alternatives). Value is low in a science-bias
assumption, as EML1 and SEL2 are empty points in deep space, where no human-enabled
science (such as sample return) can be performed.
We now perform design space exploration analysis integrating the requirements tradespace in Table 24
and the architectural tradespace in Table 27 and using the value functions defined by the exploration,
science, and policy panels. Design baseline architectures described in Section 5.4.2.7 are used for model
validation and comparison with existing studies. Figure 72 shows architectures grouped according to
different destinations being pursued. Each quadrant represents the intersection between a value function
as elicited from expert analysis, and proxy evaluation metrics for performance/cost - defined by IMLEO -
and risk - defined by the ordinal ARR metric previously defined.
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We considered architectures for which 0 < IMLEO < 2000mt. Architectures beyond the upper treshold
are unrealistic, resulting from dominated combinations of architectural decisions. We can immediately
verify that existing architectural baselines lay close to 2-dimensional Pareto fronts of the integrated design
space, therefore providing confidence on validity of the architectural model. Several tradeoffs are
represented: the multi-performance Pareto front shows the logical progression of increase in overall value
between destinations. This discussion considers performance/value-maximizing, cost/risk-minimizing
stakeholders, for whom therefore maximum exploration/science/policy value is desired (value 1.00),
while minimizing IMLEO and ARR. Architectural tradeoffs are highlighted in the chart. For both
exploration and science panels, ordinal rank on the IMLEO/Value Pareto fronts is as follows: Low Energy
NEA / Moon (lowest value) - High Energy NEA 4 Mars (highest value). Low Energy NEA and Moon
architectures are differentiated from an Architectural Risk Ranking standpoint, with Moon architectures
features lowest risk due to prior operational experience represented by the Apollo program. Tradespace
exploration from a policy perspective (third column in the figure) highlights the current stance of the
human spaceflight political debate. Moon and NEA architectures are at different levels of the Pareto front,
while Mars architectures stand back as dominated. This result is due to expert opinion elicitated in the
policy panel, where several experts provided low score to Mars missions based on sustainability grounds
due to perceived policy return / cost ratio of such mission, given current tight budget forecasts and policy
directions. Moon and low energy NEA missions (comparable to the 2000SG34 NASA HAT baseline) are
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competing options in the low-IMLEO region of the Pareto front, as per the motivations discussed in
Round 3 results of Exploration and Science Panels in Sections 5.4.6.1 - 5.4.6.4. This analysis does not
intentionally suggest an "optimal" destination pursue. A global optimum is unachievable, as the expert
elicitation identified non reconciliable, irreducible ambiguities within panels. While full consensus is not
possible, efficient compromise is instead a possibility enabled by this analysis. Architectural analysis
provides a transparent approach to characterize subjective value-based architectural tradeoffs and
compare them with objective metrics such as IMLEO estimates and risk assessments such as done with
the proposed ARR metric. Final selection is left to decision-makers, whom are called to express an
aggregate judgment based on their relative weights between exploration, science, and policy
considerations. An analytical alternative would be to formulate a "Super-stakeholder" utility function
(analogous to social welfare functions in economics) representing decision-makers, and therefore
providing an ordinal ranking of architectures by aggregating metrics in a single-objective function.
However, this approach would bias the analysis towards a particular decision-maker's view and
preference structure. An analytic approach further assumes acceptance of the axioms of rationality in
decision-making such as maximization of expected value, which are seldom employed in complex
decisions in the real-world where subjectivity (induced by ambiguity, irrationality and hidden agendas) is
heavily involved. More importantly, such approach is prone to critiques as decision-making under
ambiguity is a complex non-linear, discontinuous process. We prefer, instead, to show tradeoffs as they
presented themselves during expert elicitation iterations, having removed reducible ambiguity and
highlighted irreducible ambiguity in the debate using DB-SAF. The final decision is left therefore to
decision-makers.
We consider now the scenario where NEAs are selected as first destinations of a Flexible Path
architecture, in accordance to what is being currently pursued by NASA at the time of writing of this
dissertation. We note on the side that while this architecture is the current program of record for future
human spaceflight missions at NASA, it is affected by irreducible ambiguity in value associated to NEA
destinations, with large dissent from several expert panel members involved as shown by the DB-SAF
expert elicitation in previous sections. In this scenario, questions of interest include the selection of
desired NEA properties such as characteristic size and composition. Figure 73 and Figure 74 show the
design space grouped by object (NEA) size and composition, respectively.
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Figure 73 Architeicunl Design Space - Object Size View
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Both questions on size and composition have a clear indication from tradespace exploration.
Carbonaceous NEAs dominate throughout the NEA design space, as also shown in previous discussion of
DB-SAF panel results. This is mostly due to sinergies in astrobiology and geology questions that can be
answered returning carbonaceous NEA samples on Earth. Value perception is insensitive to NEA
characteristic size, with the exception of small sizes - which also lead to infeasible mission architectures
due to impractical rendez-vous and docking operations with the celestial body. While both exploration
and science panels gave initial indication of relevance of both requirement variables during DB-SAF
iterations, ambiguity was quickly reduced to low sensitivity of exploration/science value to both variables
- with more sensitivity expressed from the science panel. It must also be noted small NEAs are oftentime
in fast rotation around their spin axis in unstable motions, while large NEAs are slow, stable rotating
bodies - therefore representing a preferred choice from a CONOPS perspective. Lastly, ARR plots show
that NEAs are middle ground in Architectural Risk Ranking in the design space, representing















































Notwithstanding the choice of a destination, the determination of the number of crew is a critical decision
in the architecture of the in-orbit transportation infrastructure. The proposed architecting model coupled
with DB-SAF identifies the tradeoff between marginal increase in exploration/science/policy value
associated with the addition of a crewmember to the architecture, associated with reduction of risk as
measured by the ARR due to enhanced survivability of the crew during the mission. This is of particular
interest for the sizing of future exploration vehicles such as NASA's Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle
(MPCV, Figure 76). MPCV sizing is a primary driver of the architecture infrastructure, as shown in the
ambiguity impact analysis discussed later in this section.
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Architectural tradeoffs associated with exploration time, time of flight and mission mode are directly
related to the insights discussed for destination choices. Their detailed discussion goes beyond the scopes
of this dissertation. However, for completeness, such plots are reported in Appendix 9.1 (Figure 108,
Figure 109, and Figure 110 respectively).
We now resort to ambiguity impact analysis to identify areas of concern to decision-makers between
irreducible ambiguities that have been identified in this study. We will consider both architectural
tradespace metrics in this study, namely IMLEO and ARR. First we analyze ambiguity impact using a
Design of Experiments, Main Effects analysis. Figure 77 shows the results of main effects analysis on
IMLEO. Results show dominance of the choice of a destination as the primary effect impacting the
systems architecture. This is a very important area of concern as previous sections discussed widespread
irreducible ambiguity in this context. Choice of a number of crew is the second most impactful
requirement decision, which however poses less of an issue given relatively low associated irreducible
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54.8. Step 9 - Conv'ergence Criteria
A maximum number of three iterations has been used as termination criteria for DB-SAF. The following
figures (from Figure 79 to Figure 96) show the evolution of the three panels during rounds. Convergence
has also be verified with experts; they confirmed that they were unlikely to change their answers in a
fourth round of DB-SAF, therefore the study was called to a close.
Figure 97 to Figure 99 show a summary of convergence history for each value of the expert elicitation
process of the three panels. Different lines represent different values for each property value. Iteration
rounds are on the x-axis, whereas the standard deviation normalized to Round 1 is shown on the y-axis. A
normalized standard deviation convergence metric has been preferred to a coefficient of variation
convergence metric in this case as there were values with zero mean in some property variables. These
panels, in conjunction with the analysis of results presented above and the analysis of individual expert
panels allow to characterize of reducible and irreducible ambiguities encountered in the study. This leads,
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Figure 79 Exploration Panel - Round I
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Figure 88 Science Panel - Destinations - Round 2
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5.4.9. Step 10 - D)evelopment of Reconniendations
The following recommendations emerge from the analysis:
. The choice of a destination is the predominant irreducible ambiguity affecting the architecture of
in-space transportation infrastructure, with particular impact on exploration-related and policy-
related stakeholders. Reduction of this ambiguity through open debate and development of
resilient human spaceflight policies is on the critical path towards a successful program for the
next thirty year of human exploration (see Section 5.4.7).
* No clear leadership or consensus emerging among policy makers in setting a direction for human
spaceflight, which implies the need for NASA to bring new concepts for further evaluation (see
Section 5.4.6.5).
. In NEA architectures, prefer carbonaceous, large-sized (>100m) Near Earth Asteroids
destinations to leverage on synergies between astrobiology and geology science questions
enabled by NEA sample return retrieved with astronaut sorties (see Section 5.4.6.3).
- Develop an open standard on a detailed mission CONOPS for NEA missions to reduce ambiguity
on exploration value definition (see Section 5.4.6.1).
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5.5. Case Study Summarxy and Conclusions
This chapter presented a broader set of challenges than what discussed in the Mars Sample Return case
study in Chapter 4. The case study presented here is focused on the systems architecture of in-space
transportation infrastructure for human exploration beyond Low Earth Orbit. Sections 5.1 and 5.2
introduced the problem and provided motivations for the analysis. Section 5.3 outlined specific objectives
to be achieved by the case study. Section 5.4 described the step-by-step application of the framework to
the case study as per the theory outlined in Chapter 3.
A specific feature of this case study is the presence of ambiguity in the definition of the functional intent,
with direct impact on value delivery to stakeholder as expressed by goals. The questions of interest
considered in this case study led to the development of recommendations on the architecture of in-space
transportation infrastructure. The expert elicitation process in DB-SAF identified areas of reducible and
irreducible ambiguities in the exploration, science and policy panels that have been involved. Main
highlights from the different panels are discussed in Section 5.4.6.2 (Exploration), Section 5.4.6.4
(Science), and Section 5.4.6.6 (Policy). A multi-performance design space exploration analysis is
discussed in Section 5.4.7.
The most important result of the analysis is the identification of a critical irreducible ambiguity
undermining success in delivering value for the in-space transportation infrastructure of the next three
decades. The choice of a destination has a primary impact on the architecture. While NASA's program of
record at the time of writing of this thesis is focused on architecting a human spaceflight mission to a
Near Earth Asteroid, consensus on this architecture is far from being reached by the community at large,
with particular reference to exploration and policy stakeholders. Expert evaluation of NEA missions
resulted in a bimodal distribution in opinions, with experts giving high value to NEA missions at the same
time of experts giving zero value to the same types of missions. This fact is of particular relevance in
future mission planning, as it is a threat to stakeholder agreement in funding and supporting new systems
architecting and development endeavors.
The realization of this ambiguity is a call for NASA to promote an open forum on this topic, and to
develop a strong case for investments in the human spaceflight industry in the next decades by policy
makers. Ambiguity and current lack of consesus in policy leadership, as emerged by this study, are
critical items to be addressed in today's early design stages of the design of in-space systems for
successful development, implementation, operations and value delivery of the infrastructure of tomorrow.
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Chapter 6 : Case Study 3 - Retrospective Validation Case Study
"After 11 years of hard work, we are proud to announce that we are open for business. Iridium will open
up the world of business, commerce, disaster relief and humanitarian assistance with our first-of-its-kind
global communications service... The potential use of Iridium products is boundless. Business people who
travel the globe and want to stay in touch with home and office, industries that operate in remote areas -
all will find Iridium to be the answer to their communications needs." (Iridium Satellite Communications
1998)
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6.1. Introduction
Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 have shown the applicability of DB-SAF to systems architecting by means of
case study analysis. It has been shown how the framework can be applied to identify and characterize
ambiguities in areas of consensus and compromise (reducible ambiguities) and areas of open debates and
hidden agendas (irreducible ambiguities). Ambiguities are mitigated providing architectural
recommendations to decision-makers. As case studies in previous chapters derive from current
architecting problems - problems for which the "right" answer is unknown at present time - there is a
need to strengthen the case of DB-SAF by investigating its validity and effectiveness. The analysis
presented in this chapter does that by benchmarking DB-SAF results against a case for which the answer
is known, or believed to be certain.
This chapter describes the validation case study that has been developed to evaluate DB-SAF and
compare its performance with conventional Group Decision-Making (GDM). The remainder of the
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chapter is structured as follows. Section 6.2 describes the purpose of the validation and provides working
definitions. Section 6.4 outlines formulating principles of the case study. Section 6.4 states the hypotheses
that are being tested by means of statistical analysis. Sections 6.5 describes the case study, based on an
analog that has been developed concealing a historical case. Section 6.5.2.3 outlines the protocol that has
been designed for the validation, discussing criteria for population sampling and providing information on
inputs, process and outputs of the validation. Section 6.7 presents a statistical analysis of results, that form
the basis for drawing conclusions from the case study (Section 6.8).
6.2. Purpose of the Validation
The purpose of the validation is to investigate the hypothesis that the proposed Delphi-Based Systems
Architecting Framework (DB-SAF) yields to better decision-making than what could be obtained with a
Group Decision-Making (GDM) process. The definition of "better" is exemplified by means of validation
hypotheses in Section 6.4. Stating hypotheses is effective towards validation as it provides a basis for
statistical analysis.
The validation consists in an analog case study based on a historical venture that is widely regarded as a
systems architecting failure. The analog case is provided as an input to an experimental study. In the
study, groups of participants are called to analyze data and come with a decision regarding the
development of a fictional suborbital spaceline. Biases are intentionally introduced to simulate peer
pressure, ambiguity and hidden agendas in the study. Different groups are engaged in DB-SAF and GDM
sessions. The effects of the biases and the effectiveness of the decision-making processes are evaluated by
asking participants to compile a survey in which they are asked to evaluate the process they followed
using grouped-ordinal Likert scales (Likert 1932). Survey results between DB-SAF and GDM groups are
then compared using tests of statistical significance on validation hypotheses.
The case study has been inspired by the Carter Racing case (Brittain and Sitkin 1990), where a group
experiment has been designed to replicate the launch/no-launch decision of the Space Shuttle Challenger.
In this case, groups are proposed a concealed analog case where the management of a racing team is
called to make a race/no race decision. In addition to this, the validation case study of this thesis builds on
previous research that demonstrated statistical significance in decision-making quality improvements due
to the availability of confirmatory and nonconfirmatory information - which is not often the case in group
decision-making (Kray and Galinsky 2003). One of the strengths of DB-SAF over conventional GDM is
derived by explicitly providing decision-makers both confirmatory and nonconfirmatory information
during the systems architecting process, allowing identification and characterization of ambiguities.
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For the purposes of this thesis the focus is on validating the requirements elicitation part of DB-SAF. The
effectiveness of underlying systems architecting model for tradespace exploration has already been
discussed ubiquitously in the literature by benchmark with existing systems (see (De Weck, De Neufville
et al. 2004) as an example). The goal is to verify whether reduction of ambiguity, achievement of
compromise, elicitation of open debate, and identification of hidden agendas occur more effectively using
DB-SAF rather than a GDM expert elicitation process.
As the study employs statistical analysis as research tool, a representative and significantly large sample
of participants is required. Section 6.6.2 discusses sampling criteria that have been defined to ensure
representativeness of the sample. Section 6.7 discusses the optimal sample size estimate based on
preliminary assumptions of target margins of error and confidence levels desired for the analysis. For the
purposes of this thesis, the analysis is framed as a pilot study to estimate main effects on decision-making,
inform larger scale studies and strengthen the case for DB-SAF as formulated in the cross-case analysis in
Chapter 7. The following section describes the principles with which the validation case study has been
designed.
6.3. Valid'ation Principles
To achieve its goals, the validation is designed around the following principles:
- Conceal the retrospective case study with an analog case study using the same data as applied to
a different context, with the intent of removing participant biases due to background knowledge
on the original case study while keeping the same decision-making problem structure.
- Simulate the need for team work, due to the multidisciplinary nature of the analysis required for
elicitation of stakeholder needs, formulation of a functional intent and consequent definition of
system requirements.
- Simulate the effects of peer pressure, hidden agendas and ambiguity in the team work process,
and their consequences in definition of system requirements hence the selection of a systems
architecture.
- Benchmark the validity of the proposed DB-SAF against a GDM process, and therefore verify




The validation is designed to test the following hypotheses:
- Hypothesis 1: The average perceived effectiveness of DB-SAF in reducing adverse peer pressure
effects is greater than the average effectiveness achieved by GDM among team members of a
systems architecting team.
- Hypothesis 2: The average perceived effectiveness of DB-SAF in identifying and reducing
ambiguity is greater than the average effectiveness achieved by GDM among team members of a
systems architecting team.
- Hypothesis 3: The average perceived effectiveness of DB-SAF in improving Pareto-efficient
compromises is greater than the average effectiveness achieved by GDM among team members
of a systems architecting team.
- Hypothesis 4: The average perceived effectiveness of DB-SAF in eliciting open debate is greater
than the average effectiveness achieved by GDM among team members of a systems architecting
team.
- Hypothesis 5: The average perceived effectiveness of DB-SAF in uncovering hidden agendas is
greater than the average effectiveness achieved by GDM among team members of a systems
architecting team.
- Hypothesis 6: The average effectiveness of DB-SAF in improving decision acceptance among
group members is greater than the average decision acceptance achieved by GDM.
6.5. Case Study Design Approach
Previous sections described the purpose, principle and hypotheses of the validation. This section describes
the alternatives that have been considered in the design of the validation and the design process that has
been followed for the case study.
Several avenues have been considered. All the approaches shared the idea of basing the analysis on
historical cases universally recognized as architecting failures - caused by unresolved ambiguity during
conceptual design. Another primary design driver that has been considered is the multidisciplinarity of the
case, as represented by interconnected business, technology and policy elements in the decision-making
process. The first approach being considered was that of an a posteriori direct approach. In this setting, a
case study is discussed with a group of participants, who are called to perform an analysis "after the fact"
based on input data provided by the researcher. This approach has been discarded as participants would
have been biased by knowing the history of the program along with its strengths and flaws. Likewise, an
a priori direct approach has been deemed inappropriate for validation, as the lack of a known answer does
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not allow objective method evaluation and benchmarking. The analysis therefore has been designed using
an a posteriori concealed approach, where the historic case study is concealed as an analog case study.
Multiple historic studies has been screened as candidates to this approach. We initially considered 1) the
selection of a vehicle configuration for the Space Shuttle Program and 2) the Future Imagery Architecture
cases as representatives of failures in meeting original policy objectives (Logsdon 1986; Harvey 1994;
Taubman 2007). Lack of historical data in the public domain - including detailed cost, policy and
technical information as available at the time of the original decision - prevented the choice of both cases.
Eventually, a case based on the first commercial satellite constellations the 1980-1990s has been selected
for validation. The selection has been motivated by abundant literature in the public domain in the topic,
and by the multidisciplinarity of the case in its business, technology and policy facets. The choice fell
over Iridium as detailed information is available in its original stock offer to the market (Communications
1999) and its Chapter 1 filing (Court 1999). The following sections presents the history of Iridium and
details of the case study (Section 6.5.1) and its mapping to the analog case study that has been developed
(Section 6.5.2).
6._51. Ret rospctive Cse Stud -- I ritlium Satellite Conisteliation
6.5. 1. 1. i troiuction
Iridium is a constellation of satellites that was designed to enable space-based personal communications.
Iridium was initially built and developed by Motorola, leading company in the telecommunications
industry. After nurturing the project for a decade and raising capital for a total of $6 billion dollars
between debt financing, shareholders and Motorola's own investment, Iridium "solved a problem that
very few customers needed solved" (Kerzner 2009). In 1999 Iridium filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy,
becoming one of the top 20 bankruptcies in the U.S. (Finkelstein and Sanford 2000).
"What went wrong? How did the Iridium Project transform from a leading-edge technical marvel to a
multi-billion-dollar blunder? Could the potential catastrophe have been prevented?" (Finkelstein and
Sanford 2000)
6.5. 1.2 Brief Itaory of iridium
The concept of a Mobile Satellite Service (MSS) was first proposed in 1985 by Bary Bertiger, chief
engineer in Motorola's strategic electronics division (Kerzner 2009). The idea was born during a vacation
in the Bahamas, when his wife Karen complained about the inability of making a phone call with her
land-based mobile phone to close a real-estate transaction (Hardy 1996). Land-based cellular phone
technology was emerging at the time (Bird 1985), Analysts estimated the land-based phone market to
grow to 40 million customers by year 2000 (Ciesluk, Gaffney et al. 1992). Cellular technology, however,
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offered limited coverage due to lack of ground infrastructure. Iridium's idea was to make the "traveller's
dream come true", by enabling personal communications on every point of the globe (Grubb 1991).
Iridium's constellation was composed of 66 satellites with a design lifetime of 5 years, relaying voice data
between end user terminals and ground stations (Wilson 1998). Ground stations link to the land-based
PSTN (Public Switched Telephone Network) infrastructure via dedicated gateways. Several system
architectures have been proposed for MSS services by different operators (Comparetto 1993). The system
architecture of Iridium is shown in Figure 101, adapted from (de Weck and Chang 2002).
intersatellite
link (ISL)
comsat i 1 A forward link comsat i+1
2 ground of ground e j
station station terminal
downlink uplink downlnk uplink
gateway Ba end userterminal
PST Cellular
Figure 11 LEO Comunnlnicatioi Constellation Architecture ladipted from (de Week and Chang 2002)1
The customer target of Iridium was the global business traveler and high-end segments of the retail
communications market. Significant demand for MSS services was estimated by several market surveys
and analyses commissioned by Iridium (Keller 1993); in its 1990 FCC Filing, the Firm identified 15
market segments for a total of 6,076,000 subscribers by 2001 (Iridium Satellite Communications 1990) -
while critics at the time argued that the service was too expensive to attract such a high number of
customers (Cole 1994). Unfortunately, Iridium business plan proved to be overly optimistic, and
eventually headed towards failure (Bulloch 2000; Carroll 2000). By the end of March 1998, five weeks
later the introduction of Iridium to the market, the service counted 10,000 subscribers - while the
company was estimating an increase of their customer base at a rate of 40,000 subscribers per month
(Kerzner 2009).
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A detailed history of the Iridium constellation is beyond of the scope of this thesis. (Kerzner 2009)
provides a thorough account. (Finkelstein and Sanford 2000) synthesize the reasons from Iridium's
collapse in the following causes:
* Unforeseen increase of capability of land-based cellular infrastructure, reducing the market
interested in MSS services (Finkelstein and Sanford 2000) (De Weck, De Neufville et al. 2004);
* Iridium's engineering limitations (need for line-of-sight between Iridium's handheld and satellite,
inability to call while in movement, inside buildings and in urban areas) (Finkelstein and Sanford
2000);
* Schedule delays in handheld supply from manufacturers (lacking supply of handhelds for Iridium
subscribers) (Finkelstein and Sanford 2000);
* Poor partner support (partners delayed setup of marketing teams and distribution channels)
(Finkelstein and Sanford 2000).
As uncertainty arouse on Iridium's business plan, the company kept pushing the technology through its
market launch. (Finkelstein and Sanford 2000) identify three forces that created Iridium's failure:
- Escalating commitment - defined as "making decisions based on the size of previous investments
rather than on the size of the expected return" (Finkelstein and Sanford 2000).
- Poor Management - the company's CEO had vested interests in pushing the technology to the
market due to bonus incentives and the association of his name to the success of Iridium 6.
Furthermore, his leadership style has been described as "intimidating". In line with his company's
ethic, he was a staunch supporter of Iridium, with blind faith in "his" project's success (Kerzner
2009).
* Inadequate corporate governance - Iridium had 27 out of 28 directors being either employees or
partners' designated. Poor oversight and lack of an objective supervision led poor management
practices prevail. (Kerzner 2009).
6. 5. 1.3.1 alidation Ouestion
The Iridium project consisted of two stages: a research and development stage (1987-1996), and a
manufacturing and operations stage (1996-1999) (Kerzner 2009). This study analyzes Iridium in 1996,
when the corporate board made the decision of transitioning from one phase to another.
6 "Iridium's CEO gave up a $1.3 million per year contract with Motorola for a $500,000 base salary plus 750,000 Iridium stock
options that vested over a 5-year period. Staiano [Iridium's CEO] commented: << If I can make Iridium's dream come true, I'll
make a significant amount of money>> Hardy, Q. (1996). Staiano is leaving Motorola to lead Firm's Iridium Global Satellite
Project. Wall Street Journal. New York." Kerzner, H. (2009). Project management : a systems approach to planning, scheduling,
and controlling. Hoboken, N.J., John Wiley & Sons..
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Could ambiguities in Iridium's value proposition be identified and characterized in 1996 by
supporting decision-makers with a Delphi-based systems architecting approach?
To answer this question, an analog case study has been developed as described in Section 6.5.2. In this
study, a system architecting team is called to "make or break" the case of Suborbital Spacelines LLC, a
fictional aerospace venture willing to launch a point-to-point suborbital transportation service. The
following section introduces this study, and shows how the case has been developed using Iridium's data
in a concealed context.
6.5.2. Analog Case Study - Suborbital Spacelines LLC
6.52. 1. Introduction
Suborbital Spacelines LLC is a new joint venture effort in the aerospace industry to deliver a commercial
point-to-point passenger transportation service. Suborbital has conceived and designed a revolutionary
concept for a spaceplane able to carry 100 passengers from London to New York in less than one hour.
The spaceplane is based on a low aspect-ratio concept, powered by a hybrid rocket propulsion system,
with a conventional cargo aircraft acting as mother ship at take-off. Suborbital starts where the Concorde
supersonic aircraft system left, by delivering travelers new means of transportation and holding the
promise of being the next breakthrough in aerospace engineering. System engineers, business analysts
and policy experts at Suborbital worked together to ensure commercial viability of their concept. Fifteen
initial routes have been defined for the initial plan of operations for the spaceline, covering the major
business routes in the world. Additional routes have been identified for a second phase of operations, as
soon as market demand unfolded in the initial stage of the service.
Suborbital plans to deliver luxury service for the high-end segment of the market, addressing customers
who are willing to pay a premium to travel long distances in a reduced amount of time. Suborbital will be
a first-mover in this market, as it has developed enabling technologies that are not available to
competitors. Suborbital does not intend to compete with existing transportation services, rather plans to
complement them with its offer.
Although competitors are not planning to develop suborbital flight services in the near term, competition
threatening Suborbital's competition is at the outset. A "low cost" private jet lease service, Rent-A-Jet -
inspired by the analogous service delivered by conventional low cost airlines - launched its offer to the
market. While Rent-A-Jet cannot compete with Suborbital in travel time, it provides customers several
perks, such as on-board Wi-Fi, custom flight schedule and the ability to operate in secondary airports
closer to the customer's final destination. While Suborbital has been closely monitoring Rent-A-Jet's
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growth, analysts believe that its market will take a long time to grow significantly, thus not representing a
threat for the Company's plans.
Following several internal systems architecting studies and commissioning external consulting companies
to conduct market surveys and market sizing estimates, Suborbital managers decided to form a steering
committee to analyze the Company's business case and take a final decision to authorize the transition
from detailed design to manufacturing spaceplanes and operating them. The steering committee includes
three panels for Business, Technology and Policy matters. Each panel is staffed by junior and senior
experts, in addition to panel leads. Suborbital's Chief Executive Officer will chair the panel and will hold
the final decision on Suborbital's transition to manufacturing and operations.
6.5.2.2. Ncope of Suborbita Spacepltne I LD Case Stmly
Scope of Surborbital's Case Study is to compare the answers and rationale provided by Team A and
Team B to the following questions:
Principal Director (CEO) Final Decision
Should Suborbital authorize spaceplane manufacturing, infrastructure development and move to
operations as per the plan proposed by the board? How will Suborbital build confidence around its
decision towards shareholders?
Business Assessment
What business factors should the CEO consider in making its decision? What are the panel's
recommendations to the CEO and why?
Engineering Assessment
What engineering factors should the CEO consider in making its decision? What the panel's
recommendations to the CEO and why?
Policy Risk Assessment
What policy factors should the CEO consider in making its decision? What are the panel's
recommendations to the CEO and why?
6.5.2-. 3. Cost Model
The cost per function (CPF) capacity-based cost model developed by (de Weck 2004) for satellite
constellations has been used to model Suborbital's cost per spaceplane flight, and used in conjuction of
market estimates defined in Table 34 to estimate annual revenues. Cost per function is total cost to
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Suborbital per flight (expressed as $/flights), and unit of service is the total number of expected flights per
year per customer. CPF is expressed as:
Equation I Cost per Function model (adapted from (de Week 2004))
k T T
I 1+ +YC
CPF= ( ') +0 c PS1
C, -36 5 -2 4 -60 -L,
Variables in Equation 1 are defined in Table 33, are compared between the two Iridium and Suborbital
cases. Fuel cost fraction # in Table 33 has been assumed as 1/3, similar to the fuel cost fraction of
supersonic aircrafts (Davis and Eden 1967). Two flights per day were assumed in analogy with operations
of the Concorde (Sobieczky 1997). Furthermore, an average spaceplane passenger load capacity of 80% -
defined as the fraction of the total spacecraft capacity being used in each flight - has been assumed
throughout the case study.
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A validation protocol (Figure 102) has been developed and applied to the analog case described in
Section 6.5.2. In an experiment session, two independent teams have been supplied identical data and
specific questions to answer as described in the analog case scope description in Section 6.5.2.2. Team A
has been instructed to approach the problem according to a GDM process, while Team B has been
engaged in a structured process using DB-SAF.
Validation Inputs
Validation Process
Team A Team BConventional Group- Delphi-Based SystemsMaking Decision Architecting Framework
L------------------------
Validation Outputs
F igure 102 Stidy Protocol
6.6.2. Population Sanipling Criteria
Sampling criteria have been used in allocating participants to architecting team, in order to maximize
realism in results. Participants have been drawn from the MIT graduate student community. Experiments
with student subject in a campus environment is a common practice in social science research.
Advantages of using students as experimental subjects include the relative ease of finding participants to
the study relative inexpensiveness associated with their participation. However, one could argue that
students are not always the best choice for an experimental analysis. For the study to yield realistic
results, it is key to ensure that participants are good representatives of the target population object of the
study (Sjoberg, Anda et al. 2003). In our study the target population is composed by engineers, scientists
and policy-makers that have or have had decision-making roles in their career. This population is
composed of highly educated people at varying levels of experience in industry, academia, research
institutions or government agencies. This target includes experts coming from different professional
careers. This target is represented in the human spaceflight and Mars return case studies where panels
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were composed by senior experts and decision-makers. As experts were less likely to be able to
participate to a validation exercise, a targeted sampling among the student population has been
undertaken instead.
In order to achieve a representative sample, participants have been hired by MIT degree programs with
relevant interests to this study - from Aero/Astro and the Engineering Systems Division (ESD)
(representing the engineers), the Systems Development and Management Program (SDM) representing
business experts with technical background, and Technology and Policy students representing
policymakers. Participants have been assigned to business, engineering and policy roles according to their















Fire 103 1 ca Composition
Roles were designed at different levels of the organizational hierarchy; participants were assigned the role
that mostly matched their professional experience. Each expert category included one Junior Expert and
one Senior Expert, led by a Principal Director, a Principal Engineer and a Lead Policy Advisor
respectively. The business panel was given higher authority over the other panels, with the Principal
Director having ultimate decision-making judgment, based on input provided by his advisors and the
Engineering and Policy panels. The Principal Director was accomplice with the researcher, as its role was
intentionally biased towards leading to adverse decision-making while assuming an authoritative
leadership position. Participants were instructed of their hierarchical role and assigned a custom fact sheet
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as described in Section 6.6.3 (Validation Inputs). No participant in the room was supplied enough
information to solve all questions asked to the group. Teamwork and sharing of information was required
to come up with an informed solution. Contradicting, ambiguous information and selected biases were
intentionally introduced to represent adverse conditions that affected decision-making. The goal was to
check the ability of the two decision-making process in dealing with this case.
Internal validity of the experiment has been ensured by presence of non-participating observers during
experimental sessions. Observers have been tasked to observe teams as non-participant peer reviewers.
They recorded differences in decision-making behaviors between teams using GDM and DB-SAF.
Observers have been given panel-specific instruction sheets on observables to be annotated during both
team sessions that allowed consistency checks after execution of the experiments. Observers have not
been allowed to share any data or participate in any discussion within the group. Observer I has been
assigned the role of experiment supervisor, further acting as the keeper of a Knowledge Base. Experts
have been allowed to either formulate assumptions behind their rationale, or to ask a single set of
questions via email from the Knowledge Base to inform assumptions prior the beginning of the session.
Observer 1 held approval authority on the request. Requests could have been rejected to preserve the
intended design balance between positive and negative biases in the study.
6.6.2. 1. Saimple Size Estimtate
A critical aspect in the validation is to ensure that the sample is large enough to be used to derive
conclusions based on statistical analysis. Sample size is driven by the desired confidence interval (with an
associated critical point value z*) , target margin of error m and observed variability a in experiments.
In this study, quantitative analysis is performed on information elicited by individual participants, while
qualitative observations are made on overall group dynamics as unit of analysis by aggregating
information collected by observers.
Assuming that data gathered from individual participants follow a Normal distribution, the required
(estimated) sample size n is (Moore, McCabe et al. 2007):
E(quation 2 - Sample size estinate under normality assumption
,o 2
Section 6.7.3 discusses results of this estimate and analyzes the limitations associated with the assumption
of normality for the data gathered in the context of the experiment.
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6.6.3. Validation Inputs
A fact database to inform Suborbital's case study has been developed as set of inputs for the validation.
The database has been compiled to reproduce an Iridium-analog case in the context of commercial
suborbital services. Data included only information that was available at the time of the decisions in the
historical case. Each fact is documented with a reference source from the literature, showing direct
comparison between the two cases. Facts have been characterized as either positive or negative biases.
Positive biases are those which lead decision-makers towards retrospectively good decision-making - in
this case, not authorizing the transition of Suborbital/Iridium to manufacturing and operations given
business/engineering/policy ambiguities. Negative biases are those which lead decision-makers towards
retrospectively bad decision-making. Facts have been categorized as pertinent to business, engineering
and policy and evenly spread across those categories. Table 34 at the end of this section shows the
mapping of the analog case study to the retrospective case study. Individual role sheets and general
information packages distributed to the GDM and DB-SAF teams are available in Appendix 9.3.
The principles behind the creation of the facts database are the following:
e Reproduce the decision-making process documented in the literature covering business, technical
and policy history of Iridium first generation, under tailored assumptions of a concealed case
study;
- Provide an even number of facts with negative and positive biases. Negative biases are biases that
lead to adverse consequences in the decision-making process; positive biases are biases that lead
to (retrospectively) correct decision-making.
e Provide an even number of facts for each fact category (business, technical and policy).
Fact sheets customized for each team member were developed including the following information:
e Introduction
e Study Rules
e General Assumptions of the Study
e Participant's role in the Study
e Background information
e Expert domain-relevant facts list
Principles were developed to simulate team work need, peer pressure, hidden agendas and ambiguity
with the goal of testing validation hypotheses.
205
Fact lists reproduced team work need across team panels by supplying to participants a subset of facts
that were relevant to their domain of expertise only (i.e. expert domain-relevant facts). According to this
principle, no expert in the team would have been able to perform a holistic assessment of the system's
without consulting other team members. Team work need within team panels has been simulated by not
providing any participant the full set of his domain-relevant information. Fact sheets were designed so
that their union enabled a comprehensive systems architecting analysis.
Peer pressure was simulated in Team A by giving influence authority to people with higher hierarchial
positions, while instructing participants at lower organizational levels that hierarchy should have been
respected during the GDM process. Team B was peer pressure free by virtue of anonimity of the DB-SAF
process.
Ambiguity has been introduced "ambiguating" fact sheets, by fuzzifying numbers, randomly concealing
pieces of information, and so forth. The amount of ambiguation has been calibrated as inversely
proportional to the hierarchical role of the individual expert. Fact sheets were balanced such that the
higher hierarchy was balanced by a higher the degree of ambiguity within facts.
Hidden agendas were introduced by providing specific additional instructions only to a small number of
members within teams, intentionally pushing teams towards suboptimal choices that would favor
individual on team-wide. The number of hidden agendas-related facts was directly proportional to the
hierarchical level of each participant. This principle sets an adverse condition that biases the team towards
the selection of the "wrong" answer, that determined the failure in the historical case. The investigation
therefore aimed to verify whether DB-SAF could overcome this handicap by facilitating the identification
of hidden agendas-related facts.
Table 34 below shows the list of facts that has been developed for the analog case study and their
mapping to the retrospective case study.
Table 34 Suborbital %s Iridium Case Stiudy NMapping
Iridium Suborbital
Fact Literature Source Satellite Constellation Spacelines LLC
Leading-edge technical (Kerzner 2009) First time satellite First time suborbital flight
feat to fulfill a need of an constellation is conceived, service is conceived,
uncertain customer base developed and operated. developed and operated.
First time no-delay "anytime, First time <1hr transoceanic
anywhere" voice flights available to market.
communications available to However, as the system is
market. However, as the the first of its kind, there is
system is the first of its kind, no analog example to
there is no analog example estimate a customer base







customer signs up and the
time the system is ready
for use








Perceived customer need (Kerzner 2009) Market surveys sponsored Suborbital customers could
can change over time by Iridium were assessed prefer travelling using first-
"accurate at the time of their class or business-class
writing" as per US court's services on conventional
judgment. At that time, airlines.
market estimate was overly
optimistic with respect to the
Iridium's actual subscriber
base after service launch.
Development risks (Finkelstein and Software issues prevented Manufacturing issues might
transitioning from Sanford 2000; De Kyocera (Iridium's main prevent Suborbital's
engineering to Weck, De Neufville et handheld supplier) to deliver suppliers to deliver
manufacturing to al. 2004; Kerzner phones to customers in a spaceplanes and/or
implementation - potential 2009) timely fashion. Few phones spaceplane spare parts
undersupply of value- were available in the market within the expected
related operands (phones at launch. schedule.
and pagers)
Management profit (Finkelstein and "In leaving Motorola's Suborbital's CEO gave up a
opportunity associated Sanford 2000) payroll for Iridium's" $1.3 million per year
with project success (Iridium's CEO Ed Staiano) contract with a major airline
"gave up a $1.3 million per for a $500,000 base salary
year contract with Motorola plus 750,000 Suborbital
for a $500,000 base salary stock options that vest over
plus 750,000 Iridium stock a 5-year period. CEO
options that vested over a 5- commented, <<If I can
year period. Staiano make Suborbital's dream
commented, <<If I can come true, I'll make a
make Iridium's dream come significant amount of
true, I'll make a significant money>>
amount of money>>"
Overly optimistic market (Cole 1994; Hardy Iridium's 1991 FCC filing Suborbital estimates a
demand estimate 1995; Court 1999; reports an estimated customer base of 6 million
Bulloch 2000; customer base of -6 million passengers per year with its
Finkelstein and users. In 1999, one year worldwide operations, once
Sanford 2000; Lutz, after launch, Iridium only their infrastructure operates
Werner et al. 2000; de had -50,000 subscribers to at full capacity. However,
Weck 2004; De Weck, its service. forecasts might prove being
De Neufville et al. inaccurate.
2004; Kerzner 2009)
Lack of sight in (Cole 1994; Hardy The forecast for terrestrial Suborbital assumes its
competitor's growth 1995; Court 1999; communication service will eat up the high-
Bulloch 2000; infrastructure growth was end segment of any
Finkelstein and underestimating the actual competitors offering first-
Sanford 2000; Lutz, high market growth of land- class and business-class
Werner et al. 2000; de based wireless phone transportation services on
Weck 2004; De Weck, services. conventional airlines.
De Neufville et al.
2004; Kerzner 2009)
High cost to customer (Court 1999;
Finkelstein and
Sanford 2000; de
Weck 2004; De Weck,
De Neufville et al.
2004; Kerzner 2009)
Phone calls through Iridium
could cost up to $7/minute
(1998 dollars)
Suborbital's cost per
passenger is $20,000 per
flight on average. Given the
novelty of the service and
assuming passengers will




duration, the company is
planning to pose a very high
profit margin on the first
phase of its commercial
service.
Even if system never (Kerzner 2009) "Over the years, Motorola Suborbital will be a first-
results in providing achieved a reputation of mover (i.e. first to market)
service, mother company being a first-mover (i.e. first and will gain advantage
would still have amassed to market). With the Iridium over competitors in
valuable intellectual Project, Motorola was providing suborbital
property that would make poised to capture first- transportation for civilian
mother company possibly mover advantage in applications.
the major player for years providing global telephone
to come in the sector. service via LEO satellites."
Multiple markets have (Iridium Satellite Iridium identified 15 different Suborbital identified 15
been identified Communications 1990) user categories in its 1990 different routes in its
FCC filing. preliminary market estimate
(see Annex for more
information)
Enable worldwide (Grubb 1991; Hardy Iridium customers are able Suborbital passengers will
business opportunities to 1996) to be in touch with the rest be able to commute
customers that would not of the world "anywhere, worldwide, enabling
be available otherwise anytime". business opportunities that
would not be available
otherwise.
System is complementing (Communications Iridium was conceived to be Suborbital will not compete
and not competing with 1999) used as primary service in with the economy-class long
existing infrastructure areas where land-based haul transportation
phone services are not infrastructure, rather it
available. It is used as a would complement the first-
backup system where land- class and business-class
based phone services are offer. Furthermore,
available. Suborbital will not compete
with medium-haul and short-
haul passenger services.
High RDT&E costs and (Iridium Satellite Satellite development and Suborbital development and
high non-recurring costs Communications 1990; launch costs totalled a $5B non-recurring costs will total
de Weck 2004; De value in 1998 dollars. approximately $8B in 2012
Weck, De Neufville et dollars.
al. 2004; Puttalsri,








based in part on the "sunk-
cost fallacy"-making
decisions based on the size
of previous investments
rather than on the size of
the expected return. People
tend to escalate their
commitment to a project
when they (1) believe that
future gains are available,
(2) believe they can turn a
project around, (3) are
publicly committed or
identified with the project,
and (4) can recover a large
part of their investment if the
Suborbital required
significant investment in its
conception and
development phase.
Although it is true that the
system is unprecedented
and to be demonstrated, the
business case
demonstrated the
opportunity for high future
gains. Furthermore,
Suborbital management is
now identified with this
ambitious project.
Management must avoid
project failure at all costs to
avoid headlines on the
media. Furthermore, in case
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project fails." of failure, Suborbital will be
able to recover a large part




Management reputation Finkelstein, Sanford, "Staiano (Iridium's CEO) Suborbital CEO's reputation
associated with project 2000; kerzner, 995 combined his leadership is anchored with the
success style with an old Motorola success of the company. A
ethic that argued leaders failure in this large scale
had a responsibility to venture would have long-
support their projects. term consequences on
Staiano also had significant CEO's career in the future.
financial incentives to push
the project forward, rather
than cutting losses."
Reliance on system (Communications Iridium relies extensively on Suborbital's success will rely
developer and other third 1999) third parties to perform on its suppliers and partners
parties functions critical to its to deliver spaceplanes and
operations. spaceplane spare parts in a
timely fashion to meet
demand.
Collective belief (Kerzner 2009) "Although the literature (Positive) Suborbital is a
phenomena (inability or doesn't clearly identify it, technical marvel, developed
refusal to recognize there was most likely a by highly skilled engineers,
failure, refusing to see the collective belief among the a top performing
warning signs, seeing workers assigned to the management team, and a
only what you want to see, Iridium Project. The promising business case
fearful of exposing collective belief is a fervent, based on market estimates
mistakes, viewing bad and perhaps blind, desire to and surveys. /// (Negative)
news as a personal achieve that can permeate Suborbital might not be
failure, viewing failure as the entire team, the project considering sufficiently the
a damage to one's career, sponsor, and even the most uncertainties around its
viewing failure as a senior levels of business case, and while
damage to one's management. The collective the engineering of the
reputation) belief can make a rational system might prove right, its
organization act in an business and policy case
irrational manner." might lead to serious
challenges and potential
downside failures.
Management desire to (Kerzner 2009) "There may have also been A Suborbital success is
have their names etched the desire of Robert and CEO success: his name
in history as the pioneers Christopher Galvin would etch in history as the
of providing the new (Motorola's chairmen at the pioneer in point-to-point
service. time, ndr) to have their suborbital flight.
names etched in history as








financing with high debt
leverage. However, "Iridium
would be hemorrhaging
cash for several more years
before service would begin."
and "If Iridium defaulted on
Suborbital is securing
funding through equity
funding with high debt
leverage. However,
Suborbital will not generate






its debt, the investors could
lay claim to Iridium's assets.
But what would investors do
with more than 66 satellites
in space, waiting to
disintegrate upon reentering
the atmosphere?"
investors would be left with
100+ suborbital planes with
no destination to go with.
Need to obtain gateway (Communications Iridium needed to grant Suborbital needed to grant
licenses from multiple 1999; Kerzner 2009) gateway licenses and suborbital pilot licenses and
countries (licensing risks) frequency allocation "space-way" allocation
agreements from more than agreements from more than
170 countries in the world. 170 countries in the world.
Need to obtain same (Kerzner 2009) Iridium needed to grant Suborbital needed to grant
frequency allocation in gateway licenses and suborbital pilot licenses and
multiple countries frequency allocation "space-way" allocation
agreements from more than agreements from more than
170 countries in the world. 170 countries in the world.
Product does not exist yet (Kerzner 2009) No satellite constellation There is no such thing as a
was ever deployed and suborbital transportation
operated before Iridium. service at the time of
Suborbital's development.
Prototype does not exist (Kerzner 2009) No satellite constellation There is no such thing as a
yet was ever deployed and suborbital prototype service
operated before Iridium. at the time of Suborbital's
development.
System is expected to (Communications Iridium's phone service had Suborbital planes are
operate 24 hours a day. 1999) to be available 24/7. expected to operate
flawlessy throughout their
entire operative lifetime.
More capability than (Grubb 1991) More channels than GEO Much shorter travel time
predecessor system comsats
Enabling capabilities that (Grubb 1991) Worldwide networking Worldwide commute
were not possible before
First technology of its (Grubb 1991) Engineers were motivated in Suborbital is a game
kind. "Game changer" and their work as they were changer in personal
"technical marvel". developing a "one of a kind" transportation. It also
Driving motivations of system, a milestone in represents a true "one of a
engineering team history of digital kind" system, a milestone in
telecommunications. the history of aerospace
engineering.
Reducing technical risk on (de Weck 2004) Iridium's experience Suborbital's experience will
multiple-use technologies improved the technological improve the technological
readiness level with readiness level with
technologies associated technologies associated
with the satellite with suborbital flight.
constellation, such as the
case of inter-satellite
crosslink communications.
Gain operational Significant technical Significant technical
experience on new experience has been gained experience will be gained in
technologies in the operation of a large the operation of a large fleet





(Kerzner 2009) Iridium fostered research
and development efforts in
improving satellite
communication-related
technology, such as voice
and date encoding
schemes, on-board avionics








Improved understanding (Kerzner 2009) Iridium fostered R&D efforts Suborbital wil foster R&D
of subsystem-related in communications theory efforts in aerospace
technology principles for network performance engineering for vehicle
improvements. performance improvements.
Limitations of system (Kerzner 2009) It was uncertain on whether It is uncertain whether
unknown yet Iridium would have been Suborbital will be able to
able to fulfill future demand. fulfill its entire demand in
the future.
System-wide testing, (Communications Service downtime could Service downtime could be
maintenance and repair 1999) have been generated by generated by vehicle-wide
could adversely affect system-wide testing, testing, mainteinance and
system's ability to provide mainteinance and repair repair operations.
the service quality it operations.
anticipates.
Limited system-based (Communications Need for receiver to be in Need for spaceport facilities
service capacity. 1999) sight of satellite. Cannot be or to adapt conventional
used on cars or in buildings. airports to new operations.
System becoming a (Kerzner 2009) Need to develop ground Need to develop ground
political tool during infrastructure worldwide infrastructure worldwide
international diplomacy (gateways) to enable (gateways) to enable
because of the number of system operations. system operations.jobs it creates
System flying over (Kerzner 2009) Satellites orbit around the Suborbital spaceplanes
multiple jurisdictions Earth gaining global visibility would fly at unprecedented




Difference in policy (Pelton and Bhasin "There is (sic) concern "There is (sic) concern
perspective and 2000) among developing countries among developing countries
objectives between that not enough frequencies that not enough spaceways
developed and developing will be available to meet will be available to meet
countries their future needs. their future needs.
Interoperability standards (Pelton and Bhasin There is a Conventional airports
and protocols 2000) standards/protocols cannot host suborbital
(deregulation) mismatch between the flights without significant
bandwidth of the satellites infrastructure development
and ground-based fiber and operational revisions.
networks.
Needed regulatory (Pelton and Bhasin "There remains <...> a There remains a concern on
reforms to encourage 2000) concern on the part of many the part of many of the
adoption of new system of the smaller third world smaller third world nations
nations that their that their international
international transportation needs will get
communications needs will short shrift in a market-place
get short shrift in a market- solely driven by profits, as
place solely driven by their markets are often too
profits, as their markets are small to be profitable.





were required to regulate
the new service as it was
foreseen to scale up with
increasing customer
demand.
New government entities or
institutional reforms will be
required to regulate the new
service.
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"One school holds that
satellite communications
have become commercially
viable and that industry
should now be expected to
finance the future
technology needed to
succeed in the 21st century.
<...> The second school
holds that space
communications is the ony
truly successful space
enterprise <...> Finally,
there is a third school that
says commercial money can
develop the commercial
technology, but for key
emergency and public
program services <...> may
make sense."
One school holds that
suborbital transportation has
become commercially viable
and that industry should
now be expected to finance
this technology.There is a
second school that says
commercial money can
develop the commercial





Role of government in (Pelton and Bhasin There were countries (such There are countries that
defining technical and 2000) as the US and Canada) that allow private organizations
policy objectives allowed private to set technical performance
(centralized vs organizations to set for their spaceplanes. Other
decentralized) technical goals for their countries see technology as
systems. Other countries a downstream product of
(such as Japan and the EU) their policymaking efforts.
saw technology as a
downstream product of
policymaking efforts.
Practical stimulus to (Pelton and Bhasin Employment related with Employment related with
national economies 2000) Iridium's ground and space Suborbital's ground
infrastructure development infrastructure development
and operations. and suborbital operations.
Impressive (Pelton and Bhasin First country that developed First country that developed
accomplishment as 2000) worldwide communications worldwide suborbital flight
nation's future objective capabilities. commercial service.
Fostering R&D of social- (Pelton and Bhasin Additional applications could Additional applications can
related applications (tele- 2000) have been conceived in be conceived in parallel to
education, tele-health, parallel to the main-stream suborbital passenger
disaster monitoring, etc.) voice service. transportation.
Government-owned (de Weck 2004) INMARSAT tried to prevent Airline authorities could try
competitors attempting to license issue to Iridium. to prevent flight license
prevent license allocation issue to Suborbital.
Non profit competitors (Kerzner 2009) Astronomers tried to prevent Scientists try to prevent
attempting to prevent license issue to Iridium in L- license issue to Suborbital
license allocation band to avoid interferences to avoid interferences with
with scientific experiments suborbital experiments.
(which happened indeed).
Export control limitations (Pelton and Bhasin Technology export, launch Technology export,
2000; Kerzner 2009) sharing, US government government forbidding
forbidding selling selling replacements parts










Participants in both GDM and DB-SAF sessions were briefed with an introductory presentation with a
review of the scopes of the study and with general guidelines to follow through the simulation. The
presentation is available in Appendix 9.3. The study was presented to participants as a systems
architecting role play. Participants were told to participate in a 1 hour study to make a go / no go decision
on transitioning Suborbital from its development to its operational phase. Every participant was given a
general information package with simulation rules (available in Appendix 9.3) and specific role
information with technical, business or policy decisions according to the criteria stated above. DB-SAF
participants were given 3 iteration rounds to elicit information and negotiate among teams. Following the
iteration rounds, the Principal Director was given the overall information and asked to make a decision. In
the GDM setting, the Principal Director led a 1 hour group discussion by asking team members to
perform panel-specific iterations and therefore report to the overall committee. The schedule being
followed in this setting is available in Appendix 9.3. At the end of the session the Principal Director was
called to make a decision. Participants were called to fill the evaluation survey that formed the basis for
statistical analysis. It is important to note that the study was not meant to assess the group as the unit of
analysis; rather the focus was on individual participants as units of analysis. The following section
reviews the survey and describes survey design criteria that have been adopted for the study.
()6.5. \Validation Otpt
Study outputs included qualitative and quantitative data. Qualitative data has been gathered by observed,
leading to observations on group dynamics. Quantitative data has been collected through individual
surveys. The survey that has been used in both GDM and DB-SAF sessions is presented in Table 35. The
following criteria have been followed in survey design:
* Questions were intentionally formulated as short as simple to improve participants' understanding
and to allow comprehension within the limited time available for each study session.
* Redundant questions have been introduced to assess internal consistency of each participant and
account for it in results analysis.
e A 4-level grouped ordinal Likert scale has been used for expert elicitation. Likert scales provided
subjective scores to rate questions assessing peer pressure, ambiguity, open debate elicitation,
hidden agenda uncovering and decision quality assessment as experienced by participants.
* A reduced number of levels has been used as a result of a trade-off between results resolution and
overall variability. The choice allowed to calibrate the study to a reasonable sample size. This
choice has been driven by a pre-pilot study that has been conducted to test and refine the
questionnaire.
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- Middle alternatives have been omitted from Likert scales to prevent participants choose the
neutral answer in case of indecision. This choice was led following a review of analog survey
debates in social science research. The "middle question" argument is an open debate in survey
design (Converse and Presser 1986). The four scale approach has been deemed appropriate for
the scope of this study to assess statistically significant differences between distributions of
expert opinions.
Survey results is processed by means of statistical analysis. The goal of the analysis is to find statistically
significant differences in expert response between GDM and DB-SAF sessions, and therefore drive
conclusions on the validation. The following section overviews qualitative and quantitative survey results,
describes the statistical analysis and discusses challenges and caveats of the validation in the
generalization of its claims.
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What is your general comment on this role play?
What would you improve or change? What would you remove?
1. Rate the extent to which peer pressure influenced your answers during the case study:
(1) very low, (2) low, (3) high, (4) very high
2. Rate the effectiveness of the meeting in reducing ambiguities on the case study:
(1) very low, (2) low, (3) high, (4) very high
3. Rate the extent to which you think the study was driven by individual goals from certain team members:
(1) very low, (2) low, (3) high, (4) very high
4. Rate the effectiveness of the meeting in reaching an efficient compromise within your team:
(1) very low, (2) low, (3) high, (4) very high
5. Rate the extent to which you were able to clear the uncertainty around facts of the case study that were
initially unclear:
(1) very low, (2) low, (3) high, (4) very high
6. Rate the effectiveness of the meeting in identifying open debates (uncertain facts) of the case study:
(1) very low, (2) low, (3) high, (4) very high
7. Rate the effectiveness of this type of meeting to let you express your true opinion without adverse influences
from other team members:
(1) very low, (2) low, (3) high, (4) very high
8. Rate the effectiveness of the meeting in identifying hidden agendas (if any) of individual team members of
the case study:
(1) very low, (2) low, (3) high, (4) very high
9. Rate the extent to which you were able to reach a satisfactory decision with other panels within the team:
(1) very low, (2) low, (3) high, (4) very high
10. Rate the extent to which you were you able to identify decisions where further information would be required
for better decision making:
(1) very low, (2) low, (3) high, (4) very high
11. Rate the quality of the decision taken by the CEO:
(1) very low, (2) low, (3) high, (4) very high
12. Rate the likelihood of CEO decision to turn out to be the right one in the future according to your expert
opinion:
(1) very low, (2) low, (3) high, (4) very high
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6.7. Statistical Analysis of Resuilts
6.7.1. Introduction
The study has been conducted in two phases: in the pre-pilot stage, nine participants were engaged to provide
feedback to refine assumptions, information packages and test survey questions. This preparatory stage set the
ground for a pilot study. The pilot has been administered to 36 participants. This format is appropriate for a
first-order assessment of the main results beight sought in the validation. Section 6.8 (Summary and
Conclusions) discusses lessons learnt from the pilot study and provides guidance for further generalization of
the results to pursue downstream research avenues going beyond the scopes of this thesis.
6.7.2. Participants Statistics
Table 36 shows the overall statistics of participants who participated to the study. A strong majority of
participants have been drawn from the MIT Aero/Astro Department. Graduate students from the Engineering
Systems Division, the Technology Policy Program and the System Design and Management programs
participated to provide policy and business rationale at different seniority levels. The split between Master's
and SDM/Ph.D. candidates is approximately even.







Aeronautics and Astronautics 57.8% (26)
Engineering Systems Division 13.3% (6)
Technology and Policy Program 8.9% (4)
System Design and Management 8.9% (4)
Other 11.1% (5)
Degrees
S.M. Candidates 44.4% (20)
SDM / Ph.D. Candidates 55.6% (25)
6.7.3. Results Analysis
The first step in analyzing results is to determine a policy on how to treat inconsistencies within survey results.
Study participants were given a survey of 12 questions with double redundancy - meaning that only 6 data
points have been assessed from each participant. Survey consistency in social science research is typically
assessed by means of Cronbach's alpha (Cronbach 1951). Cronbach's alpha is an adimensional normalized
parameter that correlates variability observed across the sample set with individual expert's variability and the
number of items on which internal consistency is being tested. Once a value is estimated for each expert, the
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alphas can be used as weights to calibrate each contribution to the overall assessment. An alternative approach
consists in setting a minimum acceptance treshold. Experts falling below the treshold are not considered in the
data set. Small available sample size and the reduced number of redundant questions (two) led to the choice of
a worst-case analysis approach. In this approach, inconsistencies are solved by choosing the answer going
against rejection of null hypotheses. A worst-case analysis is therefore robust to type I errors, i.e. false
positives (Moore, McCabe et al. 2007), making it suitable for the scopes of the validation.
Figure 104 shows raw aggregate results from DB-SAF and GDM sessions. The histograms show the
distribution, while the vertical dashed lines show the median values for both the DB-SAF and GDM subsets.
Medians have been preferred to means being more suitable for the analysis of small samples and are more
robust to the presence of outliers. A preliminary analysis shows that DB-SAF median results are greater than
GDM median response in mitigating peer pressure (hypothesis 1), reducing ambiguity (hypothesis 2),
achieving better compromise (hypothesis 3) and better decision acceptance (hypothesis 6). DB-SAF scored
less than GDM in eliciting open debates (hypothesis 4), and achieved a tie in perceived ability of uncovering
hidden agendas (hypothesis 5).
These results are in accordance with qualitative observations taken by observers during the studies on
advantages and disadvantages of both methods as perceived by participants. It is important to stress that
decision acceptance is not correlated to objective quality of the decision. The latter is not included in the
statistics as it refers to a different unit of analysis (the group rather than the individual experts). In the study
sessions that have been conducted, all GDM sessions decided for Suborbital's transition to operations. All DB-
SAF sessions decided to delay the decision to gather more data on the case. While being an interesting result,
further experimentation would be required to test its statistical significance. In this case, the unit of analysis is
the group rather than the individual. Such result should be considered as a tendency and not as statistical
significant. Still, it is an observation of interest as it proves how final consensus (as measured by acceptance of
the final decision by individual experts) does not always lead to optimal results.
No decision-making support tool is able to predict the future and therefore guarantee forecasting optimality,
and GDM and DB-SAF make no exception. However, tools can help improving the chances of making
optimal choices by providing comprehensive analysis. These preliminary results seem to suggest that a
structured tool such as DB-SAF achieves this goal more effectively than an unstructured tool such as
conventional GDM.
Nevertheless, DB-SAF encountered limitations that surfaced during the study. The main drawback that has
been encountered in DB-SAF is that of constraining open debate by forcing experts to share their knowledge
through a structured approach with no inter-expert communication. Anonimity allows mitigation of peer
pressure and availability of confirmatory and disconfirmatory results enable reduction of ambiguity and
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achievement of compromise. The benefits of open communication are lost in DB-SAF. However, this does not
represent an issue for the case studies in this thesis, as the latter were conducted with senior experts and
decision-makers with multi-year experience in the problems being assessed. Such experts had previous
interactions between each other within their organization, through conferences, workshops and meetings. On
the other hand, this result suggests future work for DB-SAF, where experts would be engaged in group
meetings before or after elicitation sessions. The additional drawback observed in DB-SAF is that of losing the
ability of assessing body language and behavioral traits in requirements negotiations. These aspects play a
significant role in the identification of hidden agendas.
Notwithstanding observations on hypothesis 4 and 5, claims on other hypotheses seem to hold. Additional
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While the analysis of raw data provided insights on DB-SAF, a more robust approach is required to assess
claims more confidently. We use statistical significance as a tool to do so. The question of interest is
whether differences in median results between DB-SAF and GDM related scores are statistically
significant, and if so, to what level of confidence. Two-way significance tests are conducted in this
chapter.
Most tests of statistical significance rely on the assumption of data normality, such as the t-test. While t-
tests are robust to small deviations from normality (which can be further mitigated by variable
transformations), their use is inappropriate when dealing with small sample sets. Furthermore, the use of
a 4-level scale on survey design implicitly prevents data normality even with large sample sizes. As
discussed in previous sections, this choice has been motivated by the intended scopes of the validation
and by the need to improve reliability of the sample set.
Two tests for statistical significance have been employed. The first one is the Wilcoxon rank sum test
(Moore, McCabe et al. 2007), a non-parametric test that does not require data normality. This test is
particularly suited to the application at hand is it compares ordinal ranks of the data, which has been
collected in ordinal form. The Wilcoxon test is a matched-pair test that compares two populations of data
(in this case, DB-SAF and GDM data) looking for statistically significant rank differences differences.
The test works as follows. Two samples of data from the two populations are ranked. The Wilcoxon rank
sum statistic is defined as the sum of the ranks of the first samples. This statistic is compared with the
mean and standard deviation of the rank sum. The null hypothesis is rejected when the rank sum statistic
is far from the mean. Table 37 shows the results of the Wilcoxon rank sum test for the six hypothesis
under scrutiny. The two populations (DB-SAF and GDM data) are compared by differences in the
median. The null hypothesis is rejected for hypothesis I (mitigate peer pressure), hypothesis 3 and
hypothesis 6 at the 95% confidence level, and hypothesis 2 at the 85% confidence level. The null
hypothesis cannot be rejected for hypothesis 4 (elicit open debate) and hypothesis 5 (uncover hidden
agenda) at reasonable confidence levels (above 80%). Failure in rejecting the null hypothesis for
hypothesis 4 and 5 is confirmation of advantages and disadvantages of DB-SAF discussed previously, and
further confirmed by participants' feedback.
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Table 37 Wilcoxon Rank Suin Test Resultls
P-value Significance Confidence *
level level
Hypothesis 1 0.0233 0.05 95% 2.2685 321.50(peer pressure)
Hypothesis 2
0.1471 0.15 85% 1.4497 301.50(ambiguity)
Hypothesis 3
0.0348 0.05 95% 2.1106 317.00(compromise)
Hypothesis 4
0.7631 0.80 20% -0.3014 256.00(open debates)
Hypothesis 5
(hidden 0.6267 0.65 35% 0.4864 276.50
agendas)
Hypothesis 6 0.0337 0.05 95% 2.1233 314.00(CEO decision)
The other approach that has been employed for statistical significance testing is the bootstrap permutation
test (Moore, McCabe et al. 2007). Bootstrap methods consist in iterative resampling with replacement of
the original data to approximate the distribution of mean values. These methods are particularly useful to
make statistical inference on populations with skewed distributions for which the normality assumption
does not hold.
In a bootstrap permutation test, the aggregate data of the original samples been tested (DB-SAF and
GDM) is randomly split in two samples. In each iteration the statistic of interest is recorded; in this case,
the difference of the means of the two samples. The process is iterated a sufficiently large number of
times (>1,000 iterations for reference). The resulting distribution approximates the sampling of the null
hypothesis. The actual statistic - the observed difference in DB-SAF and GDM means - is compared with
this distribution. A significant statistic falls in the tail of the sampling distribution of the null hypothesis,
as the result would rarely happen by chance. The confidence level of this statistic equals the percentile of
the distribution below the statistic.
Figure 105 shows the results of the bootstrap permutation test for the hypothesis under scrutiny in this
validation. Confidence levels are shown in Table 38. The results confirm the findings obtained with the
preliminary inspection of results and the Wilcoxon rank sum test. Results show improved peer pressure
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mitigation, reduction of ambiguity, achievement of compromise and decision acceptance with DB-SAF
as perceived by individual experts.
Table 38 Bootstrap PermutatI .lion Tests - Conifidence Levels
Bootstrap Permutation Tests - Confidence Levels
(compare with Figure 105)
HI - mitigate H2 - reduce H3 - achieve H4 - elicit open H5 - uncover H6 - CEO
peer pressure ambiguity compromise debate hidden agendas decision
98% 92% 97% 43% 58% 99%
6.7.4. Sample Size Check
The pre-pilot and pilot validation studies allowed to probe response variability on survey results. While
interpretation of statistical data has been paired with qualitative data from observers and direct feedback
from study participants, it is important to assess whether the sample size that has been employed is
sufficiently large enough to have confidence in the results that have been obtained. An approximate
method of doing so is assuming the data tends to follows a Normal distribution for an increasingly larger
sample size - by virtue of the Central Limit Theorem. If so, we can estimate the size n that is required for
a sample featuring variability a and target margin of error m, with a desired confidence level represented
by its associated critical value z* (Moore, McCabe et al. 2007). We assess this estimate for both DB-SAF
and GDM data sets, and perform a worst-case analysis by choosing the maximum sample size estimate
for a 90% confidence level and 0.44 margin of error (less than V2 point on the Likert scale). Table 39
shows the result of this analysis giving 18 as a suitable sample size. The pilot study employed a sample of
36, providing sufficient confidence in the results. Nevertheless, a larger sample size is auspicable for
further generalization of these results. Section 6.8 (Summary and Conclusions) provides additional
discussion of strengths and limitations of the analysis.
Table 3) Sample Size Estimate - 90% Confidence Level
Sample HI - mitigate H2 - reduce H3 - achieve H4 - elicit H5 - uncover H6 - CEO
Subset peer pressure ambiguity compromise open debate hidden decision
agendas
DB-SAF 6 11 9 11 12 3
GDM 13 18 13 15 12 I
Max
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6.8. Suiiary and IiConchisions
This chapter presented the results of a case study that has been developed to provide validation to the DB-
SAF framework. Validating a decision-support tool focusing on stakeholder ambiguities is a challenge,
given all the exogenous factors and behavioral phenomena that need to be considered. A concealed
simulation approach has been devised to validate DB-SAF. An experimental pilot study has been
designed and DB-SAF results have been compared with traditional GDM methods.
The validation uncovered strengths and limitations of the framework. DB-SAF proved being effective in
mitigating peer pressure, reducing ambiguities, achieving compromises and improving decision
acceptance. At the same time, the validation gave the opportunity to highlight intrinsic method challenges
in eliciting open debates and uncovering hidden agendas. DB-SAF achieves beneficial results by
minimizing and anonymizing inter-expert interactions. Conventional GDM, is prone to suffer from
adverse effects such as peer pressure and ambiguity. On the other hand, direct expert interaction
facilitates resolution of ambiguities. This tension was reflected in comparing feedback from study
participants. The resulting trade-off highlights how the selection of an appropriate decision-making tool
depends on the goals to be achieved by the system architects. If peer pressure, ambiguity and hidden
agendas are primary concerns, then DB-SAF is probably an effective choice for decision making. If open
debate and high expert interaction is preferred, GDM offers leeway to do so, at the expense of exposure to
adverse effects as discussed in this chapter.
The primary challenge in this validation was to balance study breadth against fidelity. This study involved
39 participants (3 observers and 36 participants) in 2 sessions of 2 hours each. The study required
complex decision-making with implications in three different disciplinary domains - business, technology
and policy. Targeted population sampling criteria was used to improve the fidelity of the study.
While availability of confirmatory and disconfirmatory information facilitated identification of hidden
agendas, experts participating in a DB-SAF session felt the need of direct interactions to assess intangible
hidden agenda evidence such as body language, voice tone and so forth. The results of the study suggest
that a hybrid of both DB-SAF and GDM methods could mitigate both these limitations, by taking the best
traits from both methods while minimizing their intrinsic limitations. Further exploration of this hybrid
method is an interesting avenue of future research.
Careful analysis needs to be conducted to extend the generalization of these results. One should consider
the temporal dimension in decision-making. Group exercises of knowledge elicitation of any fashion are
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subject to change with time and participants. The same group of experts could reach opposite conclusions
on a systems architecting problem if the meeting is held in different times of the year. Consider for
instance the outcomes of a systems architecting team meeting of a human spaceflight mission before and
after a budget decision by the White House. Likewise, different groups of experts could reach different
conclusions due to unforeseen bias unbalance among the group. This limitation is minimized by have a
larger group size while intentionally incorporating multiple perspectives on the problem of interest.
In addition to method-specific challenges, one must also consider limitations in the evaluation of
validation-specific results. Extreme care is required to maximize the likelihood of success in reproducing
subjective factors such as peer pressure, hidden agendas and ambiguity are hard to reproduce in a
controlled setting. Reliability, internal consistency and external validation need to be primary concerns.
Challenges include the difficulty of the target population reproducing with high fidelity - in this case,
high-level decision makers and senior experts include the challenges. Participants may not be interpreting
their role correctly in a behavioral simulation setting. Observers have been used to mitigate this risk.
This validation showed that one of the most challenging elements to reproduce were hidden agendas, as
individuals had limited time to digest the information and to maturate a highly biased side in the
discussion. Furthermore, cultural and national difference are exogenous factors that play important roles
in subjective perception of leadership styles. What could be perceived as peer pressure, for instance, in a
European meeting, might not in fact be perceived in equal manner in a US environment, and vice versa.
Lastly, exposing people to new problems requires simplification. Simplification is traded against realism
in a case study. A validation case study must be of analog complexity to "real" case studies in order to
maintain relevance to its scopes.
Notwithstanding challenges, this validation showed strong tendencies in support of major claims in the
DB-SAF framework. Matching patterns observed in this controlled study with real world case studies
discussed in previous chapters show evidence of improvement in systems architecting when stakeholder
objectives are affected by ambiguity. Chapter 7 will expand this topic in more detail by performing a
cross-case analysis and driving final conclusions of this tesis.
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Chapter 7 : Conclusions
7. 1. Thesis Summary
Ambiguity is a threat to successful systems architecting. System architects need to identify, classify,
reduce and mitigate ambiguity in early phases of the design process. Sources of ambiguity include the
identification and management of stakeholders, the elicitation of stakeholder needs and needs mapping to
system functions (the functional intent of the architecture). In other words, ambiguity is a threat to
consider in upstream systems architecting processes together with the definition of the systems being
designed (Figure 106). This thesis presented a structured framework for effective identification,
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Chapter 1 introduces the notion of systems architecting under stakeholder objectives ambiguity. The
chapter describes an example from launch vehicle infrastructure systems architecting, showing how
failure in considering ambiguities in requirements (such as baseline payload masses and target
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destinations) are threats to the value delivery process of the infrastructure in the long term, when
stakeholders and needs can change in a way to invalidate the purpose of the investment. Ambiguities are
important to consider early in the design process, since this is the phase when future lifecycle costs and
potential for value generation are decided, and the phase of maximum leverage on system outcomes by
the architect. The chapter defines the objectives of this thesis as follows:
1) Identify sources of ambiguity in the value delivery and tradespace exploration processes;
2) Characterize and model the impact of the identified sources of ambiguity on the beneficial
attributes that contribute to value as delivered to stakeholders, while satisfying their needs;
3) Mitigate ambiguities by developing system development strategies to cut the downside effects of
ambiguity while exploiting its potential upside opportunities;
4) Integrate the analysis of the value delivery process and functional intent definition (upstream
architecting processes) with conventional tradespace exploration (downstream architecting
processes). The goal is to improve the achievement of global optimaliity in the down-selection of
preferred system architectures that demonstrate to be more resilient to ambiguities while still
delivering value to stakeholders;
5) Develop recommendations to decision-makers to support final decisions concerning the
selection of a system architecture for the enterprise of interest.
Ambiguity is a type of uncertainty affecting systems design. It has been defined as nonspecificity of
evidence, dissonance in evidence, and confusion in evidence (Klir and Folger 1988). Ambiguity is a
recurring theme that can be found in the engineering, design, finance, political science and social science
literature. Chapter 2 presents a multidisciplinary review in this context, and identifies four research gaps
in the literature, namely the recognition of ambiguity as a threat to systems architecting, the identification
of different types of ambiguities (Identify), their classification (Characterize), the definition of possible
mitigation strategies (Mitigation) and their assessment within the broader systems architecting process
(Integrate).
Chapter 3 delves into the topic of ambiguity with an analytical approach. Starting with an ontological
analysis and using set theory and first-order propositional logic, the chapter identifies four potential
sources of ambiguity: 1) perceived needs of stakeholder group S, 2) perceived set of intended functions,
3) function/need mapping and form/function mapping processses, and 4) formal and functional
constraints. A classification of ambiguities in systems architecting derives from the analysis. Ambiguities
are classified in reducible and irreducible. Reducible ambiguities are defined as ambiguities generated by
lack of understanding on known knowledge. Areas of consensus and compromise are special cases of
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reducible ambiguities. Irreducible ambiguities are defined as lack of understanding on unknown
knowledge. Areas of open debate and hidden agendas are special cases of irreducible ambiguities.
Identification and mitigation of both type of ambiguities is key information to system architects in the
definition of requirements and the functional definition of a system. Given this classification, the chapter
proceeds in discussing methods of expert elicitation for identification and characterization of ambiguities,
distinguishing between structured/unstructured, iterative/non iterative, and anonymous/non anonymous
methods. Canonical forms of ambiguity mitigation strategies are defined and described. These form a set
of actions, observed in multiple fields of the scientific and engineering literature, that system architects
can enact to architect their system. A descriptive Systems Architecting Management Framework (SA-
MF) is defined to reconcile actions in a unified framework. A Delphi-Based Systems Architecting
Framework (DB-SAF) is defined to inform mitigation actions in SA-MF. DB-SAF is a structured,
iterative anonymous tool for informing ambiguity mitigation strategies as defined in SA-MF in systems
architecting under stakeholder ambiguity. DB-SAF is inspired by the Delphi method in policy-making,
and defines its systems architecting version in the context of formulation of new, unprecedented systems.
DB-SAF consists of a structured process decomposed in the ten steps, as shown in Figure 107. The
chapter describes in detail the steps of the approach and their integration with conventional systems
architecting processes.
Figure 107 Proposed Systems Architecting Framework OverviewN
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The approach presented in this thesis is applied to three application case studies. Chapter 4 presents a case
study on the architecture of the Mars Sample Return Campaign, conducted at Caltech / NASA Jet
Propulsion Laboratory. Chapter 5 describes a case study in systems architecting of the transportation
infrastructure for human exploration missions beyond Low Earth Orbit. Both case studies are based on
real architecting problems being faced by NASA at the time of writing of this thesis. Expert panels that
have been involved in both case studies were all senior experts and high-level decision-makers in their
respective organizations. These two case studies involved a total of 81 interviews between June 2011 and
January 2012. Chapter 6 presents a validation case study that has been developed to evaluate the
effectiveness of the approach as compared with existing systems architecting methods. The case study
was based on a retrospective concealed validation, where a historical case study considered to have led to
an architecting failure is concealed and proposed to system architecting teams, using two different
architecting methods (the proposed approach, and conventional group decision-making). A survey is used
to compare approach performance between cases. Surveys have been analyzed through statistical analysis.
The case study highlighted advantages of the novel DB-SAF architecting approach in mitigating peer
pressure, reducing ambiguities, achieving compromises and improving decision acceptance in systems
architecting. Inherent limitations were surfaced such as the lack of direct interaction with experts,
identifying avenues of future developments of the approach in incorporating a hybrid approach between a
structured systems architecting method such as DB-SAF and conventional group decision-making
processes.
The successful application of the proposed approach of systems architecting under ambiguity in
stakeholder objectives for a broad array of applications, and its validation in an experimental setting,
evidence the applicability of the proposed methodology to a wide category of problems in space systems
architecting. While the approach has been developed with large government-funded space exploration
programs, it can be extended to for-profit commercial enterprises looking to scope R&D projects with
highly exploratory objectives as well.
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7.2. Main Findings
7.2.1. Case-study specific Filings
Identification of reducible and irreducible ambiguities in the systems architecting process of
the Mars Sample Return campaign.
The Mars Sample Return case study classified ambiguities surrounding requirements definition in MSR.
Property variables that have been assessed were sample types, total number of samples, sample depth,
sample size and horizontal radius and their implications in engineering complexity and science value.
While ambiguities on engineering complexity could be reduced to a satisfactory degree, definition of
science value proved to have several areas of irreducible ambiguity. Irreducibility is due to bimodal
distributions in scientific interests between astrobiology and geology objectives. Furthermore, as the
Martian surface is largely unknown, several areas of open debate persist - such as on the interior
composition of the planetary surface, on the definition of biomarkers that could be identified on retrieved
sample types, on the definition of weathering tresholds and so forth. The case study demonstrates the
impact of these irreducible ambiguities on the systems architecture of the mission. Six recommendations
implementing these findings have been developed, such as to delay sub-meter drilling operations until
scientists reach an agreement on the value associated with 1-meter and 10-meter drilling operations. The
full set of recommendations has been discussed in Section 4.4.10.
* Identified efficient de-scoping decisions and alternative architectures of interest for
decision-makers of the Mars Sample Return campaign.
The systems architecting analysis of Mars Sample Return identified efficient decisions that systems
architect could take while in need of de-scope the mission to meet tighter cost caps. Such measures
include the reduction of total number of samples retrieved on Earth, while investing at the same time in
improving sample detection techniques to increase the odds of retrieving scientifically significant samples
on Earth. Added capability in mobility requirements is an additional real option to invest into, in order to
increase operational flexibility of the architecture and increase the size of the pool of samples at reach of
the Caching rover mission. This implies investment in added instrumentation for in-situ analysis of
samples composition and detection of scientific features of interest. Two-element campaign architectures
are also of interest to reduce overall cost, by merging functionalities of the Fetch and Caching rovers of
the current three-element campaign baseline. This approach, however, should counter-balance with the
inherent increase in operational risk as the same rover would be responsible of placing sample caches to
the Mars Ascent Vehicle, supposedly after a period of wait for the second-element retrieve mission to
land on Mars.
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e Identification of reducible and irreducible ambiguities in the systems architecting process of
the transportation infrastructure for human spaceflight missions beyond Low Earth Orbit.
The ambiguity assessment for the human spaceflight case study (Chapter 5) identified and classified
ambiguities in the definition of exploration value, science return and policy return for in-orbit
infrastructure for future missions beyond LEO. Ambiguity in an exploration context could be acceptably
reduced and consensus was identified among stakeholders. The only area of divergence remaining in this
context is exploration value associated to 2 and 3 week stays to Near Earth Asteroids - which divergence
depends on different assumptions by experts on time required for check-out and mission preparation
operations in NEA missions. More irreducible ambiguity on exploration time (both on NEAs and
planetary surfaces) is observed in science and policy panels. All panels agreed on health risk associated
with time of flight. The dualism of reasoning of the exploration/science panels versus the policy panel is a
note of interest: while the first reason through technology and scientific reasons for their judgements, the
policy panel was concerned with factors such as impact on the media and policy return associated with
time of flight and other property variables. Irreducible ambiguity on destinations to pursue is ubiquitous
across panels, with less ambiguity observed in the science panel. As discussed in detail in Chapter 5, this
result is expected due to current debate in the international arena on this topic. Several positions in this
regard are identified by the study. The results of the study are useful information for concerned decision-
makers in acknowledging different positions across the international community, and therefore provide
support to their future decisions.
- Identified effective architectures of interest for decision-makers of the transportation
infrastructure for human spaceflight missions beyond Low Earth Orbit.
The ambiguity analysis conducted with DB-SAF in Chapter 5 is integrated with a tradespace exploration
tool to identify architectures of interest for Moon, Mars and NEA human missions. The "flexible path"
concept defined in the Augustine Report (NASA 2009) is substantiated by the proposed analysis.
Architectures being identified in the model are compared with mission studies available in the literature.
7.2.2. General cntiibtions
eThe identification of ambiguity as a threat to upstream systems architecting processes.
This thesis demonstrates that ambiguity is a threat to upstream systems architecting processes. The
research shown in this thesis on three case studies pertaining to different fields led to the development of
general insights - the canonical forms of ambiguity management, together with the SA-MF and DB-SAF
frameworks - that can be used for the analysis of future problems. if ambiguity is not properly accounted
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in early phases of the design process, the architecture is at risk of not delivering value to stakeholders
during the entire course of its lifecycle. Ambiguity must be identified, characterized and mitigated early
in the lifecycle of new systems. The canonical forms of ambiguity management strategies and their
encoding in the Systems Architecting Management Framework are tools enabling system architects to
integrate ambiguity assessments in conventional tradespace exploration processes.
e Ambiguity can be reducible or irreducible. Identification of both types of ambiguity is key
information to decision-makers.
Ambiguity can take different forms depending on the nature of the underlying phenomena, and whether it
refers to known (knowable) or unknown information. Ambiguity is reducible when it can be eliminated
and needs / judgments agreed by relevant stakeholders. Irreducible ambiguities must be properly assessed
and managed to avoid adverse effects as discussed above.
e Five canonical forms of ambiguity management strategies can be found in the literature:
Compromise, Consensus, Buy Insurance, Defer Actions, Deterrence.
The literature review led to the identification of five fundamental strategies for ambiguity management
that can be adapted for any systems architecting problem of interest. System architects can identify the
appropriate management strategy by application of SA-MF and DB-SAF as described in thesis, jointly
with conventional tradespace exploration tools.
e Tailoring of expert elicitation methods for ambiguity identification and characterization is
key to systems architecting.
Expert elicitation methods are at the core of the codification of subjective value metrics in DB-SAF.
Several tools are available to this end, such as ordinal scores and multi attribute utility theory. However,
the choice of a particular tool must be tailored to the problem at hand. No expert elicitation tool was
found to be effective for all systems architecting problem. Utility theory provides a rigorous framework
for expert elicitation, however, its applicability is limited in cases where property variables cannot be
translated naturally into monetary value (such as, for instance, the value associated with time of flight as a
proxy for health risk to astronauts). Ordinal scores are useful to this end, however, they do not offer the
same theoretical background as utility theory, and their validity depends on the effectiveness of the
system architect to provide clear explanations on the meaning of individual scores. It is advisable that
system architects analyze the applicability of available tools to the systems architecting problem of their
interest, before delving into straightforward implementation.
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* Careful consideration of behavioral aspects is critical to successful elicitation of stakeholder
needs.
Behavioral aspects were found critical during expert elicitation sessions. As outlined in Section 3.6.7,
interviews must be designed with the customer in mind, making sure to "ask the right questions", and
"ask the questions right". A formally rigorous framework with no consideration of behavioral aspects that
emerge in interviews are destined not to meet their original goals. Tradeoffs in rigor, expert time
availability and wording must be carefully assessed before execution of interviews in the field. As expert
time is a valuable resource, it is imperative not to miss the opportunity of retrieving valuable data for
mistakes in the elicitation process that could have been detected beforehand by prior analysis. Testing
interviews with "pilot interviewees" is an effective method to mitigate this risk.
* Integrated exploration of feasible requirements sets and associated systems allow the
identification of architecture that are robust to changes in stakeholder needs.
The ambiguity analysis framework is integrated to conventional tradespace exploration tools to produce
meaningful insights from a systems architecture perspective. The impact of selected ambiguities on
system architecture metrics of interest is key to prioritize efforts in ambiguity mitigation.
7.3. Sunmary of Thesis Contributions
This thesis identified and fulfilled four gaps in the literature as identified in the literature review presented
in Chapter 2. The dissertation proposed four methodological contributions:
e The use of ontological analysis as a tool for analysis of engineering systems for the identification
of sources of potential ambiguity in upstream systems architecting processes.
e A taxonomy for classification of ambiguities in reducible and irreducible ambiguities, discussing
their relevance to systems architecting.
e The formulation of canonical forms of ambiguity mitigation strategies in the systems architecting
context, and the development of a descriptive Systems Architecting Management Framework
(SA-MF).
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e The integration of ambiguity identification, classification and mitigation in broader systems
architecting processes, as demonstrated by the development of the Delphi-Based Systems
Architecting Framework (DB-SAF).
The thesis filled research gaps as discussed as follows.
First gap (Identify): To identify ambiguity in architecting systems with a high degree of innovation and
highly exploratory objectives.
How this thesis filled this gap: This thesis identified potential sources of ambiguity in systems
architecting by means of ontological analysis, and developed a framework to mitigate and identify
ambiguities. Furthermore, the validation case study described in Chapter 6 defined a novel validation
protocol to assess the effectiveness of Delphi outside of its original areas of applications in policymaking
and forecasting.
Second gap (Characterize): To characterize ambiguity as an adverse factor to effective systems
architecting.
How this thesis filled this gap: This thesis provides a framework for management of ambiguities, called
the descriptive Systems Architecting Management Framework, and describes a taxonomy for
classification of reducible and irreducible ambiguities, as described in Chapter 3.
Third gap (Mitigate): Enable mitigation of reducible and irreducible ambiguities in the functional intent of
a systems architecture.
How this thesis filled this gap: This thesis presented a framework for quantitative analysis the value
delivery process (Crawley 2008) of a system, including the assessment of ambiguity in the definition of
stakeholder needs and in the functional intent process. It presents and informs strategies for effective
mitigation of multi-domain ambiguities in systems architecting.
Fourth gap (Integrate): To integrate ambiguity assessment through expert elicitation techniques with
formal system architecting methods in conventional systems engineering practice.
How this thesis filled this gap: This gap is filled by integration of quantitative expert elicitation for
requirements definition with traditional design space exploration models. The framework presented in the
thesis allows the exploration of large design spaces through the integration of hybrid MDO approaches.
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7.4. Opportunities for Future Work
The research developed in this thesis could be advanced by pursuing several avenues for future work in
this area. A selection of opportunities of future work follows:
Application of this method to additional case studies in scientific and engineering fields,
within and beyond aerospace engineering.
The systems architecting framework proposed in this thesis has been applied to three case studies: Mars
Sample Return, In-Orbit Transportation Infrastructure for human spaceflight missions beyond Low Earth
Orbit, and a retrospective analysis of communications satellite constellations in Low Earth Orbit. Further
applications of this framework could be identified in other areas of aerospace engineering and other
disciplinary domains. The framework could be adapted for case studies in other science and engineering
fields, as well as extended to quantitative studies in support of policy-making.
e Extend the validation case study to a larger and international pool of subjects to study the
effect of cultural differences in leadership, gender and age differences, and behavioral
aspects of interest.
The validation case study presented in Chapter 6 is a pilot case study to identify trends and patterns
suggesting the improvement in system architecting outcomes when compared to conventional group-
decision making processes when applied in this setting. As discussed in Section 6.8, one must be careful
when extending the generalization of these results to a broader set of claims. Group decision-making is a
complex process which is influenced by a myriad of exogenous factors, such as time, personal
background, personality, culture, and so forth. The validation protocol developed in Chapter 6 could be
extended to a larger set of subjects worldwide to study questions of interest in social science research and
behavioral influences in decision-making. Questions of interest include: how do cultural differences and
different leadership styles in different nations affect system architecting processes in joint international
cooperation efforts? How do behavioral aspects and differences in gender and age affect decision-making
processes as applied to systems architecting? Such broad claims will require a much larger pool of
subjects, which will increase confidence on obtained results.
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e Development of further expert elicitation tools to represent subjective value judgements
deriving from expert knowledge.
Latest developments of utility theory such as utility copulas (Abbas 2010) can be used to represent utility
switches in preference structure and other complex decision-making behaviors. Another area of particular
interest is artificial intelligence and machine learning tools of supervised and unsupervised learning.
These tools can be used to improve the effectiveness of exploration of large trade-spaces, and to identify
hidden patterns in multivariate data analysis - both interesting features that could be applied effectively in
systems architecting problems.
e Integrate the framework for systems architecting under ambiguous stakeholder objectives
with concurrent engineering processes for pre-phase A / phase A system design studies.
The approach developed in this thesis is concerned with high-level systems architecting, as it focused on
broad programmatic and system development decisions. With proper modifications, the approach could
be used in systems design processes such as spacecraft design, with particular reference to applications in
concurrent engineering environments. Concurrent engineering is a systems design methodology that is
widely adopted in the aerospace community worldwide (Carter and Baker 1992; Bandecchi, Melton et al.
1999). Elicitation of expert knowledge through the proposed framework can be integrated with concurrent
engineering processes for structured inclusion of stakeholder feedback in these environments.
e Development of a hybrid approach to systems architeting under ambiguous stakeholder
objectives.
The main strength of the proposed systems architecting framework is to reduce peer pressure while
identifying, characterizing and mitigating ambiguities through a structured, iterative and anonymous
expert elicitation process and its integration with conventional system architecting tools. While
anonymity is a main feature of the approach, it also implies an important limitation to address in future
developments of this method. Anonymity and indirect expert interaction prevents a more efficient
exchange of knowledge and opinions between experts that could be obtained with conventional group
decision-making process. To mitigate this limitation, a hybrid approach could be developed, by having
experts interact in "Round 0" iterations preliminary to the application of the Delphi-Based Systems
Architecting Framework. Experts can gather at intermediate stages during DB-SAF rounds to update their
positions and facilitate transfer of knowledge. While capturing this advantage of conventional group
decision-making, this hybrid approach also allows to retain the advantages of anonimity as it allows
unpressure exchange of knowledge through anonymous polls. The characterization of performance of this
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hybrid approach is an area of future work. The main limitation being foreseen is the need for availability
of experts to gather at the same time - either in person or remotely - for direct interaction stages. This
might prove being challenging (or unfeasible) for large expert groups and panels with senior experts and
high-level decision-makers. On the other hand, this capability has been demonstrated by the proposed
approach in this thesis, as the case studies benefited from inputs from senior scientists, engineers and
aerospace managers.
e Apply online software and active learning approaches to systems architecting under
- ambiguous objectives.
A sophisticated implementation of the proposed systems architecting framework in a concurrent
engineering environment can entail the development of an online software to automate the execution of
the systems architecting framework and enable real-time interactions and real-time interview data
processing with a large pool of interviewees distributed in multiple centers. The use of clickers as
developed in active learning research (Hoffman and Goodwin 2006) is an additional tool to enable real-
time application of the framework in the context of scientific workshops, engineering meetings, and
concurrent engineering environments.
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Delta V required (km/s)
Departure from Arrival at Departure to Earth Arrival at Earth Deet to As t TotalEarth Destination Destination Destination
EML1 3100 700 700 3100 0 0 7600
Mars Flyby 3714 2115 2115 3500 0 0 11444
Mars Orbit 3714 2115 2115 3500 0 0 11444
Mars Sortie 3714 2115 2115 3500 2083 4000 17527
Mars Long Stay 3714 2115 2115 3500 2083 4000 17527
Moon Flyby 3600 850 850 3150 0 0 8450
Moon Orbit 3600 850 850 3150 0 0 8450
Moon Sortie 3600 850 850 3150 2083 1871 12404
Moon Long Stay 3600 850 850 3150 2083 1871 12404
LoNEA Flyby 3400 180 147 3200 0 0 6927
LoNEA Orbit 3400 180 147 3200 0 0 6927
LoNEA Sortie 3400 180 147 3200 2083 0 9010
HiNEA Flyby 4208 1359 1125 3200 0 0 9892
HiNEA Orbit 4208 1359 1125 3200 0 0 9892
HiNEA Sortie 4208 1359 1125 3200 2083 0 11975
Phobos/Deimos 4208 1359 1125 3200 2083 0 11975
SEL2 3200 900 900 3200 0 0 8200
I - Surface + OrbitI
9.2. Case Study 2 - MSR - Supplemental Material
9.2. 1. Introduction
This appendix presents three preliminary design models that have been developed to enable architectural
tradespace exploration in the Mars Sample Return Campaign case study. These are:
- A model for preliminary sizing of Entry, Descent and Landing (EDL) systems based on first
principles;
- A parametric model for preliminary sizing of drilling payloads based on a data set obtained from
a survey on existing drilling hardware for space applications;
- A first principle model for preliminary sizing of drilling payloads.
While the first and second model have been implemented in the architecting, the third model is presented
"as is" as it was decided not to continue its further implementation due to lack of publicly available data
on drilling payload specifications. On the other hand, the first two models have been validated with mass
comparisons with existing hardware, showing appropriate accuracy for pre-phase A study applications.
9.2. Pa ra met ric Model for Preliminary Sizing of Entry, Descent and Landing Subsystems
A parametric model for preliminary sizing of EDL subsystems has been developed in the context of this
work. The peculiarity of the model is that it does not require trajectory calculations to estimate the total
integrated heating load (which is required for preliminary sizing of a heat shield). Instead, it proposes a
linear correlation between the specific kinetic energy at entry conditions of the probe and total integrated
heat load absorbed before landing. Table 40 and Table 41 show the data that has been used for
development of the model. The model requires the following inputs:
e Heat Shield Diameter D [in]
- Drag coefficient CD [-]
* Entry mass m,,,,y [kg]
e Entry velocity venty [km/s]
Drag coefficient and entry velocity can be estimated by analogy with legacy Mars missions (Figure 113
and Table 40 respectively).
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A MSL-like EDL subsystem Entry mass is conceptualized as the sum of landed mass, lander mass, mortar
mass, parachute mass, ballast mass, backshell mass and heat shield mass (heat shield mass if further
decomposed into structural mass and TPS mass). "Useful" landed mass is therefore estimated as:
Mlanded = Mentry - Mlander - Mmortar - Mchute - Mballast - Mbackshell - Mheatshield
Figure 114 shows the linear correlation that has been found between specific spacecraft kinetic energy at
entry and total integrated heating load:
Etot 1.6541ventry -1058.4](0.01)2 Jicm
Where # = 4mentry is the ballistic coefficient of the spacecraft at entry conditions in the Martian
.rD 2CD
atmosphere.
The TPS mass fraction is obtained by a parametric relationship available in the literature (Laub 2003):
TPS _MF = 0.09 1tt051575
Therefore, TPS mass is estimated as:
mTPS = TPS 
_MF -mentry
The structural mass of the heat shield is estimated with a heat shield structural mass fraction available in
the literature (Otero 2010):
mstruct =0.08 mentry
Heat shield mass is the sum of TPS mass and heat shield structure mass:
Mheatshield = Mstruct + mTPS
Backshell mass is estimated with a parametric relation available in the literature (Otero 2010):
0.4116
Mbackshell = 6.7582mentry
Parachute mass and ballast mass are obtained with mass fractions estimated from the Mars Science
Laboratory (MSL) rover:
m parachute = 0.145mentry
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mballast = 0.1 65mentry
Likewise, lander mass is obtained with a mass fraction derived from MSL:
( 775
Mlander = 71541 mentry a 0.50mentry
Figure 112 shows a surface plot of the proposed EDL model of entry mass as a function of Aeroshell
diameter and Useful Landed mass. It can be seen that the model is non-linear in both the x (aeroshell
diameter) and y (useful landed mass) axes, with a strong non linearity corresponding to higher values for
the aeroshell diameter.
This model properly represents the challenge of landing large masses on the Martian surface, and its
validity for conceptual studies has been proven by validation with past flight missions. Table 42 and
Figure 115 show the validation results against flown JPL missions, showing an accuracy <20% making
the model suitable for preliminary sizing estimates.
Table 40 Data on FDL Sy stems of Past Flight Missions (1/2)
Viking I Viking 2 MPF MER-A MER-B Phoenix MSL
Entry Mass (kg) 992 992 584 827 832 600 2800
Ballistic Coefficient (kg/MA2) 64 64 63 94 94 70 115
Heat Shield Diameter (m) 3.5 3.5 2.65 2.65 2.65 2.65 4.6
Peak Heating Rate (W/cmA2) 26 26 100 44 44 58 155
Heat Shield TPS Thickness (in) 0.54 0.54 0.75 0.62 0.62 0.55 0.9
Entry Velocity (km/s) 4.7 4.7 7.26 5.4 5.5 5.67 6
Entry Flight Path Angle (deg) -17 -17 -14.06 -11.49 -11.47 -12.5 -15.2
Entry Flight Path Angle (rad) -0.2967 -0.2967 -0.2454 -0.2005 -0.2002 -0.2182 -0.2653
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F igure 112 Surface plot of proposed ED)1 model
x-axis: Aeroshell Diameter (m)
y-axis: Useful Landed Mass (kg)
z-axis: Entry Mass (kg)
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Table 41 Data on EDL Systems of Past Flight Missions (2/2)
Viking I Viking 2 MPF MER-A IER- Phoenix 1SL
Ball.Coeff. * vA2 1413.76 1413.76 3320.5788 2741.04 2843.5 2250.423 4140
Total Integrated Heating (J/mA2) 1100 1100 3865 3687 3687 3245 6000
1100 1100 3865 3687 2482 5455
-23.5% -9.1%
Viking 1 Viking 2 MPF MER-A MER-B Phoenix MSL
Entry Mass (kg) 992 992 584 827 832 600 2800
Ballistic Coefficient (kg/mA2) 64 64 63 94 94 70 115
Heat Shield Diameter (m) 3.5 3.5 2.65 2.65 2.65 2.65 4.6
Heat Shield Reference Surface (m2) 9.62 9.62 5.52 5.52 5.52 5.52 16.62
Cd 1.61 1.61 1.68 1.60 1.60 1.55 1.47
Cd(average) 1.59 1.59 1.59 1.59 1.59 1.59 1.59
Cd (est.)
- - -- -- - ------ 1.59
Viking 1 Viking 2 MPF MER-A MER-B Phoenix MSL
- Cd
- - -Cd (avg)
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Table 42 Model Validation )ata
specific kinietic energy at entry
.0 775.0 15.7
Viking 221.5 244.0 -9.2%
MPF 107.9 92.0 17.3%
MER-A 169.7 173.0 -1.9%
MER-B 170.3 173.0 -1.6%
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9.2.3. Paramnetric Mlodel for Preliminary Sizing of Drilling Payloads
Figure 116, Figure 117 and Figure 118 show three proposed linear relationships for preliminary sizing of
drilling payloads. The relationships are based on the dataset of existing drilling payloads shown in Table
43. The mass estimating relationships set a correlation between total drilling payload mass and maximum
drilling depth. The Imm-10m range has been divided in three sub-ranges to improve modeling accuracy.
Validation of the model against available data points shows accuracy within 20%, rendering the model
suitable for preliminary sizing studies. Inclusion of additional data points is encouraged to verify the
applicability of the model to a broader set of studies.
Table 43 Drilling payload data used in parametric model development
Depth of penetration (mm) Mass (kg) Model Mass (kg) Error (%)
MER RAT 10 0.70 0.70 0%
Mini-Corer 25 5.00 5.00 0%
CAT 100 4.00 3.65 -9%
Philae SD2 drill 230 4.80 5.34 11%
Subsurface Sampler 500 9.00 8.85 -2%
HB 1-m drill / SATM 1200 9.00 7.58 -16%
Apollo drills 3000 13.40 15.14 13%
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9.2.4. First Principle Mlodel for Preliminary Sizing of Drilling Payloads
This model performs a preliminary sizing of a drilling payload for planetary sampling based on
fundamental physics and first principles. All units of measure are S.I. unless otherwise noted.
9.2.4./. AIssuptions
9.2.4.2. Drilling Operations
T*= cumulative drilling time (total time available for drilling)
[(ko,do) ... (kN,dN)] Sample quantity/depth distribution (k0 samples to be collected at depth do, etc.
Assume the RPM of the drilling bit (hence the RPM of the motor) is constant over the entire mission.
M= coefficient of sliding friction between the drilling bit and the rock surface. It is a function of both the
drilling bit and rock surface material properties and drilling bit design. For preliminary design perform a
worst-case assumption on this parameter (if desired, an sensitivity analysis can be performed)
9.2.4.3. Electric Moior
G= RPM(motor) = gear ratio between motor and drilling bit RPMs
RPM(drilling bit)
PBOL(consumed by drilling bit)
PBOL (motor)
9.2.4.4. Drilling Bit Design
The model assumes a full-faced drilling bit of known design. If desired, the model can be easily adapted
to suit a core drill bit and trade different drill bit designs.
D = drilling bit diameter
6= depth of cut per drilling bit revolution (constant over time, i.e. no degradation is assumed on this
parameter)
9.2.4.5. Rock Properties
SE = Specific Energy. In general, specific energy is a function of strength and abrasiveness of the
formation to be drilled, of the drill bit design and aggressiveness of the drilling method. If drill bit is
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constant, SE can be approximated as a function of material properties only. If material is constant, SE can
be approximated as a function of drill bit design only.
p= rock density
UCS = rock ultimate compressive strength
9.2.4.6. Deg-radation of Rate of Penetratioti (ROP)
The Rate of Penetration decreases for a constant Weight on Bit (WOB), as the bit head flattens during
drilling. This model assumes an exponential degradation of ROP as:
ROP = ROP_1e~ii-1
Where ROP is the Rate of Penetration at the i-th drilling operation, and d; is the depth drilled in the i-th
drilling operation. p is the degradation constant for the drilling bit, which can be estimated by least-
square fitting of empirical data on the drilling bit design of interest.
9.2.4. 7. MIodeI
The number of total required revolutions for the drilling bit for the mission equals:
N
> kid;
No# of required revolutions = 6
The required RPM for the drilling bit is then:
No# of required revolutions
RPM(drilling bit) = T *
The RPM of the motor is obtained as:
RPM(motor) = G -RPM(drilling bit)




'ko-1 N kj-1 6 (k0-1)d0+ dl
Z = d + (eido + d; k e
(this formula is obtained by iterating the exponential degradation model for ROP, calculating the time
required for every single drilling operation by its associated ROP, and nesting the corresponding
equations)
The Hole Area is calculated as a function of the drilling bit diameter (assuming a full faced drilling bit):
A = D 2
4
The power consumed by the drilling bit at BOL is:
PBOL (consumed by drilling bit) = SE -ROPBOL -A
We can calculate the required Weight on Bit at BOL from the following equation (Zackny):
PBOL (consumed by drilling bit) = (UCS -A -5+ p -WOB -R) - RPM(drilling bit))
- 2 DWhere R =- R = - for a full-faced drilling bit.
3 3
The required motor power at BOL is estimated as:
PBOL (motor) = PBOL(consumed by drilling bit)
The change in temperature at BOL on the drilling bit core is estimated as:
ATcoreOL- fBOL(consumed by drilling bit)
Crock Prock A -ROPBOL
To avoid melting of the drilling bit core, a constraint must be satisfied such that:
QcoreBOL = mcorec core ATcoreBOL < heat of melting fusion of drilling bit
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9.3. (ase Study 3 - \ alidation - Supplemeiital Material
Email to Mailing List for Experts Recruitment
Subject: Systems Architecting Role Play Experiment - FREE Lunch/Dinner and FREE $10 Amazon Gift
Card to Participants
Dear Fellow Grad Students,
I would like to invite you to join me in a systems architecting "role play" experiment for my Ph.D. thesis.
The experiment will last between 2 to 3 hours, and will be held between February 1-14 in the Aero/Astro
Department. I will provide free lunch/dinner, refreshments and a free $10 Amazon Gift Card to all study
participants.
This study is part of my thesis in Systems Architecting under Stakeholders Objective Ambiguity. You
will be part of a steering committee to "make or break" the business case of a a new venture in aerospace
planning to deliver a commercial point-to-point passenger transportation service.
You will either have a background in Engineering/Technology, Business, Policy or a combination of the
three. No prior knowledge on suborbital flight systems required. SM and PhD candidates from
Aero/Astro, ESD, Sloan, SDM and TPP are welcome to join.
Should you wish to participate, please email me at golkar@mit.edu and fill the following Doodle:
http://www.doodle.com/qa3apmq5yk3eerb7 with your availability to participate on the different date
options provided. In your email, please specify your background (indication of your course of study will
do) along with your preference priorities on being involved in the Engineering/Technology, Business and
Policy panels. I will follow up with more details and a final date/time decision once the Doodle fills up.
More Details on the Business Case
DISCLAIMER: The Facts in this business case are fictional and for educational purposes only.
The names of the parties, their businesses, and their trademarks and registrations are not
intended, and should not be understood, to refer to or reference any individual living or dead or
any institution, extant or defunct. Any resemblance to any real person, organization, product or
situation is purely coincidental.
Suborbital Spacelines LLC is a new joint venture effort in the aerospace industry to deliver a commercial
point-to-point passenger transportation service. Suborbital has conceived and designed a revolutionary
concept for a spaceplane able to carry 100 passengers from London to New York in less than one hour.
Following several internal systems architecting studies and commissioning external consulting companies
to conduct market surveys and market sizing estimates, Suborbital managers decided to form a steering
committee to analyze the Company's business case and take a final decision to authorize the transition
from detailed design to manufacturing spaceplanes and operating them. The steering committee includes
three panels for Business, Technology and Policy matters. Each panel is staffed by junior and senior
experts, in addition to panel leads. Suborbital's Chief Executive Officer will chair the panel and will hold
the final decision on Suborbital's transition to manufacturing and operations.
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